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ABSTRACT

The report describes the Unified Delinquency Intervention Services (UDIS) program, a demonstration project to provide services for the chronic inner-city delinquent. Part I provides introductory information on the program and the chronic delinquent, design of the study (including staff, general design characteristics, archival data and interview data collection, the data files, and analytic issues), and the origins of UDIS (the judicial and institutional content, the institutional context, and program planning and start-up). Explained in Part II are various components of the program (such as staff organization and history, role of the UDIS advisory board, and the UDIS tracking system), intermediate outcomes of program operations, intermediate objectives of program operations (including individualized programing, the least drastic alternative principle, and short-term programing,, and appraisals of the process. A third and final section discusses program results in terms of recidivism, suppression of delinquent activity, and relative costs of UDIS and traditional institutionalization. Among conclusions is that there are three main lines of objection to providing intervention for delinquents before age 16 or a long arrest record: costs, the problem of false-positives, and generalized opposition to intervention. Appendixes include sample data collection instruments, a list of references, and sample outputs of the Northwestern Tracking System. (SBH)

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UDIS: Deinstitutionalizing the Chronic Juvenile Offender

Charles A. Murray
Doug Thomson
Cindy B. Israel

Prepared for the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, January 1978

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Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. xi

PART I. THE CONTEXT

1. AN INTRODUCTION TO UDIS AND THE CHRONIC DELINQUENT. 1
The Program 1
The Chronic Delinquent. 2

2. DESIGN OF THE STUDY 7
Staff 7
General Design Characteristics. 8
Archival Data Collection. 9
Data Sources 9
Appraisal of the Archival Data 12
Interview Data Collection 14
The Data Files. 17
Sample Selection 18
Rating Procedures. 19
Data Preparation 20
Analytic Issues 21
Reliance on the Records of Official Delinquency. 21
Treatment of Selection Bias in the Comparison Groups. 23
Statistical Considerations 24

3. THE ORIGINS OF UDIS 29
The Judicial and Institutional Context. 29
The Political Context 32
Planning and Start-up 36
Summary 39

PART II. THE PROGRAM

INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 43

4. PROGRAM INPUTS. 45
The Mechanics of the Program. 45

Staff Organization and History. 47
The Relationship with the Juvenile Court. . . . 48
The Role of the UDIS Advisory Board 49
The UDIS Tracking System. 50

5. IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES OF PROGRAM OPERATIONS. . . . 55
UDIS Referrals and the Committable Delinquent. 55
Prior Offense Record 55
Personal Background Characteristics. . . . 58
A Summary Comparison of the UDIS and DOC Samples. 62
The 35 Percent Objective 64
The Development of Service Resources. 65
Advocacy 67
Counseling Services. 68
Educational/Vocational Training. 69
Group Homes/Foster Care. 72
Rural Programs 73
Intensive Care 75
Basic Administrative Characteristics. 76

6. PROGRAM OPERATIONS: INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES. . 81
Individualized Programming. 81
The Assessments. 82
The Case Manager as a Source of Individualized Programming 83
The Least Drastic Alternative Principle 85
Short-Term Programming. 88
Reasons for Short-Term Egress. 89
Reasons for Long-Term Egress 91
Summary 93

7. APPRAISALS OF THE PROCESS 95
The Kids. 95
Perceptions of the Alternative to UDIS . . 96
Short-Term Programming 96
Responses to the Service Alternatives. . . 97
UDIS Compared to DOC 100
Comparisons Among People: The Case Manager, the Probation Officer, and the "Best Program Worker". 102
Who Belongs in UDIS? In DOC?. 104
The Role of Intervention 105
The UDIS Case Managers. 107
The Service Vendors 110
The Probation Officers. 113
How has UDIS Differed from Your Early Expections of it?. 115
How Would You Change UDIS? 116

PART III. THE RESULTS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 121

8. RECIDIVISM: UDIS COMPARED TO DOC 125
Technical Approach. 125
The Comparison Groups. 126
The Definition of "Contact" with the Criminal Justice System. 127
The Results 129
Measure 1: Any Relapse (Percentage of Delinquents who Reenter the Criminal Justice System Following Release 129
Measure 2: Subsequent Institutionalization (The Proportion of Delinquents who are Committed or Returned to DOC after Entry into the Program). 131
Measure 3: Before and After Gross Level of Activity (Number of Events per Month per Hundred Delinquents. 136
Measure 4: Seriousness of the Offense (An Index of Social Costs Inflicted by the Offense). 140
Summary 146

9. RECIDIVISM AND THE UDIS APPROACH. 149
Recidivism and Short-Term Programming 149
Recidivism and the Least Drastic Alternative Principle 152

10. THE MAIN EFFECT: SUPPRESSION OF DELINQUENT ACTIVITY. 161
The Role of the Regression Artifact 164
The Permanence of the Reduction 165
The Effects of Milder Interventions 166
Referral to Court. 166
Detention. 167
Timing of the Intervention: Age. 169
Timing of the Intervention: Offense History. . 170
Consistency of the Suppression Effect with other Research 173

11. THE RELATIVE COSTS OF UDIS AND DOC. 177
Costs in Tax Dollars. 177
Direct Costs 178
Deferred Costs 181
External Dollar Costs. 183
The Nonmonetary Costs 187
Summary 189

12. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 190
The Suppression Effect. 190
Recapitulation of the Findings 190
Consistency of the Findings with other Research 192
Explaining the Suppression Effect. 193
"You Can't Do That Any More" 197
UDIS Versus Institutionalization. 203
Recidivism 203
Costs. 204
The UDIS Operation. 207
Overview 207
Protecting the Public. 208
Placement Strategies 211
Length of Program. 214
Bureaucratic Location. 215
Correctional Intervention and the Chronic Delinquent. 217
Costs. 218
The False-Positives Problem. 218
General Opposition to Intervention 219

APPENDIX A: THE DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS
APPENDIX B: REFERENCES
APPENDIX C: SAMPLE OUTPUTS OF THE NORTHWESTERN TRACKING SYSTEM

List of Tables and Figures

TABLES

2.1 Profile of the Recidivism Samples. 18
5.1 General Characteristics of the Prior Offense Record. 56
5.2 Number of Arrests Per 100 Subjects for Selected Crimes, Prior to Intervention. 57
5.3 Resident Parents 59
5.4 Distribution of Parental Care Index Scores. 60
5.5 Parental Employment. 61
5.6 School Performance 61
5.7 Drug Use 62
5.8 Distribution of Service Days, by Type of Service 66
5.9 UDIS Service Contracts as of July 1976 . . . 67
6.1 Frequency Distribution of Number of Placements. 84
6.2 The Least Drastic Alternative and First Placement 86
6.3 Distribution of Months in UDIS 89
7.1 Attitudes of UDIS Participants Toward the Placements. 98
7.2 Comparisons of the Case Manager with the Probation Officer and the "Best Program Worker" 103
8.1 Month-by-month Sample Sizes for the Recidivism Analyses 127
8.2 Renewed Contact with the Criminal Justice System During First Year After Release 130
8.3 Institutionalization Following First Exit from UDIS or DOC 132
8.4 Institutionalization Following First Release from DOC and First Entry into UDIS 133
8.5 Proportionate Reductions Relative to Pre-Intervention Activity 138

8.6 Analysis of Variance of Total Police Contacts: The Six Month Followup Sample 139
8.7 Proportion of Offenses Beyond the Seriousness Threshold Over Time . . . 141
8.8 Log-Linear Analysis of the Proportion of Nontrivial Offenses. 142
8.9 Mean Seriousness Scores Over Time. 143
8.10 Aggregate Seriousness Scores Per Person-Year Before, During, and After Intervention. 145
8.11 Analysis of Variance of Aggregate Seriousness Scores: the Six Month Followup Sample 146
8.12 Summary of the Recidivism Measures 147
9.1 A Comparison of Recidivism Results Within UDIS: Short-term Versus Long-term Referrals 151
9.2 Annual Rate of Police Contacts by Level of First Placement. 154
9.3 Mean Seriousness Score for Nontrivial Offenses by Level of First Placement 155
9.4 Proportion of Offenses Beyond the Seriousness Threshold by Level of First Placement. 155
9.5 Aggregate Seriousness Score per Person-year by Level of First Placement. . . 156
9.6 Case Managers' Assessments of the Placements for the Case History Sample. 158
10.1 The Pre-post Comparison of Police Contacts, Ignoring the Semester Immediately Prior to Intervention 165
11.1 Basis for the Calculation of Deferred Costs 182
11.2 The Basis of the Cost Estimates for Apprehended Offenses. 184
11.3 Dispositions of Offenses Committed During the Program. 185
11.4 Costs of a Typical Intervention Cycle. . . 186
11.5 Types of Offenses Committed During the Program 188

FIGURES

3.1	Number of Juveniles Committed to DOC by Cook County Courts from 1966 through 1976.	31
III.1	An Overview of the Arrest Records of UDIS, DOC, and the Pre-UDIS Baseline.	122
8.1	"Before" and "After" Comparison of Level of Contact with the Criminal Justice System.	137
10.1	Monthly Police Contacts for the Combined Sample Before and After Correctional Intervention.	163
10.2	First Referral to Court and Subsequent Police Contacts	167
10.3	First Detention and Subsequent Police Contacts.	168
10.4	Before and After Rates of Police Contact for Three Age Groups.	170
10.5	Before and After Rates of Police Contact for Groups Aggregated by Number of Preintervention Contacts.	171

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On a topic as controversial and complex as the one with which this study deals, it is inevitable that many of the people whom we have thanked will object to some of the conclusions we have reached. So perhaps it is particularly important in this instance to add that, despite all the help, the interpretations of the data and any errors that remain are ours alone.

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Part I. THE CONTEXT

1. An Introduction to UDIS and the Chronic Delinquent

The subject of this study is the chronic inner-city delinquent. The setting is Chicago, where the state of Illinois undertook a major innovative experiment with an alternative to incarceration. This report examines what happened.

THE PROGRAM

The program was the Unified Delinquency Intervention Services (UDIS) in Cook County, Illinois. Originally funded by the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, UDIS began operations in October 1974 as a demonstration project designed to perform two primary functions.

First, UDIS was to take as its client the juvenile who had gotten into trouble with the law often enough, or for offenses so severe, that he would otherwise have been consigned to one of Illinois' seven correctional institutions for youth. UDIS was to embody the proposition that deinstitutionalization could be extended to the chronic, serious delinquent; that it need not be limited to first-time offenders, to misdemeanants, or to status offenders. UDIS was to be an alternative to incarceration.

The second function of UDIS was to unify resources, as its name implied. In Chicago as in other large areas, the human skills and physical facilities for dealing with youth have been scattered among private agencies, public agencies, store-front operations, church-sponsored groups, school-related institutions, and other decentralized, uncoordinated groups. UDIS was to be a central point at which youth and resource could be brought together.

UDIS brought to these tasks an internally consistent set of principles about juvenile corrections, all of which were argued to represent a less repressive, more supportive approach to correctional intervention than does institutionalization.

"The least drastic alternative principle" was to be the centerpiece of the UDIS approach: Given a choice, UDIS would put the youth in the environment least unlike his normal one. Keeping the youth at home was less drastic than taking him away from home; providing services in the community was less drastic than providing him with services located elsewhere; and letting the youth retain freedom of movement was less drastic than instituting compulsory controls.

Next, the UDIS approach was to get the youth out of the juvenile justice system fast--within six months if possible. Long-term care was not to be UDIS's style. The urgings of service providers that "just a few more weeks" in a program would produce the desired effects were to be resisted.

The third key principle of the UDIS approach was to be individualized programming. Detailed work-ups on each case were to be conducted, going beyond the social and family investigations that the courts or the welfare agencies had conducted. They were also to come at the situation from a fresh perspective: to ascertain the strengths in the youth and the reinforcing elements in his environment, not to catalog deficiencies. Once this was done, the UDIS participant could get the programming he or she required. Progress would be monitored closely by a Case Manager with a relatively small caseload, and it would be possible to make changes quickly when indicated.

UDIS's ultimate objectives were to reduce delinquency among its youth, with all that implies about other positive changes in the youth's outlook and behavior, and to reduce commitments to the Juvenile Division of the Department of Corrections (usually called simply "DOC") by 35 percent.

THE CHRONIC DELINQUENT

It was an ambitious task. In seeking out the committable delinquent who otherwise would go to an institution, and then *not* confining him in an institution, UDIS was putting itself at the center of what is arguably one of the most serious aspects of the crime problem.

The exact percentages vary, but the ring of the statistics is familiar. Juveniles now commit roughly half of all serious offenses in the United States. The number of juvenile offenses has tripled in the last 15 years. The numbers for the serious person-to-person offenses--strong-arm robbery, armed robbery, assault, battery, rape, and homicide have all risen alarmingly.

Accompanying the statistics are the horror stories--the 16-year old who has committed a dozen armed robberies and is put on probation, or the 14-year old murderer who says he does it because he knows his juvenile record will be sealed on his seventeenth birthday, or the juvenile gang that terrorizes a neighborhood. The violent delinquent is good press.

Some of this can be discounted. The numbers are made less menacing by introducing other variables such as changes in reporting procedures, changes in the size of the age cohort, or trends in urban migration patterns. Perspective helps too. The media coverage plays up the sensational, isolated case. But after these elements have been factored out of the equation, there remains a stubborn and very serious problem, and it appears to be concentrated in the person of the big-city chronic delinquent. The trends in his behavior have been ominous.*

The first point to be made about the chronic delinquent is the disproportionate share of the crime problem he apparently accounts for. In the study with the best data on this issue, the Philadelphia cohort study, 6.3 percent of the boys in the cohort committed 51.9 percent of the delinquent offenses (Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972, p. 88). If these figures hold true elsewhere, it is misleading to think of the cities as being victimized by some large percentage of their youth gone wrong. Rather, a relatively small number of them are extremely active.

This, however, leads to a second, troubling point: the activity appears to have become intense in recent years. The baseline of the Philadelphia cohort study, which exhaustively collected the records of official delinquency for roughly 10,000 boys born in 1945, provides a

---

* The pronoun will be "he" throughout. Despite rapid increases in serious offenses among juvenile females, their proportionate contribution to the problem is small. Also, the analyses in the report deal exclusively with males.

profile of big-city delinquency in the early 1960s. It reveals that only 53 boys out of 9,945 committed as many as 15 offenses--one-half of one percent of the boys in the cohort. In the study presented in the following pages, 93 boys of the 201 *in the sample* who had reached their eighteenth birthday had accumulated 15 or more offenses--and that sample encompasses less than 20 percent of the youth who could be expected to have comparable levels of offenses in Cook County. We have no way of knowing what percentage of the total population of Chicago youth had accumulated 15 offenses by their eighteenth birthday, but it is clear that we were sampling from a population with a much larger pool of high-frequency offenders than existed in Philadelphia in the early 1960s. Among the Philadelphia sample, 654 boys were sent to institutions. Even if those were the 654 with the highest number of offenses, the mean could have been only 9.3, little more than half of the 14.2 offenses that was the mean for the committable Chicago delinquent in 1974-1976.* The meaning of "chronic" has changed.

The third point to be made is that the seriousness of the crime has increased along with the intensity. The chronic 1960 Philadelphia delinquent was arrested for index offenses--the major felonies--only 42.5 percent of the time (Wolfgang, Figlio, Sellin, Table 6.14, p. 100-101). The 1970s Chicago chronic delinquent was being arrested for an index offense 66.7 percent of the time, and for non-status offenses more than 90 percent of the time. The prank, the underage drinking, the traffic ticket and the curfew violation were not the offenses that dominated the records of the delinquents we studied. "Chronic delinquent" as used in this report is shorthand for "delinquents who chronically commit offenses that would be crimes if committed by an adult."

In short, the popular portrait of the delinquency problem may not be far off the mark when we focus on the youngster who gets on the police records and keeps coming back. He is a major part of the crime problem. Reducing his delinquent activity is no longer thought to be just a matter of straightening out a mixed-up kid--though that certainly remains part of it. It is also increasingly perceived as a problem of protecting the people that he victimizes.

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* The calculation is based on data presented in Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972, Table 6.1 (p. 90), Table 10.3 (p. 163), the list of dispositions on page 219, and the footnote on page 159. Given the extreme assumption used in the calculation (that the 654 with the highest number of offenses were the ones institutionalized), the actual difference between the committable delinquent in Chicago in 1974-1976 and Philadelphia in 1960-1963 is undoubtedly even greater than we have indicated.

It is not surprising then that most orderings of priorities for reducing crime have put efforts to deal with the chronic delinquent in our cities extremely high on the list. But a variety of research barriers have typically obstructed efforts to learn lessons from them. Sometimes the programs have been too scattered; sometimes too limited in scope. Or often the test environment has been too soft--the programs have dealt with suburbia, not the inner-city; with status offenders, not the truly inveterate delinquent; or has been an alternative to probation, not incarceration. UDIS with its Chicago setting, a coherent and innovative approach, its varied services, and a mandate to deal with the committable delinquent, provided a unique prototype to examine.

2. Design of the Study

The Unified Delinquency Intervention Services (UDIS) program began in October 1974. The evaluation of the program was conducted from April 1976 to September 1977, by the Washington office of the American Institutes for Research (AIR) in association with W.V. Rouse and Company, a division of Barton-Aschman Associates of Evanston, Illinois.

STAFF

Dr. Charles A. Murray of AIR served as Project Director and Principal Investigator. Mr. Doug Thomson of W. V. Rouse and Ms. Cindy B. Israel of AIR acted as Assistant Project Directors. These three had primary responsibility for the conduct of the evaluation and the preparation of the final report.

A large supporting group participated at points throughout the project. Ms. Sydney Buster of W.V. Rouse conducted many of the UDIS and vendor interviews and took the lead in much of the archival data collection. Additional support during the data collection phase was provided by Ms. Blair Bourque, Ms. Ingrid Heinsohn, and Ms. Shirley Hines of AIR, and students affiliated with the Northwestern University Center for Urban Affairs. Ms. Kathe Serikaku and Ms. Susan Adams of Northwestern University jointly supervised the interviews with the UDIS clients.

Dr. Wesley Snyder and Dr. Paul Fingerman of AIR participated in the original design of the evaluation. Dr. Fingerman also provided support in the conduct of the quantitative data analysis. Ms. Virginia Sheard prepared the graphics. Ms. Joan M. Flood, D. Rigney Hill, Melissa Holland, Marilyn Lindon, and Mr. Robert Fordham assisted the previously mentioned staff in the preparation of the final report.

GENERAL DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS

For questions relating to the operation of UDIS as a specific program in a specific context, a typical case history approach was employed. Extensive interviews were conducted with the staff of UDIS and members of the agencies with which it dealt; reports and memoranda, case files, and operating procedures were collected and reviewed. These were subjected to a qualitative review. Sometimes we went as far as to assign frequencies to responses--"17 of the 35 vendors reported that..."--but no analytic statistics were used.

For questions relating to the impact of the program, we sought as rigorous a design as the situation would permit. The basic design was

Experimental Group: $O_1 (X_U O_2) O_3$

Comparison Group 1: $O_4 (X_{D1} O_5) O_6$

Comparison Group 2: $O_7 (X_{D2} O_8) O_9$

where the "O's" represent observation periods, X_U represents the UDIS intervention, X_{D1} represents the DOC (Department of Corrections) intervention *prior to* the advent of UDIS, and X_{D2} represents the DOC intervention during the same time period that UDIS was observed. The bracketed (XO) combinations denote that during-program observations of the dependent variables were included.

The purpose of observing a sample of youth who went to DOC before the establishment of UDIS was to protect against the possibility of false-positive results for UDIS. We anticipated that judges would send the borderline cases to UDIS and continue to send the hard-core, most intractable delinquents to DOC. Results favorable to UDIS could be interpreted as an artifact of selection. In that event, we planned to try to identify the set of pre-UDIS commitments who were borderline--analogues to the youth who were sent to UDIS when that opportunity opened up--and use them as an additional comparison group. As it turned out, the procedure was superfluous on two counts. The data did not convince us that judges effectively discriminated between borderline and hard-core cases, and UDIS did *not* excel the record of DOC on the recidivism measures. The design that was actually operationalized for the analysis of variance comparisons was the more straightforward one,

Experimental Group: $O_1 (X_U O_2) O_3$

Comparison Group 2: $O_4 (X_{D2} O_5) O_6$

with the pre-UDIS DOC data presented separately as a supplementary perspective on the problem.

ARCHIVAL DATA COLLECTION

Despite the volume of interviewing that was conducted for the evaluation, archival data were the key. Assembling them consumed most of the data collection resources.

Archival data were collected from three major sources: UDIS, the Illinois Department of Corrections, and the Chicago Police Department. Supplemental information was received from the Juvenile Court and the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. Copies of the recording forms are shown in Appendix A.

Data Sources

UDIS. Information was obtained that described both UDIS operations and the individual clients. We reviewed samples of internal communications (intra-office memoranda and minutes of staff meetings), minutes of the Juvenile Justice Policy Board meetings, budgetary materials, and statistical data from the Tracking System operated by the Northwestern University Center for Urban Affairs. For each youth in our sample, we examined all of the materials contained in the case files. These included:

- UDIS Facesheet: background information on living arrangements, family, school, employment, and court history.
- Probation Officer's Referral Form: background information on the youth.
- UDIS Assessment: psychosocial analysis of the youth's situation and a recommended treatment plan, performed by social workers and psychologists under contract to the UDIS program.
- Social Investigation: descriptive assessment prepared by the Probation Officer of the youth's background, family life, school situation, peer

associations, psychological problems, and police contacts. Reports were based on discussions with the youth, his family, school authorities, and any agencies involved in the case.

- Summary Progress Reports: periodic updates of the Social Investigation.
- UDIS Performance Contract: document completed by the Case Manager, the youth, and his parents at the time of program entrance. It stipulates the performance goals to be fulfilled by the youth and UDIS during the program.
- Youth Evaluation Sheet: monthly reports discussing the youth's progress in each program. The reports are completed by the servicing agency.
- Unusual Incident Report: description of any "unusual incident" (police contact, disruptive behavior, runaway) that occurs while the youth is in a placement.

We found the first four of the above documents particularly useful in completing the instruments. Supplemental materials were sometimes included in the files. School records, clinical evaluations, court reports, and educational and psychiatric test results proved helpful when available.

The second task was to reconstruct the placement histories for the sample youth. Two sources were used: the computerized data base maintained by the Northwestern University Center for Urban Affairs and the fiscal records kept by the business manager of UDIS. Both sources provided specific dates of entrance into and exit from UDIS and each individual placement.

The last task was to obtain information on the costs of providing services to each youth. These data were collected from the invoices submitted to UDIS by each service agency, and from overall budget figures compiled by the DOC financial office.

DOC. Our data collection efforts at the Department of Corrections paralleled those at UDIS: data were sought on DOC operations and on individual cases.

Most of the archival data were collected at the Juvenile Division headquarters in St. Charles, Illinois. They included DOC institutional program descriptions, policy statements, summary statistics on juvenile commitments, authorized and unauthorized absences, and financial data. Weekly population summaries were obtained for the period 1 January 1973 through 31 December 1976.

Information on individuals was drawn from two main sources at the Juvenile Division's main record office: summary record cards and case files. The summary cards provided background information (race, sex, age, county), identification numbers (which allowed us to access the numerically coded files), and the institutional movement histories for the youth. The case files contained several documents which provided more specific data on each youth:

- DOC Facesheet: background information on the youth's living arrangements, family, school, police contacts, and court appearances.
- Social Investigation: descriptive assessment prepared by the Cook County probation department of the youth's home and school situation, peer associations, psychological problems, and delinquent activities.
- Social History: descriptive assessment of the youth's background prepared by the Department of Corrections case workers.
- Psychological or Psychiatric Evaluation: psychological workup, diagnosis and recommendations prepared by the DOC staff psychiatrist or psychologist.
- Health Evaluation: results of medical and dental examinations.
- Test Scores: results of an electroencephalogram, IQ, and Stanford Achievement tests.
- Progress Reports: assessments of the youth's progress during commitment prepared by the correctional staff.

Additional materials were found in several of the files. These included court clinicals, school records, and reports from social service agencies.

The adult files of DOC were also reviewed to document commitments to the Adult Division for our sample youth.

Chicago Police Department. The records of the juvenile and adult divisions of the Chicago Police Department served as the source for police contact data.

The juvenile records were comprised of juvenile record summary cards and numbered files containing arrest and community adjustment reports. The juvenile record summary cards listed the youth's name, birthdate, and address; the Youth Division Identification Number; and the date, type, and disposition for each offense for which the youth was apprehended. The arrest and community adjustment reports found in the files provided a narrative of each offense, including details about victims, monetary value of property stolen or destroyed, premises entered, and people participating in the incident.

We also obtained access to individual arrest reports for all sample youth who were apprehended and treated as adults by the Chicago Police Department. The adult arrest reports were similar to those filed by the juvenile division, providing the youth's name, birthdate, address, and a description of the offense.

Appraisal of the Archival Data

As a general statement, the archival data for the project were plentiful, accessible, and well maintained, but the three agencies did vary in their record-keeping policies and procedures. DOC and the Chicago Police Department had central record agencies which routinely maintain massive files. Filing procedures were enforced, recording formats were consistent, and staff were specifically assigned to the job of making sure the information was intact and available. The UDIS approach was less systematic. Records were sometimes incomplete, files varied widely in the nature and detail of their contents, and recording procedures were less uniform than in the other two agencies.

Several factors may contribute to the informality of UDIS's record keeping. First, unlike DOC and the Chicago Police Department, UDIS is a relatively small operation. It does not have a distinct records department, and it does not have to respond to the information needs of other agencies. Second, several of the case management

personnel were openly disinclined to spend time filling out forms: they placed more value on what they knew in their heads about the clients than the information they put down on paper. Third, UDIS administrators produced many forms, and many of them asked for the same information. As a result, forms were left uncompleted.

The defects in record keeping at UDIS did create problems during data collection. Reliable background information on individual clients was spotty. While some of the files offered voluminous and up-to-date information about family background, school activities and delinquent behavior, others provided only cursory background description.

The major problem we encountered was in trying to reconstruct the placement histories for youth in the sample. Our original intention had been to use the Northwestern University Center for Urban Affairs computerized data base. But a preliminary comparison of the Northwestern Data with the program data kept by UDIS (the "Fiscal Cards") revealed numerous and major discrepancies. Moreover, neither source had more face validity than the other. Each discrepancy had to be checked through the files, log books, and, if necessary, the Case Manager. For all but five of the cases, we eventually reached a point of confidence that the histories of program movement were accurate.

One problem was common to both the DOC and UDIS data sources: the limited analytic utility of the psychosocial histories (social investigations, social histories, UDIS assessments, psychiatric or psychological evaluations). We were dependent upon the perceptions and subjective judgments of court officers, Department of Corrections personnel, UDIS Case Managers and assessors in developing a portrait of each youth. Their reports were useful in providing basic objective information, but we remained cautious about using descriptions of parent-child relationships, parental supervision, family stability, and emotional fitness. It was not unusual to find conflicting information about the youth's family life or radically differing assessments of his emotional health. We also exercised caution in using potentially outdated information. Some documents were accurate only for short periods of time after they were prepared because of the frequent and important changes in the lives of many of the youngsters. We extracted information from the documents filed closest to program entrance. When recent sources were unavailable, we used the information least subject to change over time from the older documents.

Our last problem arose during the collection of police contact data. We had hoped to obtain a description of each apprehended offense. We were able to do this for all youth under seventeen years of age: a narrative of each station adjusted and court referred offense was available. However, it was not possible to obtain descriptions of community adjustments for any youth who had turned seventeen before 31 December 1976. Their juvenile records had been "purged" at the time of their seventeenth birthdays. Juvenile record summary cards and arrest reports were intact, but the station adjustment reports were discarded. This accounts for the reduced number of offenses for which "seriousness scores" could be prepared in the recidivism analysis.

INTERVIEW DATA COLLECTION

Interviews were conducted with seven groups of respondents: UDIS Case Managers and administrative staff, service providers on contract to the UDIS program, Cook County Probation Officers, Cook County Juvenile Court justices and administrative staff, agency officials, those responsible for the design and implementation of the UDIS program, and the youth themselves who were participants in UDIS. The interview sample was as follows:

UDIS Case Managers	13
UDIS Administrative Staff	8
Service Providers	35
Probation Officers	22
Juvenile Court Personnel	7
UDIS Referrals	47
Agency Officials, Other*	9

Copies of the instruments used in the data collection can be found in Appendix A. The topics for each category of respondent are described below.

Case Managers. All UDIS Case Managers were interviewed on the following topics: professional background, general approach to the job, assessment of the juvenile court

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* Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, Department of Corrections, Chicago Police Department, Department of Children and Family Services, and Northwestern University Center for Urban Affairs.

judges' responses to and utilization of UDIS, and assessment of the quality and variety of vendor services.

On each of these topics, we sought both the respondents' perceptions and the specific incidents which shaped those perceptions. Several of the Case Managers provided additional information relating to appropriate and inappropriate referrals, the quality of assessments, and egress and termination decisions.

The Case Managers were also asked to reconstruct case histories of individuals in the random sample. In all, 110 case histories were obtained. Topics covered included the following:

- Child's background.
- Program placements.
- Reasons for initial placements and program changes.
- Assessment of program placements.
- Observable positive or negative changes in the youth regarding personality, school or job, police and court contact, and relationship with family.
- Role assumed by the Case Manager.
- Role of the family with UDIS.
- Role of the Probation Officer with UDIS.
- Assessment of UDIS's success or failure with the youth, and
- Activities of the youth following UDIS exit.

UDIS Administrative Staff. Interviews were conducted with the UDIS Project Director, the business manager, the program coordinator, the three case management supervisors, the head of Resource Development, and the Administrative Assistant. The content of each interview was determined by the specific responsibilities of the respondent. For example, the case management supervisors were asked to comment on the activities of the Case Managers and the nature of the vendor services, while the Project Director discussed general issues related to the program's policies and procedures since its inception.

Service Providers. Vendors were asked to provide specific information on the structure and operation of the programs. Topics addressed included:

- Qualifications of the staff,
- Organizational structure,
- Client load and capacity,
- Program components and physical facilities,
- Dropouts or absences from program, and
- Cost of services and funding sources.

The service providers were then asked to describe their perceptions of and interactions with the UDIS program. The critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954) was used to elicit examples of inappropriate and refused referrals, interactions with UDIS which positively or negatively affected the progress of the client, and the vendor's role in egress and termination decisions.

Several of the vendors were also asked to discuss individual cases. These interviews emphasized the kinds of services provided to the client as well as the nature of the youth's progress during his involvement. Again, specific behavioral incidents of positive or negative change were used as the basis for the analysis.

Probation Officers. Probation Officers were interviewed on topics parallel to those discussed with the Case Managers. These included professional background, caseload statistics, general approach to the job, contact with the UDIS case manager, utilization of UDIS, and assessment of the UDIS program.

Each Probation Officer was asked to reconstruct case histories for his clients who had been referred to UDIS. Topics discussed included reasons for referral to UDIS, involvement in decisionmaking during the intervention, changes in the youth during and after his UDIS involvement, and an assessment of UDIS's success or failure with each client. A total of 40 case histories were collected from Probation Officers.

Juvenile Court Personnel. Juvenile Court judges were asked to offer their assessments of the UDIS program and to discuss the referral process. Administrative personnel discussed the court's interaction with the UDIS program. Each interview was conducted on topics specific to the individual's involvement with the program.

UDIS Referrals. Forty-seven youth who had been in the UDIS program were asked to talk with us about their experiences. A structured interview format was used. Topics were:

- The referral process,
- Nature of the UDIS Performance Contract,
- Comparisons of program placements,
- Comparisons of juvenile justice system personnel they had encountered,
- Police contacts while in the program,
- Interactions with the Juvenile Court, and
- Comparisons of UDIS and DOC (if applicable).

Each respondent was also encouraged to assess the impact of UDIS on his activities and behavior, and to tell us his own preferred methods for dealing with delinquents.

Agency Officials. Interviews were conducted with the Administrator of DOC's Juvenile Division, the Commander of the Youth Division of the Chicago Police Department, the former Executive and Associate Directors of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, the former Director of the Department of Children and Family Services, and the former director of the UDIS Project. Each respondent was asked to discuss both the policies and procedures of his agency and his interactions with the UDIS project.

THE DATA FILES

Four major data files were used separately and in combination during the UDIS evaluation: police contact data (the lists of arrests and their descriptors), personal

history (the biographic and environmental descriptors), program history (movement among placements and/or institutions), and "case history" (the above information combined with qualitative information from Case Manager, Probation Officer, and vendors). The files were keyed to three samples: UDIS referrals, between 10 October 1974 and 1 July 1976, boys committed to DOC during the same 21 months (hereafter called "the DOC sample"), and boys committed to DOC during the 21 months immediately prior to the establishment of UDIS (hereafter called "the Pre-UDIS Baseline").

Sample Selection

The basic files used for all of the quantitative analyses were *police contact data* and *program history*. Both began from a random sample of 200 males drawn from each of the three populations (UDIS, DOC, and the Pre-UDIS Baseline), based on the 450 files in the UDIS office (out of 463 listed as referrals during that time period) and on the 1595-person roster of Cook County youth committed to DOC, compiled from the Master Card File at St. Charles. These cases are hereafter called *the recidivism sample*. Table 2.1 profiles the key characteristics of its development and organization.

Table 2.1 Profile of the Recidivism Samples

	UDIS	DOC	Pre-UDIS Baseline
Random sample of the male population	200	200	200
Deletions: Suburban Cook County address*	(45)	(38)	(50)
In UDIS twice	(4)	NA	NA
Transfers from DOC to UDIS	(10)	NA	NA
Police file incomplete or missing	(0)	(3)	(8)
TOTAL SAMPLE	141	159	142
Supplemental random sample of nonsuburban males	50	0	0
TOTAL RECIDIVISM SAMPLE	191	159	142
In original program as of 12/31/76	(21)	(55)	(12)
TOTAL EXITED FROM ORIGINAL PROGRAM (as of 12/31/76)	170	104	130
Transferred directly from UDIS to DOC with no release time	(26)	NA	NA
TOTAL WITH ANY RELEASE HISTORY	144	104	130

*Suburban boys were deleted because their suburban arrest records were not being forwarded to the Chicago Police Department.

The *personal history* file for UDIS is based on the same 200 + 50 set of referrals. In all, we completed forms for 189 boys. The others were considered to be too incomplete to use. For the two DOC samples of personal histories (DOC = 160, Pre-UDIS Baseline = 103), the cases overlap but are not identical with the cases in the recidivism sample. The personal histories at DOC had been the first data to be collected. After it was underway, fresh (and smaller) random samples had to be drawn when the scope of the original effort turned out to be unrealistic. It should be emphasized that the personal history variables are used only in Chapter 5, to compare the nature of the UDIS and DOC populations.

The *case histories* were assembled only for UDIS, based on the original 200 random sample from the entire male population (including suburban referrals). We knew that it would not be feasible to obtain triangulated case narratives on all 200, so random subsamples of 50 were identified and arbitrarily assigned priorities. In all, 110 case histories were completed. Because of the exigencies of data collection, it is technically possible that skew was introduced by overrepresentation of the experiences of some Case Managers and Probation Officers. We have no sense whatsoever that the skew existed substantively, but we do not vouch for the absolute randomness of the case history sample.

Rating Procedures

Instruments for recording archival data were tested in the field with nonsample cases. Test cases were selected and independently rated by each of the staff members. Ratings were discussed and compared and appropriate revisions were made in the instruments to clarify ambiguities and to minimize rating discrepancies. A small sample pretest of reliability indicated that a number of the personal items had dubious reliability, and they were dropped from the analysis.

Several procedures were instituted to protect accuracy and consistency in rating. Meetings were conducted by senior project staff at the outset of the data collection to orient data collectors to the instruments and rating structures. All raters were provided with data collection guides. The manuals contained sections on a step-by-step approach to obtaining information, data sources, appropriate coding structures, and item-by-item guidelines for judgmental ratings. The team leader periodically spot-checked files against the rating sheets.

Raters participating in the police contact data collection were blinded as to whether subjects were UDIS or DOC clients, and whether the offenses were committed before, during, or after program participation.

Data Preparation

Data collected for the UDIS evaluation fall into two major categories: those amenable to quantitative description and those narrative materials more suitable for qualitative analysis.

Quantitative Data. The four main computerized data files established for the evaluation were the police contact file, the personal history file, the UDIS program history file, and the UDIS client interview file. While the format for each file varied with its content, common procedures for creating the files were instituted. All data collected in the field were checked for accuracy and completeness of ratings. Missing data were coded uniformly and cases with irreducible confusion were dropped from the sample. Additional rating structures were established to facilitate analysis. For example, sample youth who were both referred to UDIS and then subsequently committed to DOC were assigned new identification numbers to reflect dual participation.

The police contact file required more extensive preparation because of the complexities created by the time series aspects of the data. Additional conversions of the data were required to reflect the time period in which each offense occurred relative to the point of UDIS or DOC intervention.

Qualitative Data. Procedures used to prepare the qualitative data for analysis were specific to each data set. Basic descriptive information common to all interviews with a group of respondents was often abstracted to facilitate analysis and report preparation. Extensive commentary offered by respondents was usually left in the original form. For 110 of the cases, we obtained triangulated information in sufficient detail to develop a "case history." The case history abstracts included information from the interviews with Case Managers, Probation Officers, and vendors as well as archival data on personal background and police contacts. When available, information from the

interviews with youth was included. Again, direct quotes from the clients were used as often as possible to keep the sense of the response intact.

ANALYTIC ISSUES

Reliance on the Records of Official Delinquency

The analysis of recidivism is based wholly on police records. The question often raised is whether officially recorded delinquency is a valid measure of recidivism. These points are pertinent to the analyses in this report.

The Relationship between Official and Real Levels of Delinquent Activity. The most commonly cited defect of official data is that only a fraction of offenses result in apprehension and, among juveniles, only a portion of apprehensions reach the stage of documentation in police records--a problem that clearly applies to this study. The reader should in all cases remember that the raw numbers of arrests reflect the offensive activity that has surfaced, not the whole story of the delinquent behavior in which these youngsters have engaged.

What multiplier should be applied? One well-known study (Williams and Gold, 1972) found that among boys with a police contact, less than three percent of all arrestable acts had actually resulted in arrest, implying a multiplier as high as 33 times the official arrest record. But that proportion was based on a very wide range of offenses, including minor ones, for a general population of youth. Presumably the major offenses such as robbery, assault, and burglary that make up the records of the offenders in this study are somewhat more likely to be apprehended than lesser offenses, and certainly more likely to lead to official documentation when they are apprehended. In Chapter 11, evidence from victimization studies and from clearance statistics are used to establish a range of apprehension rates, without regard to the age of the offender. The probable range is estimated to be 10 to 20 percent.

The inability to estimate real levels of offensive activity is a serious obstacle in assessing costs and benefits. A relatively small number of arrests among program participants may represent a much greater level of

real delinquent activity. The degree of these "hidden costs," if known, could decisively affect the conclusions.

On the issue of comparative impact of DOC and UDIS, however, the partial count represented by the police records presents more manageable problems. DOC and UDIS youth in the samples came from the same parts of town, with comparable backgrounds. There is no reason to believe that the police were more likely to apprehend one population than another. It is plausible that the apprehensions taken over the groups as wholes reflect comparable sampling distributions of real offenses and that differences between the two groups can therefore be treated as reflective of differences in real levels of offensive activity.

Similarly, we find no persuasive reason to believe that the before-after comparisons are contaminated by reliance on official records. If arrests drop, the most parsimonious conclusion is that real offensive activity has dropped. The alternative explanation--that arrests drop because large numbers of the youngsters are getting smarter and are therefore caught less often--requires an elaborate set of assumptions about the way delinquents come to commit delinquent acts, about the proportion of budding professional criminal craftsmen in the population, and about the learning process (see Chapter 12). We did not find patterns in the data which would be consistent with these assumptions. We found other patterns, especially the very abrupt nature of the before-after changes in arrests, that are not consistent with the getting-smarter hypothesis.

In passing, it can be noted that before-after comparisons using police data have more face validity than a similar comparison using self-report data. The data collectors were blinded as to the timing of the offense relative to the program intervention, and no problems of memory distorted accounts of offenses that occurred many months or years before the data were collected. In contrast, a self-reporting youth would have problems with memory in reconstructing his preintervention career. He would also have incentives to make the before-after comparison of offensive activity fit whatever points he might wish to make about the benefits or harm done to him by the intervention.

The Relationship of Police Allegations to Actual Behavior. This study ignores whether the youth was found by a court to have committed the offense for which he was

arrested. To what extent might the data be inflated with instances in which the youth was innocent?

The nature of the police records indicates that, at least from the statistical viewpoint, the problem of unwarranted arrests is not likely to have influenced the analysis. In most cases, the apprehension occurred in the act, where the chance of mistake was minimal. In the remaining cases, the collateral evidence tended to be strong: for example, eyewitnesses who knew the youth by name, or stolen property that was found in the youth's possession within a few hours of the offense. There was the occasional police account that lacked specific documentable evidence that the allegation had a strong foundation, but the number of these was statistically trivial. Short of assuming that the arresting officers were making up facts on a wholesale basis, the relationship of the allegations to actual behavior appeared to be close.

Treatment of Selection Bias in the Comparison Groups

The question of sample bias in the analysis of recidivism is inescapable because of two extremely important factors. First, 33 of the highest-risk UDIS referrals--equal to 18.6 percent of the subjects who had exited from UDIS--were unavoidably skimmed off the top of the UDIS sample. These were the boys who got into sufficient trouble while they were in UDIS to be terminated directly into DOC. Virtually without exception, the trouble consisted of frequent arrests or an arrest for a serious offense, but they have no "after UDIS" record at all, and hence could not be part of a recidivism analysis.* This selection bias alone stacks the odds substantially in UDIS's favor, and it is intractable to correction.

The second factor is that judges understandably tried to send the most dangerous delinquents to DOC and put safer ones in UDIS.

A systematic selection bias was at work that must be presumed to have worked in UDIS's favor if judges had a better than random chance record of identifying "propensity to recidivate." In the course of conducting the study, we tried to deal with the problem in three ways.

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* They were of course excluded from the DOC sample as well because of the confounding effect of the prior UDIS experience.

First, we examined the extent to which the two populations differed on a wide range of characteristics. Some of the characteristics, especially those relating to psychological variables and subjective aspects of parental and peer relationships, proved impossible to rate reliably given the file materials at hand.* But other variables on prior offense history and objective conditions and personal characteristics could be scored reliably. They revealed only one important difference--the "most serious prior offense" of the DOC sample was more serious than the "most serious prior offense" of the UDIS sample. The details are given in Chapter 4.

We investigated the influence of this variable. Matched samples of UDIS and DOC subjects were created and then compared on the indices of recidivism. The results were essentially the same as those found with the full sample. Because we were not convinced that the most serious prior offense predicted any behavior except the judges', we did not use these subsamples as the reporting basis for the analysis in Chapter 8: sample sizes were being reduced to control for a variable which was probably an insignificant part of the real but unquantifiable differences between the samples.

Our main defense against sample bias was provided by the data. *If* UDIS had shown superior recidivism results, we would have had to confront the possibility of a Type I error--falsely assigning superior performance to UDIS over DOC. As it turned out, UDIS did not generally outperform DOC on the recidivism measures. We more often have a Type II problem--it is possible that DOC outperformed UDIS and the sample bias has obscured that fact. But from a policy standpoint, this is a much less potentially harmful mistake than inaccurately proclaiming that community programs for chronic juvenile offenders work better than institutions.

Statistical Considerations

The statistical procedures employed in the report will be familiar to the technically oriented reader. These comments may be helpful in interpreting the method.

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* By the same token, however, our interrater reliability problems suggest that judges' efforts to discriminate on these variables may not succeed with any consistency across judges.

Analysis of Variance as Applied to the Time Series Data. Much of the statistical analysis in Chapters 8 through 10 is given over to a time series comparison of delinquent behavior before and after intervention. We apply an analysis of variance of mixed design with repeated measures. The between-subjects variable is the intervention (UDIS or DOC) and the within-subjects variable is time (before and after intervention). The repeated measures are several variables we use to characterize the nature and frequency of contact with the law enforcement and juvenile justice system. The analytic situation is a familiar one and presents no unusual problems.*

For analysis of the dependent variables that are expressed in means or proportions, all sample subjects were included. Measures in this category are mean seriousness score and proportion of offenses beyond the seriousness threshhold. For measures that are systematically related to time, we have specified a time period of observation and excluded all sample subjects who had not been released for at least that period. A six-month followup period was specified, yielding sample sizes of 79 (UDIS) and 75 (DOC).†

In all pre-post comparisons, the measure of preintervention activity is based on the 12 months preceding commitment to DOC or referral to UDIS, divided into two semesters.§ This procedure was employed because the steeply rising rate of offenses during the last year would create variance that would unnecessarily reduce the power of the analysis, and also so that we would have a stronger basis for assessing the importance of the regression effect.

The regression effect stems from the fact that a delinquent is sent to UDIS or DOC at the height of his delinquent activity. Any subsequent observations are therefore likely to show a drop, not because the intervention made a difference, but because the observer chose

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*See, for example, Myers, 1972, Chapters 7 and 8.

†Because of a rounding problem (six months is 182.5 days in a a nonleap year), one case that was included in the computer analysis of the descriptive statistics was excluded from the ANOVA runs: hence the discrepancy between 79 and 80 in the two types of tables.

§The comparison of interest is between the pooled two "prior" semesters and the one "post" semester. A planned comparison was applied. (Hays, 1963, 462-464) The ANOVA was computed using the Biomedical Data Package (BMDP2V) program for repeated measures.

a cutoff point which loaded the odds in favor of some reduction. This tendency of extreme observations to become less extreme on subsequent measurement is known as the "regression effect" (Campbell and Stanley, 1963, pp. 10-12) and applies to the posttreatment reductions in delinquent activity. Presumably it accounts for some unknown proportion of the reduction. By examining two semesters of activity rather than only the six months immediately preceding intervention, the artificially high rates just prior to intervention can be compared to the previous levels. Further, we can examine the before-after relationship if we discard the most recent semester altogether.

There is, of course, a delicate tradeoff involved in choosing how many preintervention months to include in the analysis. At some point the procedure ceases to protect against the regression artifact and starts to understate just as artificially the real level of delinquent behavior that prompted intervention. Two semesters seem to us a fair compromise; it is also a subjective one. We cannot claim that the regression artifact is no longer a factor. We do know, as discussed in Chapter 10, that the before-after changes are so large that they survived several attenuation tests that we tried.

Application of Log-Linear Analysis. In the case of certain "seriousness" analyses, the before and after relationships comprised a multidimensional contingency table. We applied log-linear analysis (Shaffer, 1973) to test for a significant interaction effect between type of treatment (UDIS or DOC) and time (before or after). Both hierarchical and nonhierarchical models were tested and yielded equivalent results. The nonhierarchical results are reported.

Approach to Reporting Untested Results. Throughout the analysis we struggled with the problem of having more data than we could test. This arises from the shifting sample sizes that characterize recidivism analysis in general: the sample subjects emerge from the program at different points in calendar time. Whenever the individual is the unit of analysis and his "score" over a given period of time is the variable, the only satisfactory approach we have found is to define a followup period and include in the analysis only those persons who have been "out" that long,

and only those events that occurred within that period.* Data are thereby thrown away in two ways: all the data are discarded for individuals who have been out fewer than the requisite number of months, and events that occurred after the followup period are discarded for individuals who have been out for longer periods of time.

For the UDIS-DOC comparisons, we approach the problem by *reporting* the figures derived from all of the data, and *testing* them over a six-month followup sample--taking care always to distinguish the two data sets.

But for certain intra-UDIS comparisons, the process of discarding data if we defined a followup sample would leave us with too few cases to expect any but the grossest differences to reach statistical significance. Ironically, the total data base is not that small--ratios based on some hundreds of events and person-months are available--but there is no way to test for significant differences among them. Each ratio produces just one figure, no matter how many units went into the numerator and denominator. The results are reported despite our inability to provide formal tests of significance. Caveats are embedded in the text.

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* A variety of other approaches based on rate-per-month or expected values were considered. All were unable to surmount some basic statistical problems posed by the characteristics of our comparison groups.

3. The Origins of UDIS

UDIS began receiving referrals in October 1974, after a year-long planning effort and two years of jurisdictional infighting among the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), the DOC, the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC), and the governor's office. In these struggles, UDIS had a significance that only indirectly bore on its delinquency functions. The personalities involved--especially that of Dr. Jerome Miller--and the complex hidden agendas that were at stake still affect the way that UDIS fits within the juvenile justice system. A running account of the story is given below. The chapter concludes with a summary of the salient points for understanding how UDIS has functioned.

THE JUDICIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The climate within the Illinois juvenile justice system was favorable for a major deinstitutionalization project. For years, the Chicago Police Department had been diverting a majority of apprehended youth by use of community adjustments in lieu of referrals to Juvenile Court. The court itself used internal diversion mechanisms founded on the availability of a trained staff of probation officers with low case loads. Recent changes in the Juvenile Court Act had proscribed commitments to DOC of youth who were under 13 years of age, or who were charged with status offenses or violations of court orders. A recent social investigation was required before handing down a commitment order. In December 1973, the court reinstituted an augmented form of screening and diversion that kept many cases from reaching a formal hearing. It was tried, then expanded to the entire county in September 1974, the month before UDIS began accepting referrals.

The court also had begun emphasizing family therapy training for field probation officers, as a vehicle for supporting existing family strengths that would permit the court to maintain probationers in the community. And, in

general, the leadership of the court appeared to be sensitive to the deficiencies of the juvenile justice system and willing to explore new approaches in dealing with youth in trouble with the law. The presiding judge, unlike many others preceding him, had made juvenile law and juvenile justice his speciality, and the recently appointed Director of Court Services had a strong child welfare background.

Together with DOC and the Illinois Commission on Children, the court drafted and advocated amendments to the Juvenile Court Act that were conducive to deinstitutionalization. Administrative changes at the court were made that reflected decreased reliance on commitment as a sanction. These included a prohibition against committing youth to DOC on more than one count at a time and discontinuance of the "stay of mittimus" procedure, which involved a paper commitment to DOC with the understanding that any further violation would result in summary commitment. Also, the court notified each committed youth of his right to appeal. When few youth initiated such appeals, the presiding judge in 1976 made them automatic upon commitment.

The changing approach toward institutionalization was reflected in the numbers. From 1,431 Cook County commitments in 1968, there was a generally declining trend to 682 Cook County youth in 1974.

The reductions are shown in Figure 3.1. Note that UDIS did not begin operations until the last quarter of 1974, and during those three months received only 39 referrals. UDIS clearly did not precipitate the decline in institutionalizations.

During the same period, the Department of Corrections was taking parallel steps to reduce the institutional intensity of its programs by extensive use of parole and authorized absences, allowing youth to return to their families and communities during the course of institutionalization. DOC was steadily reducing the length of time before parole to an average of about eight months in the institution. In 1970, under Joseph Coughlin, DOC undertook regionalization, a process that permitted reception of committed youth at the regional level with subsequent release of some to community-based programs in the region rather than institutionalization. In DOC, too, forms of deinstitutionalization had gained momentum when UDIS came on the scene.

Figure 3.1. Number of Juveniles Committed to DOC by Cook County Courts From 1966 Through 1976



THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

In 1973, newly-elected Governor Daniel Walker recruited Dr. Jerome G. Miller of Massachusetts to direct the Department of Children and Family Services. The Governor brought Dr. David Fogel from Minnesota with the intention of appointing him to direct the Department of Corrections. Together, the two men provided an important catalyst for the implementation of UDIS and were focal points for the complicated political and bureaucratic maneuvering that ensued.

The directorship of DCFS was not the only attraction that persuaded Miller to leave his position as Director of the Department of Youth Services in Massachusetts. Miller made no secret of his continuing interest in corrections, and he accepted the DCFS position with the understanding that at least the juvenile division of DOC would be transferred to his jurisdiction. Governor Walker also is said to have allowed Miller to select the DOC director. The choice was David Fogel.

At this point, the agreements seem to have been quite clear. Walker and Fogel would support legislation to transfer the juvenile division of DOC to DCFS. Miller was then expected to proceed with a massive deinstitutionalization effort similar to the one that he had conducted in Massachusetts when all of the traditional juvenile correctional institutions in the state had been closed.

The Fogel part of the plan broke down in the legislature when he was rejected by the Senate. Republicans and downstate Democrats opposed his liberal policies, and the Chicago area Democrats were still piqued by Walker's capture of the Democratic gubernatorial nomination from the candidate put up by Daley's organization. Balked at putting Fogel in charge of DOC, Walker appointed him executive director of ILEC, the state planning agency charged with allocating Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds and conducting comprehensive justice planning for the state. Fogel, a former member of the staff at the Berkeley School of Criminology, had been the director of corrections in Minnesota and had made a speciality of prison reform and deinstitutionalization. Eventually, his ideas regarding sentencing and correctional practices would culminate in a book proposing a justice system consisting in part of flat-time sentencing and voluntary participation in--and voucher payment for--

institutional rehabilitative services (Fogel, 1975).* As executive director of ILEC, Fogel did not have the administrative control of corrections which he would have had as head of DOC. He did control the funds being funneled to Illinois through LEAA, however, giving him some influence over the directions of justice system programming.

The plans for the transfer of the Juvenile Division of DOC to DCFS were derailed by the Senate's rejection of Fogel as DOC director and by Walker's subsequent problems with the legislature. Allyn Sielaff, who was appointed and confirmed as DOC director, apparently did not have an understanding with Walker about allowing a transfer of the Juvenile Division. He refused to allow his deputy to testify on behalf of the transfer bill and, after passing the House, the bill was permanently tabled by the Senate. Residual jurisdictional competition between Miller and Sielaff was not finally clarified until December 1973, when they signed an agreement that Sielaff would not obstruct Miller's pursuit of federal funding for juvenile justice programming and Miller on his part would refrain from direct attempts to effect a transfer of the Juvenile Division to DCFS.

In his widely publicized deinstitutionalization effort in Massachusetts, Miller had acted rapidly, ignored the political niceties, and in the process made himself a controversial figure with both the corrections community and the public. Reports of the controversy followed him to Illinois, and Miller obliged the press by giving them some new headlines. He was an unabashed proponent of abrupt and dramatic methods. Without them, in his view, the gradualism of the liberal professionals and the recalcitrance of the bureaucracies would stifle real change. Neither did he think much of the system to begin with. When asked his opinion of the new $32 million Juvenile Justice Center, with its 500-bed temporary Detention Center and elaborate facilities for the Juvenile Court, Miller in a televised appearance replied that he would like to take a squadron of tanks and level it. Neither this attitude nor his style increased his popularity with established justice system agencies.

As head of DCFS, however, his primary responsibility was for child welfare services rather than juvenile justice. DCFS had been established in 1965 as the statewide agency

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* The proposal failed in the Illinois legislature but a similar proposal has since been enacted in California.

responsible for the care of children made wards of the state by the courts, most of whom had been found to be dependent or neglected. Only a small portion of the department's services were directed toward youth found to be delinquent or in need of supervision. The department's primary responsibilities were in the areas of shelter care, foster care, adoption, group homes, guardianship, and residential treatment. It had been allocated the funds for temporary care which the juvenile courts throughout the state previously controlled.

Dr. Miller brought to the administration of DCFS the same philosophy and style which he had exhibited in youth corrections in Massachusetts. He saw DCFS, viewed by private child welfare agencies and juvenile courts throughout the state as inefficient, unwieldy, and unresponsive to the needs of children, as an agency ripe for a shake-up. With him from Massachusetts he brought a group of like-minded planners, administrators, and policymakers. He publicly and frequently criticized his new department. Placing himself on the side of "the kids," he took on the child welfare agencies, the justice system, and members of the old DCFS staff.

His first dramatic move was to bring back to Illinois a large number of youth, numbering in the hundreds, who had been placed out-of-state, many of them in institutions that were subsequently exposed as grossly inadequate, sometimes brutal. But at the outset, as in Massachusetts, his efforts to quickly return children to their families and communities were widely criticized as premature, without adequate planning or resources. His support eroded and, shortly before UDIS began receiving its first referrals, the governor removed Miller and appointed him to be juvenile justice adviser. A few months later, Dr. Miller left Illinois to accept a similar position in Pennsylvania, where he was later given administrative responsibilities for youth corrections. There, he has since undertaken another major deinstitutionalization effort.

In the actual design and management of UDIS, Miller had little direct impact.* But in setting the stage for UDIS and helping to secure funding, Miller was very important.

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* But the perception of his involvement by others created problems. The UDIS staff had to go to great lengths to disavow his control.

From the outset of planning, UDIS represented a much less radical departure than Miller undertook earlier in Massachusetts or subsequently in Pennsylvania. Miller, by the nature of his position, the political obstacles and established organizational traditions which greeted him, and the reputation which followed him from Massachusetts, had none of the control over deinstitutionalization in Illinois that he had enjoyed in Massachusetts. This lack of control and the questionable legitimacy of DCFS as an agency for overseeing delinquents constrained Miller. So whereas in Massachusetts Miller operated from a "deep end" philosophy, summarily returning to the community even the most delinquent and unmanageable of the youth, he took a softer approach in UDIS. Explicitly, UDIS was for the 35 percent of those who otherwise would have been committed from the state's largest county; implicitly, it was for the less serious of the committables, those whom probation officers and judges might ordinarily have reservations about the wisdom of commitment, especially given the availability of community-based or alternative resources.* Despite Miller's disdain of gradualism, UDIS represented just such a policy. It was also, however, part of an open strategy to help him gain control of DOC's Juvenile Division so that he could proceed with more complete deinstitutionalization. And it was only the first of at least two scheduled diversion/deinstitutionalization projects. The second shoe, which never dropped, was the Juvenile Offenders Services Project (JOSP). It was designed for the more serious committable youth who had previously been institutionalized. It was never implemented in Illinois. The impetus for its adoption died with Miller's departure.

The stage for UDIS then was set by an unusual cast of characters, many of them new to the state, or at least to their positions, and most of whom have by now vacated

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*Since UDIS was designed to accommodate only 35 percent of those who would otherwise have been committed and there were no provisions for random assignment nor for a secure intensive care unit (in the original proposal), it was inherent in the program that it would be used primarily for those youngsters who otherwise would have been committed but were considered not to pose as serious a threat as other committable youth.

those positions.* The circumstances and timing under which UDIS developed in Illinois are important for understanding initial and residual attitudes toward it, and the course that it has taken. Apart from its merits, weakness, radicalism or lack of it, the circumstances surrounding the establishment of UDIS guaranteed that it would be--and has been--viewed with persistent apprehension by traditional justice system agencies. Without Miller, UDIS might never have existed. But with his name, it became very difficult to make UDIS work.

PLANNING AND START-UP

While Miller was fighting his battles with DOC and the legislature, the actual planning for UDIS took place at a much different level.

ILEC, the source of the money, took the first concrete steps. Its juvenile justice planning had for some time been oriented toward diversion and deinstitutionalization. Prior to Miller's arrival, ILEC had funded day-treatment projects with both residential and nonresidential components in Peoria and in Macon and St. Clair Counties. Insofar as they served youth who were second offenders and probation violators, they highlighted ILEC's commitment to keeping youngsters out of DOC.

ILEC wanted to become more active in Cook County, which, anchored by Chicago, accounted for two-thirds or more of commitments to DOC. The obvious strategy for ILEC to follow in the pursuit of deinstitutionalization was to sponsor a program within the Juvenile Court of Cook County as they had done elsewhere around the state. But ILEC was continually frustrated by the Chief Judge

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* In addition to Miller, Paul DeMuro, the first director of UDIS, and William Gschwend, a planner who was largely responsible for writing the UDIS grant proposal, have gone to Pennsylvania; Allyn Sielaff, Director of DOC, and Seymour J. Adler, Director of Court Services at the Cook County Juvenile Court, have resigned and taken other positions; Governor Walker, who brought Miller and Fogel to the state, was defeated in the 1976 Democratic primary; his aide, Chet Kamen, who worked closely with Miller and Fogel, left his position early in the Walker administration; Fogel, who signed off on the UDIS proposal, left ILEC in January 1977; Robert Weber, who had advocated deinstitutionalization within DOC, departed the state about the time that UDIS was transferred to DOC; and several important planning and management staff members, both at UDIS and at the Juvenile Court, have resigned.

of the Circuit Court, who was strongly opposed to federal funding. Without his approval, ILEC could not fund UDIS as a Juvenile Court program. In part because of this, the 1975 ILEC Comprehensive Plan identified DCFS as the eligible applicant for UDIS funding.

The early planning efforts took place in a series of meetings at Seymour J. Adler's office at the Juvenile Court, during November and December 1973. The meetings were called by ILEC: ILEC had juvenile justice money to spend and wanted to find out how best to spend it. The meetings were attended by Adler from the court, Robert Weber and Allyn Sielaff from DOC, Allen Carpenter and David Fogel from ILEC, and Paul DeMuro and Jerry Miller from DCFS. There is some disagreement about the degree to which prior decisions about the shape of UDIS had already been made by Miller and Fogel. DOC in particular suspected that it had not been fully included in the negotiations. The suspicions and charges that were exchanged were symptomatic of the interorganizational difficulties which were part of the process of planning and implementing UDIS.

Shortly after these meetings and the inclusion of UDIS in the 1975 ILEC Comprehensive Plan, the grant proposal was written. A private consultant, William S. Gschwend, a former associate director of the Peace Corps and former director of a community mental health program on Chicago's Near West Side, was retained by DCFS to write the proposal, working in collaboration with Cook County juvenile justice officials. In particular, Gschwend worked closely with White's and Adler's offices in the Juvenile Court. Several ideas were proposed and discussed. One version of the referral process called for committable youth to be assigned randomly to UDIS or DOC. The presiding judge vetoed that suggestion. As it eventually emerged, the grant included two important administrative devices in addition to the service recommendations. First, UDIS was to be accountable to a Juvenile Justice Policy Board composed of major actors in Cook County's and Illinois' juvenile justice agencies. Second, at ILEC's insistence, someone with contract and budget expertise was to be part of UDIS's administration. Management of the network of services was to be the responsibility of probation or parole officers; resource development and youth-service matching were to be accomplished by the UDIS staff.

Before ILEC could fund UDIS, the proposal had to be approved by the Chicago-Cook County Criminal Justice Commission. In April 1974, its staff recommended denial

of the application due to unresolved issues. These included the need for clarification of legal, procedural, and budgetary questions as well as for letters of support from the Juvenile Court, DOC and the State's Attorney's Office, and formal notification to Judge Boyle. The staff review stated that approval could still be given if these matters were resolved before the April 25th meeting. DeMuro sent a letter responsive to the issues raised, obtained the requisite letters of support, and with Miller appeared at the subcommittee meeting. Subsequently, the Commission approved the application. ILEC made the award on July 29, 1974.

In the meantime, DeMuro, who had been Miller's superintendent of a state training school for boys in Massachusetts, was serving as DCFS liaison to DOC. In this capacity, he participated in the early planning for UDIS and directed a dry run for UDIS while the grant was pending--the "Reclamation Project" started in March 1974. Consistent with Miller's and DeMuro's deinstitutionalization orientation, this project was designed to reclaim DCFS wards who were in DOC. Although over 150 such youth were identified and there appears to have been satisfactory cooperation between DOC and the project, less than 30 youth were reclaimed. But the experience did provide an opportunity for future UDIS administration and staff to work together before UDIS began operations. It also identified some of the problems which they could expect to encounter.

UDIS intake was to be dependent on referrals from the Juvenile Court (up to 30 a month) and DOC (up to 7 a month). Cooperation from these agencies was crucial to UDIS' success. Administration of both agencies had already indicated their support; it now remained necessary to obtain the support of line staff. At the Juvenile Court, this meant having probation officers recommend referrals to UDIS and then persuading the judges to make the actual referrals. Adler's office sent out the message that the court administration was firmly in support of UDIS. Adler appointed his administrative assistant to act as liaison with UDIS. She instituted a series of orientation meetings for probation officers and judges. These meetings, held before UDIS became operational, were designed to acquaint staff with the rationale and objectives of UDIS, to introduce them and UDIS staff, and to convey how to make appropriate referrals. The court staff also frequently reminded UDIS of the importance of involving probation officers and judges. Juvenile Court support was continued in the form of directives and reorientation meetings.

UDIS had the money, the personnel, and the provisional blessing of the court. It only remained to start working with delinquents.

SUMMARY

The context in which UDIS developed has had at least three important effects on UDIS.

First, UDIS was tagged from the outset as one of Miller's projects, and this has continued to make it an object of suspicion. Some disliked Miller's methods, some thought his ideas on corrections were scatterbrained, still others perceived him as a political and bureaucratic threat.* As it happened, he had very little to do with the design or operation of UDIS. But the notion that UDIS was his program has perpetuated suspicion by officials in the system that continues to this day. It has also perpetuated stereotypes of the UDIS staff (for example, as radicals and amateurs) that had very little basis in fact when the program began and even less now.

A second important result of the political struggles that surrounded UDIS is its peculiar independence of other agencies. It could not be placed in its logical home, the juvenile court, because Judge Boyle, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court, was opposed to federal money for court programs. It originally went to an unlikely home, DCFS, because of Miller's special relationship with Fogel. Then it was moved to the jurisdiction of DOC. But although its final move made it administratively and fiscally responsible to DOC, it retains a great deal of day-to-day autonomy. Its staff, with the exception of the current director, is not drawn from DOC, nor do many of the staff appear to be headed for careers with DOC. In all, the links that bind UDIS to any other bureaucracy do not visibly constrain its freedom of operation.

A third characteristic of UDIS that goes back to the circumstances surrounding its origins is the loss of its patrons. The people who took the lead in designing UDIS, getting the money for it, and starting it in operation, are gone. The governor, head of DCFS, head of DOC, head

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* We heard very little praise of Dr. Miller among Illinois and Cook County corrections and juvenile justice officials. He has many strong, vocal supporters elsewhere and is seen by some as the leading contemporary figure in juvenile corrections. Nobody, it seems, is neutral about him.

of ILEC, the director of court services at Juvenile Court, the first director of UDIS, the people who developed the proposal, and several other closely associated officials have gone on to other jobs. As we discuss the operation of UDIS in other chapters and some departures from the original plan for the program, it should be remembered that very few of UDIS's senior staff helped draw up that plan.

Part II. THE PROGRAM

Introductory Note

The achievements of UDIS, like those of any social action program, form a hierarchy. The ultimate measures of UDIS's success center on the issue of recidivism. The assessment of them has been assigned to Part III. In Part II that follows, we examine the process that led to those impacts.

The first topic deals with the simplest of all levels: *program inputs*, or the nature of the program's basic components once the grant application was approved and implementation actually got underway. Chapter 4, "The Program Inputs" describes the structure and mechanics of UDIS.

The next level of achievement is what we will call *immediate outcomes*: the direct results of correctly performing the basic program functions. In the case of UDIS, this meant obtaining the right kind of referrals, assembling service providers of adequate number, variety and quality, and competently administering the linkage of referrals and services. Chapter 5, "Immediate Outcomes of Program Operations," deals with these issues.

The *intermediate outcomes* are next: outcomes which do not reflect achievement of the program's intended impact, but do reflect the extent to which the program's distinctive *logic for achieving impact* has been realized. They are particularly important in this assessment. UDIS rightly saw itself as trying to do much more than serve as a routing center. It brought a clearly defined approach to delinquency intervention. The program's success in implementing these principles is the subject of Chapter 6, "Intermediate Outcomes of Program Operations."

Part II of the report concludes with an overview of how these elements of the program--the inputs, immediate outcomes, and intermediate outcomes--were assessed by the major sets of actors surrounding UDIS. The perceptions of UDIS staff, probation officers, service vendors, and the youngsters themselves are reviewed in Chapter 7, "Appraisals of the Process."

4. Program Inputs

The following describes the basics of the UDIS program: the mechanics of how it was supposed to work, the staffing pattern, UDIS's relationship to the Juvenile Court, the role of UDIS's Advisory Board, and the UDIS Tracking System.

THE MECHANICS OF THE PROGRAM

A juvenile offender was said to be eligible for UDIS if he had been adjudicated delinquent on two petitions or if he had committed a serious offense and, for either reason, was likely to be committed to DOC. Several directives to probation staff codified these criteria. The system was supposed to operate (and usually did) in the following manner.

A Probation Officer (PO) confronted with a youngster who was a candidate for DOC decided whether, in his or her judgment, the offender could be maintained in a noninstitutional setting through the network of services that UDIS could tap. If so, the PO got in touch with a UDIS Case Manager who then decided whether the case was eligible. If UDIS indicated that it was, the PO requested referral to UDIS at the next court hearing. If the judge consented, the youth was referred to UDIS for a two-week period of assessment. A psychologist or social worker under contract to UDIS then interviewed the youth and prepared an assessment report.

The Case Manager was responsible for developing a program plan jointly with the youth, his family, the PO, and service agencies. A "performance contract" was prepared stating what the youth agreed to do as his part (typical provisions were to "stay out of trouble," and "go to school") and what UDIS would provide as its part of the bargain. On the court date, the assessment and performance contract were presented to the judge who then decided whether to accept the plan, to direct UDIS to rework it, or to commit the youth to DOC.

Once the judge had accepted the proposed program, the youth was entered into the services that had been chosen from among the roster of advocacy, alternative education, family therapy, vocational training, wilderness stress programs, group homes, and psychiatric services with which UDIS maintained service contracts. Most UDIS clients received services from more than one vendor. The services could be provided on an overlapping as well as on a sequential basis. Changes were decided upon by the Case Manager.

A youth participating in the program, remained technically on probation, with continued participation in UDIS stipulated as a condition of that probation. The PO maintained contact with the youth and his family, the Case Manager, and the vendors providing services to the youth. Vendors reported unusual incidents (for example, a police contact, injury, or felonious activities) to the Case Manager, who reported them to the PO. The vendor worker also included such incidents in the written monthly report on the youth.

Each UDIS participant received an identification card documenting his status as a UDIS referral. If picked up by the police, a UDIS youth was supposed to show them the UDIS card, in hopes that the officer would get in touch with UDIS. At least one UDIS staff member was on call 24 hours a day.

Case Managers were not direct service workers but instead performed a number of coordinating functions. They brokered services by identifying appropriate resources, arranging for placements, and helping to establish objectives and expectations. They also monitored the youth's progress and the progress of the vendors working with him, and prepared reports on the results for the court.

If there was a major unscheduled change of program or a serious problem, or if the youth was picked up by the police for a new offense, the case was usually brought back before the judge. If the judge determined that the youth had violated the conditions of his probation, the youngster could then be committed to DOC or, depending on the judge's decision, a new program might be developed.

"Egress" was UDIS's term for successful completion of the program. If all went well, a youth was supposed to be egressed within six months. He could stay in the program longer if the Case Manager judged that the extra time was in the youth's best interest. But after six months the

decision to maintain the youth in the program was to be subjected to increasing scrutiny by the case management supervisors.

"Termination" was the word for failure. Termination could be associated with direct commitment to DOC. In other cases, termination could occur when the UDIS staff decided that their resources had been exhausted, or that the youth was chronically failing to participate in the chosen services. A youth who had been terminated but not committed ordinarily returned to his standard probation status. An egressed youth might or might not return to probation, depending on the circumstances.

STAFF ORGANIZATION AND HISTORY

UDIS was a small organization with a simple structure. The central job was that of the Case Manager, each of whom looked after 25 to 30 cases.

There were minor changes in the organizational structure of the UDIS office, but staff responsibilities remained generally stable. The basic administrative staff during the period of the evaluation included an executive director, a fiscal officer and an administrative assistant. The executive director had responsibility for the overall administration of the project. The fiscal officer maintained the financial records for the program and ensured that vendors were paid for services provided to the UDIS clients. The administrative assistant oversaw the office routine.

Program staff included a program coordinator, two case management supervisors, two resource monitors, a court representative, and eight Case Managers. The program coordinator negotiated vendor contracts and assumed responsibility for the program staff. The case management supervisors directed the Case Managers, monitoring progress of their cases and ensuring that the Case Managers were in close contact with their clients and service providers. Resource monitors had responsibility for making monthly on-site visits to all vendors to ensure that vendors were fulfilling contract stipulations. The court representative screened prospective UDIS clients and acted as a liaison with the judges and probationary personnel.

Four support staff completed the UDIS roster, providing secretarial services to both the administrative and program staff.

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JUVENILE COURT

UDIS depended on the Juvenile Court of Cook County for the vast majority of its referrals.* UDIS had substantial control over whom it accepted, but it relied on Probation Officers to recommend referrals and on judges to order the referrals. The relationship with juvenile court was therefore crucial to UDIS's success. The court's perceptions of UDIS are described in Chapter 7. Here, we outline the structural characteristics of the relationship.

Support from the top came early. The presiding judge was consistently positive toward the UDIS concept. The Director of Court Services at the time that the UDIS grant was written and during its early months of implementation was a strong advocate for UDIS and communicated this support to court staff. The court's first UDIS liaison conducted unit-by-unit orientation sessions as the project was phased in, and argued vigorously for support from Probation Officers.

But while administrative support was necessary to ensure cooperation with UDIS, it was not sufficient. Individual judges had wide latitude in the dispositions they ordered, and the Probation Officers were the judge's primary source of information about a case. Judges and Probation Officers determined whether UDIS got referrals. UDIS therefore encouraged close interaction with the PO's by organizing Case Managers on a geographical team basis which coincided with the organization of probation units. Not only was this valuable for increasing familiarity with resources and communities (a major reason why the probation units had been organized this way) but it also facilitated communication with the Probation Officers. Contact was further eased by the location of UDIS at Edwards Center, only two blocks from the Juvenile Court buildings, for its first two years of operation.†

Working in UDIS's favor were two job-related incentives for judges and POs to refer cases to UDIS. First, judges had more control over youth referred to UDIS than those committed to DOC. The former was still a ward of the court, the latter was not. The judge could monitor the progress

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*DOC can assign a youngster to UDIS as part of a parole plan, but to date this has constituted less than 5 percent of UDIS referrals.

†UDIS was later forced to relocate at a less accessible location in downtown Chicago.

of the youth who had been referred to UDIS, order program changes if indicated, or increase the length of time in program. In contrast, the youth committed to DOC was typically beyond the judge's control and could be released by DOC at any time.*

Another advantage applied to Probation Officers: they could reduce their involvement with a troublesome case by referral to UDIS. As one judge noted, Probation Officers "spend 90 percent of their time with 10 percent of their cases." UDIS offered a way other than commitment to DOC that a PO could free some time for dealing with the 90 percent.

THE ROLE OF THE UDIS ADVISORY BOARD

As described in Chapter 3, an important feature of the original UDIS grant proposal was the creation of a Juvenile Justice Policy Board (JJPB). It was to be the overseeing body for UDIS and the ultimate advocate for the youth in the project. More sweepingly, it was to be a vehicle for implementing major policy initiatives in the state juvenile justice system. As such, it had impressively senior composition: the directors of ILEC, DCFS, DOC, the Youth Division of the Chicago Police Department, the Division of Youth Services of the Chicago Department of Human Resources, the Illinois Pardon and Parole Board, the Presiding Judge and Director of Court Services of the Cook County Juvenile Court, the Assistant State's Attorney in charge at the Juvenile Court, and, as an ex-officio member, the UDIS Project Director.

As it happened, the JJPB performed much more modest functions. It did, however, have its accomplishments. It helped secure funding. It brought together--at least for the early meetings--some of the most important decision-makers regarding juvenile justice in the state. It helped UDIS work through some important issues during the early months--for example, defining the role of the Case Manager, and developing a sound procedure for selecting service providers. The Board functioned as a sort of ILEC analog in reviewing proposed contracts. But the discovery was soon made that despite what the grant and the by-laws said, the Board had little power and the UDIS director was actually

*Within limits. A recent executive order by the governor mandated a minimum three-month stay for youth committed to DOC.

accountable to the DCFS director. It also was not long before members of the Policy Board settled back into their traditional patterns of interacting with one another. Absenteeism increased, along with the practice of designating subordinates as stand-ins.

The failure of the original concept was soon recognized and the group was reconstituted in August 1975. Its new name was the UDIS Advisory and Planning Board. Membership was expanded to include the Director of the Illinois Department of Mental Health, the Director of the Public Defender's Office at the Juvenile Court, and the Superintendent of the Chicago Board of Education. The Board continued to review and vote on contracts, receive reports and presentations from Northwestern's client tracking and monitoring system, and discuss relevant issues. In the revised setup, however, the nominal delegates were asked to attend only quarterly meetings to discuss broader issues. Housekeeping matters were handled by alternates at the intervening monthly meetings.

THE UDIS TRACKING SYSTEM

From the outset, UDIS operations were monitored by a "tracking system": a computer-based information system operated by the Center for Urban Affairs at Northwestern University and funded by ILEC. The system was initially encouraged by Paul DeMuro and Professor Andrew Gordon. Gordon had previously been active in an effort to track youngsters served by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). For UDIS, the intention was to capture the information that would enable UDIS both to meet its basic mandate of getting referrals who were available for DOC and to be accountable to the JJPB. Type of placement, changes in placement, referral patterns among judges, geographic spread of the UDIS referrals, the geographic spread of the placements, the age and offense of the referral--these were among the items that were to permit assessment of the extent to which UDIS was operating in the way it was supposed to operate.

The Policy Board was the principal consumer. At the outset, the Policy Board took an active role in requesting specific types of information from the tracking system, and the reports were steadily revised to incorporate those requests. As time went on, a monthly statistical profile of UDIS's operations was developed that has remained largely

unchanged for the past year. An example of the material in use in early 1977 is shown in Appendix C.

The extent to which the data provided by the tracking system were actually used to affect policy decisions is difficult to measure. DeMuro is said to have used the tracking system extensively during UDIS's initial phase. To him it was an important management tool preventing UDIS from becoming just another type of probation service--since the tracking data could provide a basis for adhering to UDIS's principles of short-term programming and community-based placement. In addition to DeMuro, the Policy Board apparently took an active interest in the contents of the tracking system reports early in the program. Gordon remembers Policy Board members who, after examining the monthly report, would telephone to ask why a minor offender--a glue sniffer, for example--had slipped into that month's batch of referrals.

As the Policy Board became less important, and especially after it was reconstituted, the consumer of tracking system information increasingly became UDIS itself. The system continued to serve much the same functions that it served for DeMuro, often in increasingly sophisticated ways. For example, each Case Manager could have a monthly summary of his or her entire caseload history including each youth's status (active or inactive), sex, age, race, placement history (by vendor, in and out dates, and current status), probation area, and number of petitions, as well as the instant offense, and the judge with jurisdiction over the case.

Specific examples of policy changes or of administrative actions because of the tracking system were relatively scarce. There is reason to believe, however, that the impact of the tracking system on the course of UDIS was substantial. More than most programs, UDIS became what it was intended to become. As we shall discuss in subsequent chapters, UDIS tenaciously clung to its role as an alternative to incarceration, despite pressures and inducements to do otherwise. It met its basic functions of building up a substantial and varied offender roster and of utilizing it in the originally envisioned form. And on all of these issues, the tracking system served up a highly visible and specific monthly statement of how UDIS stood. We lack the hard evidence we would prefer to have but our assessment of the history of UDIS suggests strongly that this running balance sheet of UDIS operations

played a significant role, most prominently, during the early, formative months of the program.

Our assessment of the quality of the tracking system reached somewhat contrasting conclusions about *design* of the system and *data collection procedures* for maintaining it.

In design, the tracking system had several strengths. *It asked the right questions*--the choice of data points reflected unusually careful attention to the reasons for collecting data. There were very few data points that we would add or substract from the system, even with our considerable advantage of hindsight. *The system was flexible.* It could produce a wide variety of outputs, as illustrated in Appendix C. Given a specific question, it could custom-make an output to answer it. *The regular reports communicated.* The format and content of the reports were easy to read or to scan. They made it as undemanding on the consumer to use the information as any comparable monitoring system we have encountered. And they put the crucial data up front, highlighted, where it was hardest to ignore. Overall, we consider that *the UDIS tracking system was exceptionally well designed for its purpose,* and in many ways could serve as a model for program-based information systems that are all too often clumsy, uninformative, and unused.

Data preparation and entry at Northwestern also appeared to flow smoothly. *The main problem with the tracking system lay in its data collection procedures.* The primary mode appeared to be questions addressed to the Case Managers, and Case Manager responses to a number of the questions were inaccurate often enough to introduce nontrivial levels of error into some items. We did not systematically check out every data point, but in the course of the evaluation, we had occasion to use some of them, and we characteristically found problems. The primary example occurred when we were reconstructing placement histories, as described in Chapter 2. Youth who had actually left the program months earlier were often reported as still active, and the data on individual placements were often incomplete or wrong. Age provided another example. Apparently Case Managers commonly guessed the age, rather than checking the file folders, and they systematically erred on the young side. Hence, for some time, it was believed by the program's operators that UDIS was dealing with a population that was substantially younger than DOC's. In fact, a comparison using birthdates

indicates that the ages were nearly identical (see Chapter 5). A spotcheck of 50 cases further revealed that the age listed in the tracking system did not correspond to the date of birth on UDIS's own "face sheet" (the basic biographical form) in 11 cases--a discrepancy rate of 22.0 percent of the cases.

In early 1977, these and other problems led Northwestern and UDIS to collaborate on a major update and correction of the system's data. Reforms in data collection procedures were also instituted. These occurred after the end of data collection for the evaluation, and we therefore have no measures of their effectiveness.

It should not be inferred from the above comments that the tracking system's data were too error-ridden to be useful. On the contrary, the errors probably led to few if any important misinterpretations of UDIS's activities. It was the cumulative record, over the life of the program, that was primarily affected by the data problems.

5. Immediate Outcomes of Program Operations

The first measure of accomplishments is whether and how well UDIS performed its basic functions of (1) obtaining referrals who otherwise would be committed, and (2) developing a roster of service providers of adequate size and variety, and (3) competently administering the office.

UDIS REFERRALS AND THE COMMITTABLE DELINQUENT

The question addressed here is whether UDIS dealt with the truly hardcore, chronic delinquents who otherwise would have been committed to DOC. Below, we compare the UDIS referrals and DOC commitments on prior offense record and personal background characteristics.

Prior Offense Record

The typical member of the sample experienced his first arrest a few months before his twelfth birthday and found himself in UDIS approximately four years later. During that time he accumulated an average of 13.2 arrests, as indicated in Table 5.1.* This history typically consisted of six crimes of theft (including burglary) and two involving injury or an immediate threat of injury.† The rest were largely damage, narcotics, and possession offenses, plus an average of 1.2 status offenses. The record included an average of 3.1 detentions at Cook County's temporary detention center for juveniles, popularly known as Audy Home.

The youth committed to DOC during the same period had an almost identical offense record on these measures. Note, however, that the Pre-UDIS Baseline--that is, delinquents

*"Arrest" will be used to refer to what is more precisely stated as "take into custody."

†"Injury or immediate threat of injury" defines what will be called *violence-related offenses.* They include assault, battery, attempted or actual homicide, armed and strong-armed robbery, rape or attempted rape, and other sexual assault.

Table 5.1 General Characteristics of the Prior Offense Record

(All values are sample means)	UDIS (n=191)	DOC (n=159)	Pre-UDIS Baseline (n=142)
Number of arrests	13.2	12.8	10.6
Number of appearances in court	6.7	6.2	5.3
Number of detentions at Audy Home	3.1	3.2	2.4
Number of violence-related offenses	2.2	2.5	2.2
Number of theft offenses	5.7	4.8	4.3
Number of other non-status offenses	4.1	4.2	3.3
Number of status offenses	1.2	1.3	.9
Age at first offense	11.8	12.1	12.2
Age at program entry	15.6	15.8	15.4

committed to DOC during the 21 months before UDIS became operational--generally showed lower totals than either UDIS or DOC. Comparing the Baseline with the combined UDIS and DOC samples, the difference in number of arrests, number of appearances in court, and number of detentions in Audy Home were all statistically significant ($p<.002$ using a t-test comparison of means).* We interpret this as a reflection of the trend toward fewer commitments that accelerated in 1975-76. Standards for commitment were becoming more demanding.†

On these general descriptors, then, there is no distinction between UDIS and DOC commitments. When the nature of the offenses is examined more closely, a few differences do emerge. As Table 5.2 indicates, *the very severe violent crimes--homicide and rape--generally resulted in commitment rather than referral to UDIS.* Similarly, DOC commitments had higher proportions of the other violence-related offenses. This is consistent with the nearly universal view of the Probation Officers and judges we interviewed, that the youth

*"Statistically significant" as used in this report means that the observed differences would be expected to occur by chance less than five times out of 100, if the true difference were zero.

†In this sense, virtually all of UDIS's referrals probably would have been committed if they had brought identical records to the courts five or ten years ago.

Table 5.2 Number of Arrests per 100 Subjects for Selected Crimes, Prior to Intervention

	UDIS (n=191)	DOC (n=159)	Pre-UDIS Baseline (n=142)
Homicide	1.0	7.5	5.6
Rape or sexual assault	3.1	8.8	7.7
Battery	84.8	97.2	81.7
Assault	25.1	33.8	21.8
Armed robbery	30.9	52.1	29.6
Strongarm robbery	73.3	80.3	73.9
Auto theft or criminal trespass to vehicle	78.5	99.3	76.1
Other theft	507.9	430.2	371.1

who were thought to pose the most danger to the community were being institutionalized. A record of violent offenses was the most conspicuous objective criterion available to the judges for identifying this subpopulation.

Relatively few boys in the DOC sample set it apart from UDIS. Twelve homicides were counted among the 159 members of the DOC sample compared to only two in the 191-person UDIS sample. DOC boys accounted for 22 victims (aside from those killed) who had to be hospitalized, compared to 12 for the UDIS sample. Fourteen persons were raped by the DOC sample compared to six by the UDIS sample. Using the Sellin-Wolfgang index for scoring the seriousness of offenses, only one of the 151 UDIS boys for whom seriousness data were available--0.7 percent--had committed an offense with a score greater than seven.* This compared to 12 of the 122 DOC youth with seriousness data--9.8 percent--who had scores greater than seven. Below that point, the distributions of most serious prior offense were very similar for the two samples.

The basic facts of the offenses do not always convey the kinds of data that judges used in deciding whether to send a youngster to DOC or to UDIS. Lack of remorse on the part of the delinquent, a Probation Officer's judgment that a recurrence of a violent offense was likely, a particularly cruel or senseless aspect to an offense--these considerations were not captured in the data we collected.

* See p. 140 for a discussion of the index. See p. 14 for an explanation of the missing seriousness data.

Judges and Probation Officers were openly trying to send the hardest of the hardcore to DOC instead of UDIS, and they may have succeeded beyond the relatively minor distinctions that appear in the offense histories that have been presented.

Personal Background Characteristics

In addition to offense record, we also reconstructed as much material as possible about the youth's environment and his personal characteristics. The following pages summarize the population characteristics of UDIS referrals, contemporaneous DOC commitments, and DOC commitments during the 21 months prior to the establishment of UDIS.* Note that the sample sizes are substantially reduced on many of the variables. The reason in all cases was missing data in the files, or data so inconclusive that a reliable judgment could not be made. This may have produced bias in the population means; it is less likely to have interfered with the UDIS-DOC *comparison*.

Age. The means and distributions of age at program entry were nearly identical. For UDIS, the mean was 15.6 years and the standard deviation was 1.0. For DOC, the mean was 15.8 years and the standard deviation was .9.

Race. For UDIS, information on race was available for 189 persons in the sample. Of these, 142 (75.1 percent) were Black; 28 were White (14.8 percent); and 19 had Hispanic surnames (10.1 percent). For DOC, 123 of 153 were Black (80.4 percent); 22 were White (14.4 percent); and 8 had Hispanic surnames (5.2 percent).

Adults in the Home. Less than one out of four in the UDIS and DOC samples was living with an intact set of natural parents. More than half were living in a one-adult household. The Pre-UDIS Baseline had somewhat less disrupted family situations. The sample breakdowns for these and other household types at the time of program entrance are shown in Table 5.3.

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* See pp. 17-19 on the distinction between the recidivism samples and the ones for whom personal background characteristics were collected.

Table 5.3 Resident Parents

	UDIS (n=187)	DOC (n=160)	Pre-UDIS Baseline (n=103)
Two natural parents in household	22.5%	22.5%	33.0%
One natural parent and one step parent	13.9	20.0	24.3
Other two-adult arrangement	.5	1.3	1.0
One natural parent	45.5	45.6	33.0
Other single adult arrangement	7.5	6.3	7.8
Non-family residential arrangement	10.2	4.4	1.0

Note the greater proportion of UDIS than DOC referrals who came to the program from a nonfamily residential arrangement (foster care, for example): 10.2 to 4.4 respectively. This difference is consistent with the argument occasionally voiced by Case Managers that UDIS sometimes was used by judges as a supplemental source of services for extremely disadvantaged delinquents who would not otherwise go to DOC. Also, DOC youth had a step-parent in a two-parent home somewhat more commonly than did UDIS youth (20.0 to 13.9 percent respectively).

Parental Care. An index was prepared with the following indicators of defective parental care: a record of physical abuse or conflict, frequent absence from the home, chronic use of alcohol or drugs, involvement in criminal activities, and other specified parental problems (e.g., emotional disturbance, prostitution) that make residence in the home unsuitable. The hypothesis was that judges were institutionalizing boys not just on the basis of the offenses, but also from reluctance to leave youth in conspicuously unsuitable home environments. UDIS was expected to receive youngsters with more normal home environments.

This expectation was not borne out. The breakdown of index scores is shown in Table 5.4. The potential range of scores was 0 (no noted problems on any of the indicators) to 14 (extremely severe problems with both parents on all of them). When data on one or more of

Table 5.4 Distribution of Parental Care Index Scores

Parental Care Index	UDIS (n=176)	DOC (n=94)	Pre-UDIS Baseline (n=53)
0	51.7%	61.7%	58.5%
1	33.0	21.3	18.9
2	10.8	12.8	11.3
3	2.8	3.2	9.4
4	1.1	1.1	1.9
5	.6	0	0

the indicators could not be obtained, that case was excluded from the analysis.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the distribution of scores is the unexpectedly large proportion of youth in all three samples with only minor reported problems on these indicators. More than half had no noted problems at all. Again the differences in the UDIS and DOC results were nominal.

Parental Employment. Unemployment in one common sense of the word--inability to find work despite being available for a job--was less often a problem than we would have predicted. As shown in Table 5.5, in less than 10 percent of the cases in any of the samples were either both resident parents or the only resident parent sometimes or chronically unemployed despite efforts to find work. But there was a very large group of welfare families, usually one-parent without a male present, that comprised virtually all of the cases under the category "not in the labor market."

UDIS families had somewhat fewer overall unemployment problems than DOC families but the difference derived from fewer cases (1.6 in the UDIS sample) in which one of two parents was unemployed. UDIS actually had slightly more cases than DOC of "total unemployment" (category 3) in which both resident parents or the only resident parent were unemployed. UDIS also apparently had more welfare families than DOC (judging from the "not in labor market" category).

Table 5.5 Parental Employment

	UDIS (n=122)	DOC (n=113)	Pre-UDIS Baseline (n=73)
Resident parent(s) in labor market, regularly employed	41.0	44.3	57.5
One parent in labor market, regularly employed and one parent is either sometimes or chronically unemployed	1.6	8.9	9.6
One or both resident parent(s) in labor market are sometimes or chronically unemployed	6.6	5.3	8.2
Both or only resident parent(s) not in labor market	50.8	41.6	24.7

School Performance. We did not have access to school records, and the information in the case files was often scanty. Ratings on school performance and behavior were attempted whenever possible. They yielded the results shown in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 School Performance

	UDIS (n=94)	DOC (n=66)	Pre-UDIS Baseline (n=53)
No problems	2.1	1.5	0.0
Below average performance or occasional truancy	28.7	24.3	22.6
Below average performance and frequent truancy or behavior problems	37.3	48.5	47.2
Failing grades and chronic truancy or severe behavior problems	31.9	25.8	30.2

Again, the hypothesis that judges were sending the less troubled youngsters to UDIS was not confirmed.

Drug Use. Drug use is one of the few indicators that showed a UDIS-DOC difference. two of every 11 DOC commitments had a noteworthy drug or alcohol problem("sporadic," "chronic," or "clinical"), compared with one of every 11 UDIS referrals. The distributions are shown in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7 Drug Use

	UDIS (n=176)	DOC (n=153)	Pre-UDIS Baseline (n=91)
No known use or minor experimentation	69.9	52.3	72.5
Occasional use of alcohol or soft drugs	21.0	30.1	17.6
Sporadic or suspected use of hard drugs	3.4	4.6	2.2
Chronic use of drugs or alcohol	4.5	13.1	6.6
Clinical addiction	1.1	0.0	1.1

The extent of drug use was significantly greater for DOC than for UDIS ($z = 2.97$ derived through a Mann-Whitney U test, $p<.002$ in a one-tailed test).

Psychological Problems. We were unable to construct a rating of emotional and psychological makeup that was reliable across subjects. The manifest variation in the bases that psychologists used to arrive at their assessments was too great. Our best estimate from the ratings we employed is that approximately 10 percent of UDIS and DOC cases exhibited psychological pathologies severe enough to require professional treatment. No between-group differences were apparent.

A Summary Comparison of the UDIS and DOC Samples

UDIS had to fight a running battle to obtain the kind of referrals it was meant to handle: the delinquent who would otherwise have been committed to DOC. Everyone

involved--UDIS staff, Probation Officers, and judges--agreed that UDIS was perceived as a softer, less drastic alternative than DOC, that judges would occasionally like to take advantage of UDIS's resources for youth they would otherwise put on ordinary probation, and that judges tried put the most dangerous offenders in DOC. In no sense did UDIS and DOC receive randomly selected subsamples from among the population eligible for commitment to DOC.

We asked Probation Officers to estimate how many of the youth would have been recommended for commitment to DOC in the absence of UDIS. The 16 Probation Officers who were able to respond had recommended approximately 145 youth to UDIS. Of those, the Probation Officers estimated that they would have otherwise recommended approximately 88 for commitment--slightly more than 60 percent. The judges actually referred approximately 138 of these cases to UDIS (an indication of the importance of the Probation Officers' recommendation). The Probation Officers estimated that the judges would otherwise have committed approximately 85 of them--61.6 percent. UDIS staff members themselves acknowledged the existence of borderline referrals who were technically committable and met UDIS's basic criteria, but who ordinarily would have remained on probation.

These perceptions are only faintly substantiated by the statistics. In offense record and personal background, the degree of similarity between the UDIS and DOC samples was remarkable. Severity of the most serious prior offense appeared to be a discriminating variable, but even that applied to a relatively small number of offenders.

We came to this summary interpretation about the extent to which UDIS obtained committable delinquents for its referrals:

If the question is whether the UDIS referrals were *technically committable*, the answer is yes, virtually without exception. *The criteria set by the program--two adjudications of delinquency or a very serious offense--were typically overfulfilled.*

If the question is whether the UDIS referrals *would actually have gone to DOC if UDIS had not existed*, the answer is "most of them," but with some equivocation about the proportion. Judging by the quantitative indicators, the 60.7 percent figure given by the Probation Officers

appears to be too low. *It would be possible to produce very closely matched UDIS and DOC samples on all of the offense characteristics by skimming off approximately 9 percent of the most serious DOC offenders.* But many non-quantifiable elements did affect commitment decisions, and it is likely that the percentage of UDIS youth who would not have been committed is closer to the Probation Officers' estimate than the quantitative analysis suggested.

It is equally important to note, however, that we have no way of knowing whether these elusive other factors really make a difference, and whether judges are in fact successfully discriminating between less and more dangerous offenders. Predicting the propensity to recidivate among juveniles is a highly inexact art. Our overall assessment is that *the UDIS and DOC samples were drawn from a population of the most serious, chronic delinquents that Cook County is bringing into its juvenile court and that the overlap between the two samples is very high.* DOC is getting more of the very serious violent offenders than UDIS, and judges are *trying* to give DOC the more intractable cases as well, with an unknown degree of accuracy.

Given the pressures on UDIS to accept borderline cases, its record on this objective is impressive. Numerous instances of refusal to accept referrals were noted, even at times when UDIS was also under pressure to increase intake. *The staff of the program effectively adhered to the proposition that UDIS was to be an alternative to incarceration,* not a supplement to probation.

The 35 Percent Objective

UDIS originally proposed to measure its success by reductions in the number of youth going to DOC. More specifically, UDIS undertook to reduce Cook County commitments to DOC by 35 percent. Did UDIS succeed?

It was a poorly conceived objective in the first place. As Figure 3.1 indicated (page 21), commitment rates fluctuated widely for reasons that were irrelevant to UDIS. It would easily have been possible for UDIS to have had 100 percent committable referrals during a period that showed rising commitments, or zero committable referrals during a period that showed falling commitments. The issue is not whether commitments rose or fell, but whether the UDIS referrals *would* have gone to DOC if UDIS had not been an available alternative. We have already addressed that issue.

For the record, however, the data revealed the following. In the 21 months preceding UDIS (January 1973 through September 1974), the master card file at St. Charles indicated that 1,012 Cook County youth entered DOC. During the subsequent 21 months (October 1974 through June 1976) while UDIS was in operation, 553 Cook County commitments appeared in the master file. The drop was 45.4 percent. Moreover, the slope of a regression trendline during the 21 months preceding UDIS was -.63; in the following 21 months it was -.83, despite the lower base from which the second period began. The existing decline in commitments did accelerate once UDIS began operations. Of course, the next year's commitment figures could as easily go the other way, no matter how well or poorly UDIS continues to do its job.

A more meaningful assessment can be obtained from another approach. Suppose that the Probation Officers' estimate is correct that 61.6 percent of the UDIS referrals would have otherwise been sent to DOC. As we have indicated, that estimate is probably conservative. Consider further a datum that will be explained more fully in Chapter 8, that roughly 35 to 40 percent of UDIS referrals can be expected eventually to end up in DOC anyway. The implication of these two proportions is that at least 37.0 to 40.0 percent of the 463 UDIS referrals during those 21 months would have otherwise gone to DOC and, because of the existence of UDIS, never did. They also imply that the effect on DOC referrals in that period would have been an increase from 553 to 838: an increase of 51.5 percent over the actual commitments.

Two factors make the 51.5 percent figure an inflated estimate: the implicit and probably unwarranted assumption that the boys who went from UDIS to DOC were evenly distributed among all referrals and not concentrated among the 61.6 percent who "would have gone" to DOC without UDIS, and the fact that some of the 553 commitments were ex-UDIS participants. But even after making allowances for these inflationary effects, it appears that *UDIS had a substantial effect in reducing DOC commitments from Cook County*, very possibly meeting the sense of the 35 percent objective.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SERVICE RESOURCES

The implementation of UDIS depended on developing a large and varied assortment of service providers, or "vendors." Despite reservations expressed by some UDIS staff members about the variety of services, *UDIS's overall accomplishments on this objective appeared to be good.*

From early in the program, there rarely were bottlenecks resulting from a shortage of slots in the desired type of service.

The menu of vendor services available to UDIS Case Managers fell into six categories: advocacy, counseling, educational/vocational, group homes/foster care, rural programs, and intensive care. These placement types may be arranged roughly along a continuum ranging from least drastic alternative to most drastic alternative. The fit is not perfect, but advocacy, counseling, and educational/vocational services are generally consistent with maintaining the youngster in the community; group homes/foster care represent a more controlled environment that may or may not be linked with the youth's community; and the rural and intensive care programs are typically residential with no community ties. Table 5.8 shows the distribution of use of each service type for the program sample.

Table 5.8 Distribution of Service Days, by Type of Service

Type of Placement	Number of Days	Percent of Total Vendor Service Days (includes overlaps)
Advocacy	24,848	52.1
Counseling	4,525	9.5
Educational/Vocational	6,862	14.4
Group Homes/Foster Care	4,909	10.3
Rural Programs	5,039	10.6
Intensive Care	1,474	3.1
Total	47,657	100.0

n = 165 (excludes 21 youth in the 191-person recidivism sample still in UDIS as of 12/31/76 and 5 additional cases with ambiguous or incomplete program histories)

A seventh type of setting for UDIS youth was Audy Home, Cook County's juvenile detention center. UDIS referrals were there out of necessity, not as a "placement," and Audy is therefore excluded from the analyses.

Through mid-1977, UDIS had contracted with 110 vendors. These included the providers of services mentioned above and individual assessors and consultants. A complete list of resources that UDIS has tapped would be larger yet.

Contracts were not used for doctors or hospitals nor for providers who billed for no more than $500 of services. Table 5.9 shows contract vendor services available as of July 1976, a typical representation of UDIS services once the program was underway.

Table 5.9 UDIS Service Contracts as of July 1976

Vendor Type	Number	Placement Slots			Median Charge
		Range	Total	Mean	
Advocacy	12	5-40	187	15.6	$58.64 per week
Counseling	7	5-30	85+	17.0	$25.00 per hour
Educational/Vocational	9	5-30	60+	12.0	$7.38 per hour $48.50 per week $226.34 per month
Foster Care	4	5	10+	5.0	$136.60 per week
Group Homes	7	4-8	48	6.9	$36.60 per day
Rural Programs	4	8-15	42	10.3	$33.00 per day
Intensive Care	3	3-6	12	4.7	$36.25 per day

The following descriptions convey the nature of each of the six main categories of service.

Advocacy

Advocacy services were the backbone of UDIS. Of the 165 youth in the program sample, 148 (89.7 percent) had been referred to advocacy services.

"Advocacy" is a relatively recent concept in juvenile services. It refers to the role of representing the youth in his confrontation with the juvenile justice system or any other of the institutions he might encounter. An analogy is often drawn between this role and that of the typical middle class parent whose child is first picked up by the police. The parent may be angry or may be supportive, but he or she will go to the police station, make the necessary commitments to the authorities, get a lawyer if the offense is a serious one, arrange for treatment services if indicated, and generally run the interference that keeps most middle class delinquents out of training schools. Advocacy services were intended to provide the

UDIS youth with a person who could fill a similar role in dealing with the system. As of July 1976, UDIS had contracts with 12 advocacy agencies.

Services focused on intensive contact, with youngsters and advocates spending from 10 to 25 hours a week together. Programs varied, but many provided athletic activities, trips, social functions, and peer group "rap" sessions. Almost all furnished weekly allowances for their clients.

The categories of "advocacy" and "counseling" overlapped, but important differences remained. While advocates sometimes provided counseling services, they attempted to do so outside of traditional counseling settings. They viewed themselves more as representatives for their charges--in the court, the police precinct, the school, and the family. As one advocacy director put it: "Advocates view themselves as 'Philadelphia lawyers,' helping kids to deal with the system and society and being their friends. Counseling is informal, done in the car or during half-time of a basketball game."

The UDIS and advocacy philosophies were compatible: both acknowledged the role of their clients as victims as well as offenders--victims of neglect, poor schools, peer pressures, and institutions of social control. To provide an advocate to represent and support the youth was thus consistent with UDIS's youngster-against-the-world view. But there was also a highly pragmatic reason for the importance of advocacy in the UDIS service roster. UDIS had to demonstrate first that it could offer more intensive personal contact than a probation officer could and, second, that it could provide surveillance while the youth was in the community to protect public safety. The advocacy agencies claimed to fill both of these functions.

Almost any youth who was not placed in a residential setting outside of the community was placed with an advocate. Often, this placement was combined with one in an educational or vocational program.

Counseling Services

Counseling services were intended to help the youth reconcile the conflicts in his life. Unlike the street-oriented advocacy services that focused on informal contact between the paraprofessional worker and the youth, the counseling services offered scheduled weekly or twice-weekly

sessions with professional counselors. As of July 1976, UDIS had contracts with seven counseling agencies. Of the 165 youth in the program sample, 42 (25.5 percent) had been referred for counseling.

Vendors typically provided three types of counseling: individual, family, and group. Counseling style varied with both the program and the worker. Some used traditional psychoanalytic techniques while others employed reality therapy, parent effectiveness training, or a positive peer culture model. Family counseling sessions offered the youth a structure for confrontation and interaction with all family members in an attempt to remediate deteriorating relationships. The Near North Family Guidance Center specialized in providing treatment to drug abusers and their families.

Referrals to counseling agencies were usually made when a Case Manager felt that his client's conflicts in the home required professional intervention, that a client's problems in social or psychological adjustment required a more therapeutic approach than an advocacy agency could offer.

Educational/Vocational Training

Academic Programs. With only a handful of exceptions, UDIS referrals had school problems. Truancy and poor school performance were nearly universal among the members of the sample, and a number of personal history folders also made reference to learning handicaps or mental deficiencies. UDIS therefore from the beginning maintained contracts with academic services. In broad terms, these services fell under two headings: tutorial programs, which worked with students on a one-to-one or small-group basis, and alternative schools, which provided a normal class structure with special supplementary resources for problem youth. Both types of services were designed to provide maximum learning in a minimum time--they had the UDIS youngsters for only a few months and were asked to compensate for years of academic deficiencies. In addition, both types of programs sought to foster positive attitudes toward learning that, it was hoped, would survive the short-term intervention.

As of July 1976, UDIS had contracts with three tutoring programs and one alternative school. Of the 165 youth in the program sample, 58 (35.2 percent) had received tutoring services. Four (2.4 percent) had been enrolled in the alternative school.

Discussions with the Case Managers indicated that a youth was likely to be chosen for an educational service for one of four reasons. The first three consisted of special learning needs: functional illiteracy, diagnosed learning handicaps, or pronounced behavioral or motivational problems that prevented the youth from learning in a traditional school setting. The fourth reason was the youth's own interest. If a youngster exhibited an interest in going back to school and the Case Manager felt that the child's public school was not an appropriate setting, a referral was made to one of the educational services.

Tutorial services, while offering instruction in a full range of academic subjects, emphasized the development of reading and math skills. Some programs were designed specifically to prepare older students for the general equivalency degree (GED) examination. Others played a more general catch-up role, helping the youth raise his grade level to the point that he could reenter the public school system.

The chief advantage of the tutorial service was that it permitted a high degree of individualization: one-on-one and small group instruction, periodic testing, individual counseling, and flexible hours of attendance. Recreational and vocational activities were used as incentives and rewards for academic performance.

The individualized nature of the academic programs also tended to produce a spillover function among program personnel. Staff members noted that although advocacy was not explicitly one of their functions, tutors were sometimes asked to take their UDIS clients to the hospital, pick them up at the police precincts, or represent them at court hearings.

As Case Managers frequently pointed out, the tutorial service was for many of the UDIS youth their only opportunity for a positive learning experience, the extent of the child's learning problems were often being such that individualized attention was the only way to break through barriers that had been built up over the years. The importance of this advantage of the tutorial programs was reflected in the proportions of UDIS referrals sent to them rather than to the alternative school.

As of July 1976, only one alternative school (CAM Academy) maintained a contract with UDIS. The Academy provided an ungraded year-round program that allowed

students to obtain high school diplomas in one to two years. Offerings were diverse, ranging from traditional courses in grammar and simple mathematics to projects in "self-awareness for the future" and "community portrait photography." The program promised to engage the youth in the educational process through informal relationships with staff. Intensive individual and group counseling were said to be a central part of the alternative school program. There was a one-week counseling orientation period as well as frequent group counseling sessions during the school term. Program components included vocational workshops, GED evening classes, and a special educational curriculum for students with severe reading difficulties. UDIS clients were considered "special program students" by the Academy and did not have to meet the usual entrance requirements of graduation from elementary school or qualifying scores on admission tests.

Vocational Training. Vocational programs were intended to prepare the older UDIS client for independent living by providing training and exposure to the world of work. The emphasis was on development of employable skills so that the UDIS youth who had egressed could realistically believe that the option of getting and holding a legitimate job was open to him.

Some programs, or some components within programs, required that the youth be over 16 years old or have completed the eighth grade. These restrictions, combined with the general preference of UDIS to return its youngsters to school whenever possible, meant that the youth referred to vocational programs was likely to be older than the average referral. Characteristically, the participant in a vocational program was a high school dropout who had expressed interest in learning a trade. Overall, 5 youth (3.0 percent) in the sample had been assigned to a vocational program.

Four of the five vocational training programs accepted both male and female clients. One--"Pretty Girl," a modeling and self-improvement school--served only female clients. With that exception, the vocational training programs provided structured courses in mechanical and industrial arts: welding, auto mechanics, machine and raw-material processing, and printing. Some participants received on-the-job training with the Illinois Department of Vocational Resources and the Chicago Alliance of Businessmen. Vendors typically tried to locate appropriate job placements for clients who successfully completed the training schedule.

As in the educational programs, vocational training services tended to fill advocacy, counseling, and educational functions as well. Three of the vendors offered individual or group counseling for their clients. Two of the programs provided academic tutoring and GED preparation.

Group Homes/Foster Care

The placement that we call "a controlled environment" was intended to provide structure and supervision away from family tensions, neighborhood haunts and delinquent peers, while still within Cook County. Three types of services fell within the controlled environment category: group homes, foster care, and a Transitional Living Program. Of the 165 youth in the program sample, 46 (27.9 percent) had been placed in group homes and seven (4.2 percent) had been placed in foster homes. None of the youth in our sample participated in the Transitional Living Program.

Group Homes. Group homes were typically large, old houses with seven to nine adolescents in residence. Some of the homes were overseen by a set of houseparents, usually consisting of a young married couple. Others were staffed by counselors who rotated shifts to provide 24-hour supervision. While a few homes offered in-house structured daily activities, others remained primarily living quarters with educational, recreational, and advocacy services left to outside agencies. All the houses placed counseling at the center of their programs. Many scheduled regular group and family counseling sessions, and had staff members trained in crisis counseling. Residents were enrolled in public and alternative high schools as well as GED and vocational training programs. Tutoring was to be provided by house staff when the need arose.

Some of the residents held part-time and summer jobs. Recreational opportunities included memberships in community centers, the YMCA, and recreational programs held at high schools, as well as field trips and special house occasions. The majority of the program personnel interviewed indicated that advocacy was limited to representation in the court or with the police.

The homes were intended to structure their programs around the eventual return of the youth to his family. Parents were usually encouraged to visit the homes at any time. After a brief orientation period, youth often returned

to their own homes for overnight and weekend visits. Despite their residential character, the group homes typically were very far from being even a minimum security environment.

A youth was likely to be placed in a group home for one of several reasons: because the judge, probation officer, or state's attorney insisted on a placement outside the home as a precondition for referral to UDIS; because there were severe conflicts between parent and child; because parental instability or deplorable physical conditions made continued residence in the home inadvisable; or because negative peer influences and gang activities in the neighborhood indicated a need to relocate the youth.

One of the homes, St. Leonard's House, served the special function of shelter care facility for UDIS youngsters awaiting court hearings after picking up a supplemental petition. Youth were said to be placed at St. Leonard's to "cool off" until suitable residential programs were found.

Foster Care. Foster care provided a home-like residence for the youth who could not remain in his own home but did not need the structure of the group home. The supervising agencies recruited and screened all foster parents and additionally trained them to provide individual counseling to their foster children--a function supported by weekly visits of case workers and by frequent family counseling sessions. Most of the placements were temporary, with the youth working toward a return to his natural family or toward independent living.

Transitional Living Program (TLP). TLP was an "emancipation" program; it allowed the adolescent to move away from his family and toward independence without completely discarding adult support. Clients shared an apartment with an advocate who provided counseling for personal, academic, and vocational problems. TLP was run by the Community Advancement Program (CAP). Youth could attend group and individual counseling sessions at the CAP offices where counselors were available for crisis intervention on a 24-hour basis.

Rural Programs

The rural programs provided intensive programming away from the inner city environment where most UDIS

referrals originated. Although the programs differed in structure and emphasis, all allowed the Chicago client exposure to a nonurban environment--often, the first exposure. As of July 1976, UDIS had contracts with four rural programs. Of the 165 youth in the program sample, 83 (50.3 percent) had been referred to at least one of those programs.

Two of the programs, Underway and Darrow Hall, offered time-lined wilderness experiences based on the Outward Bound model. A third, the Work Camp, was an intensive vocational-educational program. Finally, Crossroads was a six-week program set in a combination of rural and city locations.

The two wilderness programs were physically demanding. Youngsters were required to hike, climb, swim, canoe, and learn how to survive in the wild. Each "brigade" included from eight to ten youth, and each program cycle lasted from four to six weeks. While both programs focused on experiential learning, the staff assumed a directive and supportive role, teaching specific wilderness skills and providing counseling on program experiences and problems at home.

The Work Camp, developed specifically for the UDIS client and widely used until its closing in late 1976, required the youth to participate in basic vocational activities such as painting, construction, and food preparation, hoping that he would find work rewarding. The camp also had an alternative school program, preparing some youngsters for return to public schools in Chicago and others for the GED examination. Recreational opportunities included overnight camping, horseback riding, swimming, and gymnastic activities. The typical stay at the Camp ranged from two to four months.

The Crossroads program worked with groups of eight youngsters for a period of six weeks. The program was geared toward rural and city exploration. Clients experienced country life through hiking, camping, and talking with farmers. They re-explored the city through experiences ranging from museum visits to rap sessions with pimps. These experiences were accompanied by formal and informal counseling with emphasis on ways the youth could best survive in his own environment. The program also offered vocational and academic tutoring.

Three of the programs provided followup services for their clients for the first few weeks after their return to the community. Although advocacy was not a primary function of any of the programs, a few staff assumed that role informally by attending court hearings and speaking with Case Managers, Probation Officers, and families.

First placements in rural settings were often at the insistence of the judge and not because of the UDIS assessment or the Case Manager's inclination. A first referral might have been made for one of several reasons: seriousness or length of the youth's offense record, conflicts or deleterious conditions in the home, delinquent peers, or gang activities in the neighborhood. Mid-program rural placements, on the other hand, frequently resulted from a supplemental petition or from the failure of the community-based placements to change the attitudes or actions of their clients. In these cases, the rural program became the "least drastic alternative" by default (the remaining alternative being probable commitment to DOC).

Intensive Care

The residential intensive care facilities were designed to deal with the delinquent youth requiring psychiatric or psychological evaluation and treatment. Two types of facilities fell within the intensive care category: hospitals providing psychiatric services, and residential programs using a behavioral approach. UDIS had contracts with three residential programs as of July 1976and purchased hospital services on an individual basis. Of the 165 youth in the program sample, 14 (8.5 percent) had been placed in intensive care facilities.

Hospital services were designed to meet the specific needs of each youngster. The programs were usually supervised by an attending psychiatrist with psychologists and social workers providing therapeutic support. Typically, a youth who was referred for care underwent a psychiatric work-up and evaluation. Individual and group counseling sessions were held on a regular basis. Hospital programs offered daily academic classes as well as tutoring for students who needed additional help. Recreational facilities were sometimes available on the hospital grounds.

The Intensive Care Unit of the Illinois State Psychiatric Institute offered psychological services to its clients. It employed a social work approach rather than the traditional psychiatric model used by the hospitals.

Camelot and Arden Shores were less secure residential facilities offering therapeutic programs based on a behavioral model. The Arden Shores treatment plan was positive peer culture, emphasizing, in the words of its staff, "the concept of personal responsibility for a student's own behavior and concern for the welfare of his classmates." Formal group counseling sessions were held daily and parental group meetings were held once a week. The program offered daily special education classes on the junior high and high school level as well as an assortment of treatment-oriented recreational activities.

Youth who were considered to be "behaviorally dangerous" or who had severe emotional problems were likely to be referred for in-patient psychiatric services. Sometimes a judge would stipulate that a youth with a long and serious offense record be placed in an intensive care facility if he was to be a UDIS referral Youngsters with behavioral problems who required longer-term care than the rural programs could offer and who were likely to respond well to peer group interactions were referred to the Arden Shores program.

BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE CHARACTERISTICS

The administrative style and efficiency of the office was periodically an issue. The first director, Paul DeMuro, had worked for Dr. Miller in Massachusetts and shared some of Miller's propensity for the unconventional. A doctoral candidate in the humanities before he joined Miller, he had accumulated substantial experience in correctional and youth services programs by the time that he became director of UDIS. But he was not part of the correctional establishment in Illinois, nor did he seek to become part of it.

The staff he assembled was young and, from all accounts, enthusiastic and committed. It was also widely perceived as radical and amateur. A review of the vitae of the initial staff indicates that charges of amateurism were overblown. Most of the staff had professional training or experience in social work, counseling, or closely related fields.

The validity of the radicalism label depends on point of view. Staff members who had been at UDIS from the beginning freely conceded that they saw themselves as different from the rest of the juvenile justice system. In fact, that was one of UDIS's major virtues. As one put it:

> DeMuro's energy and lofty goals radiated to the staff, who also became energized and rallied around an ideological cause. These factors were especially important in UDIS's early days, when support from the outside was not to be found.... Fighting an uphill battle and constantly struggling to keep the Project going, UDIS staff found support and optimism from within itself and was able to push its way into the juvenile justice system.*

On some occasions, the feeling of isolation from the system apparently led to behaviors that are behind the accusations of radicalism. For example, judges and probation officers sometimes accused UDIS Case Managers of covering up in-program offenses and of otherwise being "morally relativistic," as one judge put it, in their determination to stay on the youngster's side. But evidence of a genuinely radical tone to the early UDIS operations was not apparent in our retrospective assessment.

The management style under DeMuro was loose. An early management evaluation of the UDIS program discussed this in some detail and, as vendors frequently testified, the management deficiencies were a source of inconvenience or worse in dealing with UDIS.†

But DeMuro had important strengths as well. The commitment and effort he elicited from his staff is said to have been remarkable. He made UDIS a going concern despite the contemporaneous upheavals in DCFS and other agencies with which UDIS worked, despite the negotiations for the transfer of UDIS from DCFS to DOC, despite the change in mandate and operations of the Policy Board, and despite the widespread identification of UDIS with Dr. Miller. By the time he left in mid-1975, UDIS was functioning more or less in the way it was intended. This was not a trivial accomplishment.

The second and current UDIS director was appointed from within the ranks of DOC. Shirley Goins had extensive experience in corrections and most recently had served as a Regional Administrator in the Field Services Division. Like her predecessor, she was strongly committed to community-based treatment. Unlike him, she had years of experience in

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*From an unpublished paper by Nancy Brenner, a UDIS staff member.

†See Chapter 7.

Illinois corrections and appears to have come to her job with general support among the state and county juvenile justice agencies. She also did not have to bear the onus of identification with Jerry Miller.

She was hired with instructions to tighten up the internal administration of UDIS, and she did. Under her direction, a table of organization was prepared, new office procedures were developed, and record-keeping practices were made more systematic. She also undertook to establish better communications with vendors, who had complained of UDIS's arbitrary style and administrative idiosyncracies. She made progress; many of the vendors we interviewed clearly distinguished between DeMuro's UDIS (bad) and Goins' UDIS (good).

Some staff who were part of both administrations argue that the changes were not all for the better. A more structured administration was said to have produced hierarchical decision-making procedures, less feedback from Case Managers to administrator, and less participation by the case staff in the workings of the office. The élan that was part of the looser DeMuro organization was gone, it was argued. The sense of being a unique program with a special mission was diminished. A number of the original case staff have left the program, in part for these reasons.

While the change in atmosphere might have been real--judging this from the outside is extremely speculative--it is not apparent that the substance of the operation changed. The nature of the Case Manager's role *vis-a-vis* the youth and the definition of objectives both appeared to be essentially unchanged. From another perspective, it may be that UDIS serendipitously got what was needed at the time it was needed. It may be that highly personalized, iconoclastic organizational style helped establish a distinct identity for UDIS, sustained its approach in the face of pressures to modify it, and generally got the program through the difficult startup period. More structure and less flash were probably necessary to establish acceptance of the program as a long-term part of the juvenile justice system.

Overall, *UDIS's management practices did not become a major evaluation issue.* Insofar as we were able to determine, none of the important outcomes of the UDIS program would have been significantly changed given a "better" management approach. The discrepancies and gaps in the UDIS case files as discussed under the design of the study (Chapter 2) were real, but they seem to have had more effect on the conduct

of the evaluation than on the actual management of cases. The occasional complaints of vendors that payments were slow or that UDIS did not schedule its flow of referrals efficiently or that monitoring was perfunctory also had a basis in fact, but they were reported sporadically rather than as a widespread consensus. From a purely administrative standpoint, *UDIS appears to have reached a point of adequate competence, with a short logistical tail and a generally efficient translation of budget dollars into services for the youngsters it was supposed to help.*

6. Program Operations: Intermediate Objectives

To many of the proponents of UDIS, the journey was as important as the destination in assessing accomplishments. Specifically, UDIS set out to implement three principles for dealing with the chronic delinquent:

- Individualize the program to fit a youth's particular strengths, needs, and progress;
- Implement the least drastic alternative principle--keep the youth as close to his family and community as possible; and
- Move the youth out of the program quickly--ideally within six months.

The following pages describe the extent to which these intermediate objectives of the program were met.

INDIVIDUALIZED PROGRAMMING

Individualized treatment has been an objective of many juvenile delinquency programs, but one which continually has had to compete with forces that drive bureaucracies toward uniform processing patterns. As a small agency contracting on a purchase-of-service basis with private vendors, UDIS hoped to avoid this problem.

UDIS intended to achieve individualized programming through three resources: (1) an intensive assessment of each youth's needs and growth potentials, (2) availability of vendors to meet those needs and encourage those potentials, and (3) Case Managers who could make the appropriate links, monitor progress, and intervene to redirect programming or change vendors as required by the youth's particular situation. The nature of the vendor roster has

already been examined. We consider below the extent to which each of the two procedural resources materialized.

The Assessments

UDIS set for itself an almost contradictory philosophy toward assessments. To many staff members the medical model was anathema. Its diagnostic labels, aspirations of dispassion, compartmentalization of problems, and above all pervasive assumption that something was wrong with the youngster, all clashed with the principles that motivated UDIS. But at the same time, UDIS was supposed to provide services that were especially appropriate to the youth's situation. To achieve that goal it was necessary to know in detail what the situation was.

The solution UDIS chose was to conduct assessments, but ones that focused on the youngster's strengths rather than weaknesses. The assessor was not to chronicle all the things that were wrong with a referral's family, or school record, or living conditions, or peers, but determine the positive aspects that could be built upon through the right services. Assessors were retained on a consultant basis, at $100 per assessment. The assessor was to review the referral's folder, meet with him and (when possible) his family, and prepare a written report.

Even if the process had worked exactly as planned, it would have been a far from thorough assessment. From a clinician's perspective, the assessment procedures that UDIS followed could provide only the preliminaries to a full-scale probe of the youth and his situation, even assuming that the focus stayed on the youth's strengths. *UDIS's rhetoric about careful assessment was not consistent with the resources that were earmarked for it.*

In practice, the assessments did not meet even the minimal standards that were set for them. Typically, they consisted of a few typewritten pages of information. Often they appeared to be based on a single brief interview with the youth and no meeting at all with the family. Material often appeared to have been cribbed from the social and family investigations in the youth's folder. In at least one case, the "assessment" was copied verbatim from those sources.

On a more subjective level, we frequently judged that what emerged from the assessment reflected the individual predilections of the assessor rather than the individual needs of the youth. Important, well-documented information from other sources--about a drug habit, or a pattern of violent behavior, or a critical factor in the home environment--would often be omitted. The assessor's narrative would sometimes give positive indication that he or she was *not* familiar with that information. In other instances, assessors would exhibit what seemed to us (and to the Case Managers with whom we discussed it) a remarkable naivete--as, for example, when an assessor dismissed a long history of drug habits because the youth had assured the assessor in their single encounter that he had decided to quit.

The above comments deal with the general level of assessments. Exceptions did exist, and vindicated the proposition that an assessment from a positive perspective can throw a different light on potential treatment strategies. But they were exceptions. We rarely identified instances in which the assessment led, or should have led, to a placement choice that the Case Manager would not have made otherwise.

UDIS staff members became increasingly disenchanted with the assessment procedure. It was discarded in the spring of 1977. In its place, Case Managers were to take the lead in getting the information needed for the development of a program--as in practice they had been doing for some time.

The Case Manager as a Source of Individualized Programming

The experience with the Case Manager in promoting individualized programming was more positive. The evidence takes two forms.

First, whether the decisions were good or bad, it is apparent from the number of program changes that many cases were getting individual attention. The mean number of placements was 3.2, distributed as follows:

Table 6.1 Frequency Distribution of Number of Placements

Number of Placements	Number of Youth	Percentage
0	1	.6
1	29	17.6
2	27	16.4
3	51	30.9
4	31	18.8
5	6	3.6
6	8	4.8
7	7	4.2
8	3	1.8
9	1	.6
10	1	.6
	165	99.9

The cases with fewer than three placements typically were one of two types: an uneventful case or one that posed such severe problems that the youth was summarily sent to DOC. These accounted for 34.6 percent of the total. The other 65.3 percent represented the cases that required individualized in-program manipulation and shifting. For this subgroup, the mean number of placements was 4.1. Case Managers were at least trying to deal with problem cases by trying new placements. *UDIS did not retreat to a pattern of one-shot programming* in which the youth either succeeded or failed, then left. Details of the reasons for and results of these changes conclude this chapter.

Another source of evidence of individualization in treatment emerged from the data collection for the case histories. The Case Managers' knowledge of individual referrals was impressive. They usually could recall not only the general substance of a particular case but also frequently the reasons for changes in programs that had occurred months before. *To the extent that detailed knowledge of the individual is an indicator of individualized programming attention, UDIS as a whole appeared to do well.*

This does not mean that UDIS provided the referrals with tailor-made, uniquely appropriate program combinations. While the individual was unique, the number of issues that determined placement decisions was relatively

small, and certain types of placement decisions were predictable. Use of advocacy, for example, was virtually standard operating procedure for all referrals who were kept in the community. But the fact that patterns existed does not mean that individualized programming was not taking place within those patterns.

THE LEAST DRASTIC ALTERNATIVE PRINCIPLE

The UDIS philosophy of keeping youngsters out of correctional institutions was extended to the criteria by which the noninstitutional alternatives were to be chosen. In any given situation, the presumption was that the least obtrusive intervention should be selected unless compelling reasons forced the choice of a more restrictive setting. The principle as enunciated in the original UDIS proposal was as follows:

> No juvenile offender shall be confined or removed from his community for any purpose where he can as adequately be treated in the community if appropriate resources are located or created to administer that treatment, consistent with the public safety.

Two bases constituting "compelling reasons" for not selecting the least drastic alternative were thus identified: (1) inadequacy of community-based treatment services in a particular community for a particular youth, and (2) doubts that a community placement would satisfy the requirements of public safety. These two caveats provided UDIS with substantial flexibility in applying the least drastic alternative principle.

To facilitate the analysis, we divided the placements by the degree to which they were drastic, as defined by UDIS. The least drastic group (Level I) included services provided while the youth stayed *in the community and at home*. The service categories in Level I were advocacy, counseling, and educational/ vocational. The next step up the scale, Level II, included services which were provided *in or near the community, but which did not permit the youth to stay at home*. The two service types in Level II were group homes and foster care. The most drastic alternatives that UDIS offered (Level III) were the *residential out-of-the-community* services: intensive care, wilderness, and work camp programs.

Overall, the members of the sample spent 67.8 percent of their days in Level I placements, 14.0 percent in Level II placement, and 18.2 percent in Level III placements--a clear predominance for the community-based, at-home placement when the program histories are considered as a whole.* The *initial* placement of 165 youth in the total program analysis sample broke down as follows:

Table 6.2 The Least Drastic Alternative and First Placement

Level of First Placement	n	
Level I	90	54.5%
Level II	27	16.4%
Level III	48	29.1%
Total	165	100%

A bare majority of UDIS referrals went first to the least drastic type of placement. On the other hand, the inclination of UDIS to apply a less drastic alternative when possible did emerge in the nature of the changes from the first to the second placement. Of the 42 youth who started in Level III and had a second placement, 36 (85.7 percent) moved to a Level I. In comparison, of the 67 who started in Level I and had a second placement, only 31.3 percent were moved to Level III facility.

The reasons for choosing a more drastic alternative were not revealed by objective measures. The Case Managers were not markedly different in the distributions of their referrals among levels. Nor did the judges as a group show clear biases toward a favorite placement. Two of the seven judges who had referred more than 10 cases to UDIS showed some discrepancies from their colleagues (with only 33.3 percent and 16.7 percent of their referrals going to Level I initial placements), but their referrals together accounted for only 19.2 percent of the sample.

To our surprise, the prior offense record--or at least those parts that could be quantified--also failed to explain the initial placement decisions. The number of prior offenses bore little relationship to the level of initial placement. Boys with eight or fewer prior offenses went to

* These proportions are based on the most drastic placement on any given day (a boy in a group home could also be receiving Level I services). "Days in UDIS" thus refers to calendar days, not service days.

Level I placements 55.6 percent of the time; boys with 9 to 16 offenses went to them 56.7 percent of the time; even for those with more than 16 offenses, the proportion of Level I first-placements dropped only four points, to 52.8 percent.

Neither did a record of violence-related offenses have the importance one might expect. Boys without any violence-related offenses went to Level I initial placements *less* commonly (44.8 percent of the time) than boys with one or two violence-related offenses (56.6 percent of the time). Similar results were obtained when only the instant offense--the basis of the most recent petition--was considered.* Boys referred for a violence-related offense went to Level I placements 54.6 percent of the time compared to 52.5 percent for boys referred on other offenses.

The factors in the instant offense that did seem to push a boy toward Level III first placement were (1) involvement with weapons, and (2) drugs. But even their influence was obscure. Of the 24 boys referred for a weapons offense *not* tied to a person-to-person crime (predominately "unauthorized use of weapon"), only 45.8 percent went first to a level I placement. But--and we have no explanation for this--of the 30 boys referred to UDIS for armed robbery, 70 percent went first to a Level I placement--well *above* the average.

For drug charges, only 3 out 8 referrals went to a Level I first placement, but they constituted fewer than two percent of the total intake during the observation period.

Why then did a boy go to a residential environment as a first placement? In most cases, because the court insisted upon it as a condition of referral. Among the 110 case histories, 56 boys were sent first to a Level II or Level III placement and we were able to obtain information on the reason for the placement in 49 of those cases. Of the 49, 27 (55.1 percent) were sent to a residential placement at the court's direction. Three others were placed directly from DOC to a UDIS residential placement under the arrangement whereby committed youth could be transferred from DOC to UDIS as a transitional step (see page 48), and another four voluntarily chose a wilderness program.

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* All figures relating to the instant offenses were taken from tracking system data, updated as of 10/4/77, and are based on *all* UDIS referrals from October 1974 to July 1976, not a sample.

The other 15 were sent to a residential placement because of the family situation (4 cases), the assessor's recommendation (4), age (1), parental request (1), lack of other resources for a suburban referral (1), positive prior results from a comparable DCFS program (1), need for a strong male role model (1), and unspecified "needs" (2).

In all, we know that UDIS had a choice in 69 of the 110 case histories, and that UDIS imposed a residential service as a first placement in only 15 of those instances--21.7 percent. The evidence is clear that the least drastic service type was in fact UDIS's preferred programming strategy. The evidence also strongly indicates that more drastic residential placement was not chosen lightly. *UDIS did not significantly depart from the sense of the least drastic alternative principle* when the placement decision was within its control.

SHORT-TERM PROGRAMMING

The last of UDIS intermediate objectives that we shall examine was to provide short-term programming. Consistent with its other attempts to avoid excessive intervention, UDIS sought to identify the need, provide the indicated services, and get out of the youth's life as quickly as possible. Originally, the ideal was a 120-day cycle--only four months. That soon gave way to a more elastic objective of three to six months.*

UDIS retreated significantly from its intentions for short-term programming. As Table 6.3 indicates, more than half--56.5 percent--of the sample were in UDIS longer than six full months.† More than one-third (34.0 percent) were in for at least nine full months or longer. In all, the

*As UDIS continued to encounter the many forces that tend to prolong the intervention period, "six to eight" months became a common formulation. This was to some extent a matter of changing the objective to fit practice, as well as of rethinking the desirability of shorter time limits.

†The followup using the Northwestern Tracking System (updated as of 10/4/77) enabled us to determine exit dates for all 191 members of the recidivism sample. Note also that the mean was computed from days, not the rounded distribution of months.

mean stay in UDIS for the sample was 8.02 months (S.D. = 3.99), only a month shorter than the mean number of months spent in confinement by the DOC sample before first parole.

Table 6.3 Distribution of Months in UDIS

Number of Months	Number of Referrals	Percentage of Sample	Cumulative Percentage	Number of Months	Number of Referrals	Percentage of Sample	Cumulative Percentage
less than 1	3	1.6	1.6	10	6	3.1	77.9
1	5	2.5	4.1	11	13	6.8	84.7
2	7	3.7	7.8	12	7	3.7	88.4
3	13	6.8	14.6	13	4	2.1	90.5
4	7	3.7	18.3	14	4	2.1	92.6
5	23	12.0	30.3	15	5	2.6	95.2
6	25	13.1	43.4	16	3	1.6	96.8
7	25	13.1	56.5	17	1	.5	97.3
8	18	9.4	65.9	18	3	1.6	98.9
9	17	8.9	74.8	19 or more	2	1.0	99.9

The reasons why a referral did or did not get out within the intended period go to the heart of all the intermediate outcomes we have been discussing. Individualization in programming and efforts to use the least drastic alternative interacted with the desire to move the youngster out, fast. The principal categories of reasons are discussed below. Note that the discussion is restricted to the 64 boys who *egressed* from the program. Termination meant the truncation of a program, not its completion. The timing of a termination and the reasons for it were generally independent.

Reasons for Short-Term Egress

We begin with the relatively small set of case histories--20 out of the 64--in which egress did occur within six full months after program entry.

The Quick Positive Change. Six of the cases got out of UDIS within six months for the logical reason: they did well from the start. They were willing to accept UDIS's conditions, responded favorably to the one or two programs

that they were in, and stayed out of trouble with the law while in the UDIS program.

It is important to note that the six clients had atypical backgrounds. Of the three for whom we have police contact data (the other three were from the suburbs), two had had only four offenses prior to UDIS involvement, putting them in the bottom 10 percent of the UDIS sample on prior offenses. The three youth for whom no police contact information was available came from intact families in the suburbs, two of which were well into the middle class economically and socially. The Case Manager of one of these "success stories" told us that the youngster did not belong in UDIS in the first place, and he had only been in UDIS to pacify the court.

"Quick positive change"--the most attractive reason for early egress--thus had only six examples among the 110 case histories we collected, and five of these involved youngsters who had characteristics shared by few of their UDIS peers. The causes of success--whether it was the Case Manager, or the match of services, or just a matter of getting a youngster at a time when he was ripe for intervention--is not known. There were too few to find the common elements.

Factors Beyond UDIS's Control. For nine of the short-term cases, the length of intervention was not attributable to UDIS. The family moved out of UDIS's jurisdiction, or the court decided to terminate probation for technical reasons, or the court decided to give responsibility for the boy to another youth-serving agency. There was not much UDIS could do--the boys were "egressed," whether they were doing well or poorly.

Unavailability of Resources (two cases). UDIS in its early months of operation had few community-based resources for suburban referrals. Many of the advocacy agencies in particular were neighborhood-based and would not provide services to clients outside of a defined geographic area. Early suburban referrals therefore tended to be placed in rural programs or not placed at all.* In two instances

* Note that suburban youth are not included in the recidivism analysis, and that the assessment of rural placements is therefore not contaminated by this peculiarity in placement decisions.

among the case histories, boys were egressed within five months because, according to the Case Managers, the youth needed advocacy services that were unavailable.

"What Else Can We Do?" Three cases of egress within six months are illustrated by what might be called Case Manager frustration: the boys participated in the placements, did not get arrested, but did not seem to change at all in either attitude or other behavior. Egress reflected a decision by the Case Manager that (a) longer intervention would not be worthwhile, but (b) there were no grounds for terminating the youth.

Overall, then, *the cases of short-term programming that we examined showed very little evidence that UDIS could satisfy its own standards of success in six months or less.* In only 6 out of 20 case histories was a boy egressed within the intended time because UDIS thought he was ready. When egress did occur during the first six months, it was for other reasons in 14 out of the 20 relevent cases.

These findings do not necessarily mean that short-term programming failed. They simply indicate that UDIS tended to behave as its originators accused traditional intervention programs of behaving. Like other youth workers, *a UDIS Case Manager typically was reluctant to stop providing services when it was thought that the services were promoting progress.* And because that situation usually existed at the six-month mark, the youth were kept in the program.

Reasons for Long-Term Egress

In 44 of the 64 case histories, the youth remained in UDIS longer than six months--in 6 cases, longer than a year. Below, we examine the patterns among the many reasons for keeping a youngster in the program.

Reintegration into the Community. Eight cases indicated an attempt by UDIS to reintegrate a youngster who had been placed outside of the community in a Level III service, typically a rural placement. In all eight cases, the youth had been placed outside of the community at the insistence of the judge, Probation Officer, or assessor. All of them had done well while in the Level III placement. When they returned, they typically were placed with an advocacy agency. Additional educational and counseling services

were sometimes provided. Case Managers and Probation Officers alike argued vigorously that a transition period was essential if the positive gains made in rural settings were to be consolidated.

The Trial and Error Pattern--Matching Services to Needs. Ten of the case histories indicated prolonged attempts to find services to meet the youngsters' needs. The distinguishing characteristic was not the attempt to make the match, but the trial and error factor--finding a new service after the youth was not responsive to the first or second or even third one. The ten youth we have grouped under the trial and error pattern received from two to ten different services.

The Second Chance. Giving a youngster another chance after a new arrest was a risk that UDIS took pride in taking. Nine egressed youth who were in the program longer than six full months fell into this category. The typical youth picked up new charges and was taken back to court. The UDIS Case Manager was put in the position of persuading the judge not to commit the boy to DOC. This usually meant a new program plan with new placements (often residential and out of town), and the additional time required to put the boy through the cycle of placements--hence the length of stay in UDIS.

Lapses in the System. Systemic problems appeared to contribute to the length of stay for at least 11 of the youngsters for whom we have case histories. There were three types: changes in Case Manager with subsequent confusion, problems with jurisdiction--either dual responsibility assumed by UDIS and DCFS or tie-ups in the court bureaucracy, and the unavailability of appropriate services.

Some of the problems were clearly beyond UDIS's control. For example, three of the cases involved DCFS wards with delinquent histories. UDIS was asked to provide services that DCFS could not; eventually, DCFS assumed both fiscal and supervisory responsibility for the youngsters. Similarly, problems with the court were not under UDIS's control. For example, one youth who remained in UDIS for almost ten months had been before five different judges.

A change in Case Managers could result in a longer stay in the program for several reasons. Perhaps the new

Case Manager needed time to learn about the youth and to assess his progress. In other cases, the Case Manager changed the focus of the program entirely. In still others, he or she resurrected a quiescent case and provided the youth with new services.

The third type of systemic lapse was the unavailability of the appropriate service at a particular time. It was often a problem of timing, not of lack of contracts with the needed vendor--for example, a youth might need a wilderness service immediately, but the next cycle would not start for another month. In such cases, the repercussions could persist for some time. Case Managers reported that a common consequence was diminished credibility for themselves and a general loss of interest in other services by the boy. But the lapses only rarely prolonged the overall stay in UDIS.

Inertia. There were six cases in which the youth remained in either one or two community-based programs for longer than six months. In some cases, it was said that a conscious decision was made to continue the services and attention for longer than six months. In most of these, however, it was at least partly an example of a quiet referral, an inexpensive service (e.g., advocacy), and a distracted Case Manager who did not get around to arranging for egress.

SUMMARY

If the question is *whether* UDIS implemented the three principles that were the underpinnings of its approach, the simplest answers seem to be these.

On *individualized programming*, UDIS Case Managers rated good marks for translating this objective into actual practice. As a rule, *Case Managers knew their clients well, followed their progress closely, and moved quickly to make changes when they were indicated.* The rhetoric for UDIS at the beginning probably oversold the notion that each referral would get his or her own tailormade, uniquely appropriate programming combination. The Case Managers did as much as was reasonable and may have come closer to individualized treatment than most correctional programs. We made no attempt to relate "degree of individualization" to success or failure as reflected in the case histories.

On *the least drastic alternative principle*, UDIS in general steadily attempted to put theory into practice, even if it became somewhat deemphasized by the UDIS administration after DeMuro left. *Given a choice, UDIS seldom opted for a residential or noncommunity service without a compelling reason; often, UDIS was not given a choice.* UDIS preferred to put a boy into the more drastic of its services if the alternative was to lose him to DOC. The question we will take up in Chapter 9 is whether trying to implement the least drastic alternative was a sound policy in the first place.

On *short-term programming, UDIS retreated significantly from its original goal.* Some of the reasons were similar to those that have motivated youth workers elsewhere, variations on the theme that a few more months, another try, might finally get the job done. UDIS Case Managers had an added reason: if maintaining the youngster beyond six months was the way to avoid his commitment to DOC, UDIS was prepared to part with its short-term programming principle.

7. Appraisals of the Process

The last three chapters discussed the UDIS process as consisting of discrete elements. But in practice the elements of the process were intertwined, especially in the appraisals of the people we interviewed. The pages that follow present the assessments of the UDIS process and concept as voiced by four key sets of actors. We begin with a group that we have ignored until now: the UDIS referrals themselves. We then turn to the opinions of the UDIS staff, service vendors, and the juvenile court's Probation Officers.

THE KIDS

The juvenile delinquents who were sent to UDIS--"the kids" as they were universally called--provide our first appraisal of the process. We interviewed 47 of them, drawn from among the sample of 191 for whom we had obtained program and recidivism data.* Of this group, 29 had egressed from UDIS, 15 had been terminated, and 3 were still active. Fifteen of them had been in DOC as well as UDIS.

It was a self-selected sample. We talked to those youngsters who could be located (those residing in DOC may to this extent be disproportionately represented) and who either wanted to talk to us or who simply were attracted by the ten dollars that was paid to each respondent as a fee for his time. The results cannot be read as an unbiased, random sampling of UDIS participants. But we have no assumptions about how the self-selection biases worked; no reason to infer that the sample was more or less positive toward UDIS than the average, more or less responsive to certain types of programming, or more or less self-analytic about their experiences. The intervening variable of "being locatable" and the money interfere with many of the usual biases of self-selected samples. In terms of age,

* See Chapter 2 for details.

offense records, and background variables, the interview sample was typical of the larger random sample.

On the issue that most worried us at the outset, the degree of candor we would find, few problems developed. Occasionally, the interviewer knew that he or she was being conned. There undoubtedly were times when we were conned without realizing it. But the overwhelming majority of interviewees appeared to be open, ready to talk, and unworried about following a party line of any sort.

Perceptions of the Alternative to UDIS

Perhaps, as discussed previously, some of the UDIS referrals would not have gone to DOC.* But *in the minds of nearly all of the referrals we interviewed, UDIS was the alternative to a clear and present threat of incarceration.* Of the 42 boys who responded to this item, 36 (85.7 percent) said that they would have gone to DOC if they refused UDIS. Three were unsure. Only three boys of the 42 (7.1 percent) thought they would have stayed on probation. And as the interview narrative said of one of those three: "He thinks he probably would have been released (instead of going to DOC) but he was afraid to take the chance and so chose UDIS."

Short-Term Programming

Most of the interviewees were under the impression that UDIS had a time limit, and a short one. Of the 42 responding to this item, almost a quarter of them (10) remembered being told that they could get out of UDIS in three months or less. Another 21 of them (50.0 percent) said they were led to believe they could get out in no more than six months. Nine of the boys thought there was no time limit, and two thought there was a limit longer than six months.

It happens that the boys in the interview sample stayed in UDIS for a mean of 8.2 months, slightly longer than the 8.0 months mean for the entire recidivism sample. But the boys exhibited no distress at the discrepancy between promise and reality. On the contrary, *44.4 percent of the boys who responded believed they were in UDIS for the right amount of time and another 40.0 percent*

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* Pages 55-57.

*said they were in UDIS too briefly.** Only seven out of the 45 (15.6 percent) said they had been in UDIS too long.

The relationship between *perception* of the appropriateness of the length of time and the *actual* length of time was almost nil. Of the 18 boys who had left in six months or less, eight said "too short," eight said "about right," and two said "too long." For the 22 who spent between seven and 12 months in the program, the respective numbers were 8, 12, and 2. For the five who were in UDIS longer than a year, the split was two for "too short" and three for "too long." Below the most extreme lengths of time in UDIS, then, there was almost no sense whatsoever of being kept in for an excessive length of time.

It should also be emphasized that those who wanted to stay longer were *not* the ones being egressed after unusually short interventions. The mean stays for the "too short" and the "about right" groups were only 1.5 days different--7.7 months in both cases. (The standard deviations also rounded identically to 2.8 months.) *Whatever the arguments may be for moving youngsters out of UDIS as fast as possible, there is no evidence that they were shared by the youngsters themselves.*

Responses to the Service Alternatives

We asked the boys to assess some of the individual placements (a maximum of three per respondent) which they had experienced, chosen by us at random from among the ones they had experienced. In all, the 47 interviewees answered Likert-scaled items about 102 placements: 32 advocacy, 9 counseling, 15 educational-vocational, 25 foster-group home, 1 intensive care, and 20 rural.† In addition, they talked informally about what they thought of them. Table 7.1 shows the items and the overall results.

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*N = 45. One of the three active interviewees was scheduled for egress in a few weeks, and his response was therefore included.

†Many of these items are from the instruments used in the study of deinstitutionalization in Massachusetts being completed by the Center for Criminal Justice of the Harvard Law School. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Robert B. Coates in giving us access to the project's materials and permission to adapt them to this project.

Table 7.1 Attitudes of UDIS Participants Toward the Placements
(Number of Placements = 102)

Item	Agree or Strongly Agree	Disagree or Strongly Disagree	Neutral or No Response
"I learned things which will be useful to me for . . ."			
• getting a job	46.1%	41.2%	12.7%
• dealing with problems	58.8	31.4	9.8
• finishing school	59.8	30.2	9.8
• I was placed here to be punished	20.6	72.5	6.9
• I was placed here to be kept off the streets	43.1	48.0	8.8
• I was placed here to learn about myself	52.9	33.3	13.7
• I never liked this program	12.7	68.6	18.6
• The staff makes decisions about you without asking you	25.5	62.7	11.8
• If a kid does well the STAFF tells him so personally	81.4	12.7	5.9
• If a kid does well here, the KIDS tell him so personally	41.2	51.0	7.8
• People in the program are pretty much split into two different groups, with staff in one and kids in the other	29.4	62.7	7.8
• There are too many kids here who push other kids around	11.8	81.4	6.9
• I feel that I fit in here	54.9	30.4	14.7

Several of the items indicate that the UDIS placements were not seen as punitive. Note, for example, the large proportions disagreeing with the statements "I was sent here to be punished," "I never liked this program," and "There are too many kids here who push other kids around." It also appears that the placements were more often than not experienced as helpful and reinforcing, insofar as they had been useful for dealing with problems and finishing school. UDIS was a correctional program, but apparently one which in itself was seldom an object of real antipathy.

The issue we next examined was whether responses to these items varied when placements were grouped by (1) functional type, or (2) degree to which they were "drastic" as defined by Levels I, II, and III. In conducting the analysis, we assumed that the respondents' internal interpretations of the response categories ("strongly agree" versus "agree," for example) varied widely, producing a

high but unknown degree of unreliability.* But *we further assumed that ratings by the same respondent on the same item for two placements represented a valid expression of the direction of the respondent's perception of differences between the two placements on that item.* Thus, for example, if respondent A "strongly agrees" that he was in program X too long, and "agrees" that he was in program Y too long, we conclude that he preferred program Y on that dimension. The objective is not to determine *absolute* weights of attraction or lack of it toward a given placement type, but *comparative* weights.†

No remarkable differences in responses to the items were observed when the placements were grouped by functional type. Advocacy, counseling, and educational-vocational service (all Level I) were given similar marks except on the obvious items (e.g., educational-vocational services got higher scores on responses to the job item).

There were a few noticeable differences on responses to the items among those boys who rated both a nonresidential (Level I) placement and a residential one (Level II or III). There were 30 pairs of this type. They yielded these unsurprising results:

- Staffs of residential placements were implied to have punished a boy who "messed up" (the item's wording) much more than staffs of the nonresidential placements (18 out of the 30 pairs indicated this, none indicated the opposite, 12 indicated no difference).

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*The procedures that might be invoked to assess and correct for item unreliability require that a large number of respondents have rated the same placement--a condition that, given the large number of placements that UDIS used, would have required a sample of several hundred youth.

†A natural further assumption would seem to be that there is also a difference in direction between any type of "agree" and any type of "disagree." But our experience in the interviews led us to doubt even this seemingly obvious interpolation. On too many occasions, we observed that the qualitative aspects of an answer did not jibe with what we would have predicted from an examination of the formalized responses. Some boys, it appeared, objected in principle to endorsing any program on any dimension when it was put in the form of an explicit item. For them, giving a "neutral" answer on an item, or even a mild negative one, was equivalent to a rave review by the rest. There were enough of these instances to cast doubt on the reliability of any except the *comparative* response analysis.

- Punishment also was seen as a more salient purpose of residential environments than of nonresidential ones (nine pairs indicated this, none indicated the opposite, 21 indicated no difference).

- Keeping the respondent off the streets was seen as a more salient purpose of residential environments than of nonresidential ones (14 pairs indicated this, two indicated the opposite, 14 indicated no difference).

- Staffs of residential placement were implied to have made unilateral decisions about the respondent to a greater extent than in nonresidential placements (12 pairs indicated this, three indicated the opposite, 15 indicated no difference).

- The respondents believed they "were in the program too long" more commonly of residential programs than of nonresidential programs (11 pairs indicated this, four indicated the opposite, 15 indicated no difference).

and, surprisingly,

- "To learn about myself" was seen as a more salient purpose of residential programs than of nonresidential ones (seven pairs indicated this, one indicated the opposite, 22 indicated no difference).

For none of the other items did the net number of preferences for one type of program exceed five out of the 30 pairs (16.7 percent). Even in the cases cited above, a clear majority of the 30 pairs indicated a difference between the two types on only a single item--punishment for "messing up."

UDIS Compared to DOC

Fifteen of the boys in the sample had been in both UDIS and DOC, and they were asked to rate each of those experiences on a similar set of Likert-scaled items. Again, the results were predictable. DOC was perceived as more punitive, more authoritarian, and less desirable than UDIS:

- "I was placed here to be punished": 12 pairs indicated this was more true of DOC than UDIS; one the opposite, two no difference.

- "I was placed here to be kept off the streets": nine pairs indicated this was more true of DOC than UDIS, none the opposite, six no difference.

- "I wanted to get out of this program": eight pairs indicated this was more true of DOC than UDIS, one the opposite, six no difference.

- "The staff made decisions without consulting me": six pairs indicated this was more true of DOC than UDIS, two the opposite, seven no difference.

- "There are too many kids here who push you around": five pairs indicated this was more true of DOC than UDIS, one the opposite, nine no difference.

UDIS was seen as more concerned with the development of the youngster:

- "I was placed here to learn skills or get an education": six pairs indicated this was more true of UDIS than DOC, none the opposite, nine no difference.

- "If I was dissatisfied with the way things were going, people would listen to me": eight pairs indicated this was more true of UDIS than DOC, two pairs the opposite, five no difference.

- "There was at least one staff person who really knew me": seven pairs indicated this was more true of UDIS than DOC, two the opposite, six no difference.

In items of actual behavior, DOC did come out on top in one respect:

- "I attended school regularly": 10 pairs indicated this was more true of DOC than UDIS, none the opposite, five no difference.

For the following items, the net number of preferences for one type of program was three or fewer out of the

15--or in other words, UDIS and DOC were perceived as being roughly equivalent:

- "I had a choice about what activities to go into."
- "I was placed here to receive counseling and to learn more about myself."
- "If he wants to, a kid can con the staff pretty easily."
- "Someone lets you know where you stand and backs it up if you're doing okay."
- "Someone lets you know where you stand and backs it up if you're messing up."
- "My family kept up with what was happening to me."

The sample of boys who had been in both UDIS and DOC was small, and only gross differences could be interpreted with any confidence. All of them were predictable.

Comparisons Among People: the Case Manager, the Probation Officer, and the "Best Program Worker"

Who got closest to the interviewees? Who was perceived as the most helpful? The most influential? The boys in the interview sample were asked to rate their most recent Probation Officer, their most recent Case Manager, and a person identified by the interviewee as "the best person you've worked with in any program" on a set of chacteristics. The results are shown in Table 7.2 on the following page. As in the prior discussions, the preferences were determined by comparing separate ratings on the same item.

The overall pattern is not complex. As a source of *advice*, the best program worker was preferred over the Case Manager, who in turn was preferred over the Probation Officer. The same ordering prevailed on the items relating to source of actual *help*, but the gap between the CM and the best program worker narrowed. When the topic was the degree of *influence* wielded by these persons, the Case Manager pulled even with the best program worker, and the PO passed the Case Manager in the overall rating.*

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* The perception of the PO's greater influence relative to the others is presumably minimized, if we assume that a halo effect was at work favoring the program workers and Case Managers.

Table 7.2 Comparisons of the Case Manager with the Probation Officer and the "Best Program Worker"

	Comparing Case Manager and Probation Officer (n = 46)			Comparing Case Manager and Best Program Worker (n = 46)		
	Number preferring . .			Number preferring . . .		
	CM	PO	No difference or NA	CM	Best Program Worker	No difference or NA
The Preferred Source of Advice . . .						
on police problems	18	7	21	8	7	31
on court problems	18	7	21	13	11	22
on money problems	13	5	28	2	19	25
on family or personal problems	15	4	27	8	17	21
on school problems	15	6	25	5	22	19
TOTAL	79 (34.3%)	29 (12.6%)	122 (53.0%)	36 (15.7%)	76 (33.0%)	118 (51.3%)
The Actual Source of Help . . .						
in court	15	11	20	14	14	18
in getting a job	17	6	23	10	19	17
in finding good programs/activities	19	9	18	10	15	21
in thinking ahead, making plans	18	8	20	8	15	23
TOTAL	69 (37.5%)	34 (18.5%)	81 (44.0%)	42 (22.8%)	63 (34.2%)	79 (42.9%)
Degree of Influence . . .						
with the police	7	8	31	6	5	35
with the court	12	15	19	14	7	25
with the school	6	10	30	9	11	26
with the family	7	8	31	9	14	23
TOTAL	32 (17.4%)	41 (22.3%)	111 (60.3%)	38 (20.7%)	37 (20.1%)	109 (59.2%)

Who Belongs in UDIS? In DOC?

At the end of the interview we asked two open-ended questions that were at the heart of the issues in the evaluation. The first related to the merits of institutionalization versus UDIS:

> "Imagine you were the judge and you had to send some kids to UDIS and some to DOC. Which kids would you send to UDIS and which would you send to DOC?"

The question forced a choice; in retrospect, we would prefer that the item have explicitly included "nobody should go to DOC" as a choice. But, with that caveat in mind, the responses were just about what might be expected from a random sample of Chicago citizens. Discounting six nonresponsive or uninterpretable answers, 37 of 41 respondents said in varying ways that the violent or repeat offenders should go to DOC and the others to UDIS.*

A violent offense was uniformly defined as one that could hurt people--murder, rape, armed robbery, arson. Commitment to the Department of Corrections was seen as "punishment" and almost always justified on that basis. DOC was seen as a reasonable response to people who hurt other people--even by those respondents who had themselves been adjudicated for a violence-related offense. Committable youth also were those who repeatedly came in contact with the police and court: "The ones who keep getting in jail every week. I probably should have been sent."

Some of the interviewees considered attitude and motivation as important factors in the decision to send a youth to DOC. "People who don't have respect or care about people or the law should go to DOC," said one boy, in contrast to "people who have respect for people but just made a mistake should go to UDIS."

This distinction typifies the respondents' general feelings about the delinquent who belonged in UDIS. He was redeemable; he only needed a little prodding to help

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* The nonresponsive or uninterpretable answers included four based on race, one that stated "I'd send my father to DOC and my sister to UDIS," and an unelaborated remark, "don't look at the charges--they don't mean anything."

him straighten out. For the most part, the UDIS youth, as defined by the respondents, was the property offender--caught for joyriding, breaking windows, running away, occasionally burglarizing. He was the kid who was younger, who deserved a second chance, who was motivated to do better. One youth categorized the appropriate UDIS referral as one who showed signs of wanting help and "trying to rehabilitate," brought into the program "early in his life," and "near his first offense."

Few of the youth thought that UDIS was appropriate for the "bad" category. Most respondents implied that they had established a definite line between "bad" and "good" or "those who needed to be punished" and "those who deserved to be helped." Only three of the interviewees were willing to give the bad kid another chance. One of those was quite clear about it:

> "I'd take the baddest kid and send him to UDIS and see how he works out. Send everyone to UDIS, give them another chance, but if they do something really bad, I'd send them to DOC."

One respondent recommended that no one be sent anywhere.

The Role of Intervention

The second of the open-ended questions at the end of the interview was this:

> One of the arguments about how to run UDIS is whether it's better to do anything to a kid in trouble, or better to leave him alone. I'm asking you: If a kid has gotten in trouble with the police, does it mess him up even more to go into some sort of probation or UDIS? Should you you leave him alone and figure he will grow out of it? Or should you try to do something for him?

It was one of the very few items in the questionnaire that elicited a highly consistent response: 37 out of the 45 who responded--82.2 percent--said, often, with some vehemence, that it was better to do something than

to leave the delinquent alone. Two were neutral. Six opposed intervention.*

There were no dominant themes in the answers. The closest to one was the set of 12 responses that, in one way or another, emphasized the helping aspects of the intervention. Some of these were general suggestions to "put a kid in a program where he'll learn something," or to "do something constructive." Others more specifically suggested school or job training, or structured recreational and camping opportunities--experiences that we suspect had been positive ones in the histories of the youngsters who recommended them. Endorsements of counseling and advocacy were also included in this set of responses: "...Let the advocate work out the problem rather than go back to court. Younger kids and ones not really with a home haven't had anyone that takes care of them."

Six of the respondents spontaneously mentioned the need to get help to the youngster early. "Try and do something," said one boy. "He may need someone to try to make him understand what life will be about. UDIS is better for younger kids who are easier to change." Others simply saw no point in waiting.

UDIS got seven mentions as the right place to go. Two were real testimonials. One was from an eventual loser: "I got the feeling they (UDIS) were the only people in Chicago who were trying to help kids in trouble and keep them from coming out here (DOC)." The second: "Send the kid to UDIS. They changed me, and I'd done everything in the book."

Five respondents cited the need to provide the youth with a dose of reality. These ranged from suggestions for jail tours, to short punishment stays at the detention center, to this punchy recommendation:

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* Several factors should have slanted the responses toward the *non*-intervention point of view. The wording itself may be slanted. Also, it should be assumed that the boys would be motivated to focus on their own roles in whatever progress they had made and to attribute failures to UDIS or DOC. The respondents had no reason to believe that they would gain by saying good things about intervention, and they had been critical on specific items about UDIS or DOC. These considerations augment our interest in the consistent responses to the question.

"I'd try to help. You don't grow out of things too fast; you need some kind of experience. If you stay in DOC long enough, you'll see. Look on the outside of city jail and you'll see. Eat what they make up instead of your mama's cooking. You'll straighten out."

In all, the responses were provocative reading; perhaps most provocative in their optimism that change was possible and in their optimism that the change could be accomplished by dealing directly with the youth. The interview item almost openly invited the boys to invoke the many environmental factors that contributed to their troubles and that would impede their futures. They received nearly no attention. The boys we interviewed focused on the prospect of interventions leading to personal remedies, in advice ranging from the introspective:

He should be put in a place where he can sit down and *think*...A kid who doesn't communicate with his family, or UDIS, or (program) workers should be put someplace where he can communicate with himself, because that's really what he can't do....

to the pragmatic:

Better try to help first. When you get older, things get harder....

to the cheerful:

Try to help him and change him. It really works. I had fun.

THE UDIS CASE MANAGERS

The Case Managers were the key staff persons in the UDIS program. They reviewed cases with Probation Officers prior to referrals, interacted with judges and assessors, helped to identify and develop resources, matched youth with vendors, and then monitored progress.

It was a position with great potential for role conflict. Case Managers had to move among roles as service broker, advocate, resource developer, and program monitor. They were expected to safeguard the rights and promote the

interests of youth assigned to them and at the same time contribute to the protection of the public. Their definition of "success" was keeping the youth from penetrating further into the criminal justice system, but they were also put in the position of acting as the source of information that might lead to commitment to DOC.

We interviewed 12 of the Case Managers who constituted the case management staff during the period of the evaluation. They were young, ranging from 24 to 34 years of age, with a mean of 25.5. As a group, however, they were not inexperienced. Only two were without previous experience in youth work or related fields. The other eight possessed academic credentials, job credentials, or both.

Their experience as UDIS Case Managers ranged from four to 26 months with a median of 18 months. (At the time of the interviews in November and December 1976, UDIS had been in operation for approximately 26 months.) The caseloads ranged from eight to 29, with a median of 22.

Before describing how others evaluated the performance of the Case Managers, we examined the Case Managers' own conception of their role and how they stood on issues that might be expected to differentiate them. Were all believers in the radical nonintervention philosophy? Did they always find themselves supporting and defending their clients? Did they see themselves as aides to or as adversaries of the criminal justice system? Each Case Manager was asked to define his approach to the job on five sets of contrasting styles:

- Advocacy ("represent client").
- Radical nonintervention ("get the client out of the system as soon as possible").
- Discipline ("make the client live up to his agreement").

Diagnosis ("do what is best for the client").

Treatment (change the client's behavior and values").

Support ("the Case Manager is always on the client's side").

• Monitoring a case ("be on top of what is happening to the client").	Participating in a case ("try to take part in the vendor's decisions about how the program is run").
• Aiding the juvenile justice system ("UDIS is one more part of the system").	Adversary of the juvenile justice system ("UDIS and the rest of the system are fundamentally different").

The alternatives were often not directly, unidimensionally contradictory, but they did represent elements of potential tension in the Case Manager's approach and served as a basis for the conversation about how the Case Manager did his or her job.

Several themes emerged from the responses. First, almost all of the case management staff stressed the importance of individualization of approach. An advocacy approach might work well with one client, a more diagnostic approach might be appropriate for the next. Similarly, the complexities of each case and the skills of the vendor providing the services determined the level of participation that the Case Manager assumed in a case. Responses such as "It depends on the kid, the case, and the service provider" were common, when discussing the advocacy/diagnosis continuum.

A second consistent characteristic of the responses, and a striking one in view of UDIS's "pro-kid" image was the strong support voiced by the CMs for discipline and accountability. Six of the 11 saw a disciplinary emphasis in their approach to their clients. Four put themselves in the middle on the discipline-support continuum, and only one claimed to be "nonauthoritarian." The discussion further indicated that the Case Managers were generally inclined to draw lines and try to hold to them. Contract goals were not only to be negotiated, but to be fulfilled. Youngsters were to be accountable for their actions and activities.

A third theme of the responses was the preference of the CMs to be monitors rather than participants in the program activities. Almost all of the respondents viewed themselves as service brokers who were to monitor the adequacy of the service and the progress of the youth rather than to participate in each case. The answers were generally qualified, however. Case Managers participated in all major decisions regarding program changes and egress or termination. At the outset of service provision, vendors were told

what goals were to be met and the nature of the youngsters' specific needs. Additionally, Case Managers generally reported that they often became active participants during crisis situations.

This "fire-fighting" aspect of the Case Manager's role was addressed by one of the case management supervisors. Case Managers, he pointed out, had to spend much of their time dealing with the youngsters in crisis. As a result, monitoring of both the referrals and the vendors was sometimes irregular. Case Managers tended to lose track of referrals who went through programs uneventfully, particularly those in residential placements who seemed to experience fewer problems.

The case management staff offered several suggestions for changing the UDIS program. The most frequently mentioned were: longer program participation, better followup planning, more interaction with the family and the community, and smaller caseloads. Individual Case Managers offered recommendations that Case Managers do their own assessments, develop contracts with more group homes and specialized foster care, increase coverage by advocates, improve skills of the UDIS staff, more regular and consistent monitoring of resources, better internal communication, and more systematic staffing of the caseloads.

THE SERVICE VENDORS

Interviews were conducted with 58 individuals from 35 vendor agencies. At the time of the interviews, 30 of these agencies were still receiving referrals from the UDIS program. Twelve of the vendors offered primarily advocacy services, five provided counseling, seven offered either academic instruction or vocational training, six were group home or foster care providers, three were rural programs, two were intensive care facilities, and five agencies provided two types of services (either advocacy and counseling or advocacy and group home/foster care).

In describing the nature of their contact with UDIS, *half of the 22 vendors who discussed the topic in detail had clearly positive reactions.* As they saw it, monitoring was professional, the Case Managers were involved and interested in the progress of their referrals, and cooperation with UDIS in dealing with specific problems came easily.

The vendors elaborated on these remarks with incidents that, in their opinion, had positively affected the progress of the youth in their programs.

The majority of the incidents had a theme of "collaborative case work." A basic example cited by one vendor was the joint meeting of Case Manager, vendor, youth, and family that was held at the outset of each case. Another case typical of the collaborative casework theme was the vendor who reported to UDIS that a youth was extremely unstable and could not keep a job. The Case Manager and vendor worked together to motivate the youth to get a job and keep it. In another case, a youth was accused of committing a theft. The vendor and the UDIS worker believed that the student was falsely accused so they traced the student's activities, and eventually obtained a dismissal of the charge.

Sometimes collaboration led to modifications in the program structure. For example, one vendor reported that a Case Manager had been the initiator of a plan to set up an "egress week," during which a youth about to complete his participation would stay at the group home during the day and return to his home at night. The purpose was to allow the youth to gradually become integrated back into the home and environment.

On other occasions, vendors cited examples that illustrated UDIS's function as a service broker. In one instance, a Case Manager provided assistance to the vendor in securing an attorney for one of the boys in the program. The attorney was able to prevent a youth from being committed to DOC by demonstrating that he had been brought in on a supplemental petition for violation of probation after the date established for termination of probation. The youth successfully egressed from UDIS. Three other cases of this type involved Case Manager assistance in securing an independent living arrangement after the probation officer and vendor agreed that the youth's mother was unsalvageable, securing placement in a wilderness program for a youth from a poor home needing enrichment, and securing an employment placement at a hotel, to pay for the youth's tuition for an engineering program.

Six vendors had mixed reactions to their experiences with UDIS. The negative aspects of their reactions were concerns that Case Managers needed more frequent personal contact with youth, criticism that UDIS's liaison with the families of the youth was inadequate, and criticism

that the variability among Case Managers was too high. In each of these cases, however, the criticism came in the context of otherwise positive descriptions of UDIS's performance.

Five of the vendors were vocally critical. Case Managers were said to operate under individual philosophies. It was charged that little continuity and consistency existed among the UDIS program, the Case Managers, and Probation Officers. Monitoring was said to be inadequate. Other criticisms were that UDIS was run inefficiently and ineffectively; that policy and procedures needed to be improved; that vendors and Case Managers did not seem to know what to expect from each other; that Case Managers were less qualified and experienced than Probation Officers.

The most common critical theme, however, had to do with UDIS administrative policy, not the ongoing process of dealing with referrals. Many vendors--including some who were highly positive toward the process itself--found it difficult to deal with the open referral projections that UDIS preferred. Vendors argued that the uncertainty about the number of referrals they could expect made it extremely difficult to maintain staff and facilities. This was an especially important issue among the small vendors operating on tight budgets. UDIS, of course, resisted "guarantees" that would tend to restrict UDIS's latitude in using the vendors that were most appropriate for a given referral.

Assessing the negative reactions to the UDIS process is complicated by the fact that three of the five are no longer receiving referrals--in two of those cases because UDIS was dissatisfied with the vendors' performance.

We asked for accounts of incidents that had negative impact on a youngster's progress. Only one had a concrete, observable negative result--when a Case Manager made a mistake on a court date for one boy, which was said to have led to the boy's commitment to DOC.

The other negative incidents were less dramatic. Four of the 12 could be classified as examples of disagreement between the vendor and the Case Manager as to appropriate ways of dealing with the youth. Three incidents involved lags in communication or delays in getting referrals placed. Three involved a lack of understanding of a

community or lack of trust in or consideration for an agency. One incident was in regard to the egress of a youth who was sent home against the wishes of the vendor. The other incident involved a judge's decision not to follow the recommendation of UDIS and the vendor.

We asked specifically about incidents of premature egress decisions. Fourteen vendors were unable to recall any. The other seven recalled 16 incidents of premature egress decisions. The consequences of most of these appeared to be minor or unknown. There were three exceptions. One vendor reported that a youth was egressed by UDIS when he seemed to be progressing well in school and his job. Against the vendor's wishes, he was returned home where living conditions were extremely poor and his mother had 14 or 15 children. The vendor, from a group home, felt that the youth needed foster care. Two or three days after egress, there was a fire in the youth's home that killed his mother and two siblings, and left the youth in critical condition. The same vendor told of another youth, a gang leader, who was responding well to treatment in a structured setting and who was egressed against the vendor's advice. The following week, the youth killed someone. Another vendor recounted the case of a youth who was egressed after three months in a rural placement, despite his desire to stay. He died of a drug overdose three weeks after leaving.

THE PROBATION OFFICERS

Twenty-two Probation Officers were interviewed about their interactions with UDIS. In addition to providing case history material, 17 of the POs were also asked a series of more general questions about the relationship of probation and UDIS. They reported a cumulative total of approximately 138 youngsters from their caseloads who had been sent to UDIS, and approximately 79 who had been committed to DOC during the same period.

By way of comparison with the UDIS Case Managers, 11 of the 17 Probation Officers had masters degrees. The rest had the bachelors degrees, usually with some graduate training. Their ages ranged from 26 to 52 years of age with a median of 29. Their experience as field probation officers at the Juvenile Court ranged from 2 to 18.5 years with a median of about 4 years.

Three topic areas were explored with the Probation Officers which are particularly pertinent to the appraisal of the process. These items were:

- What is and what should be your contact with the CM during referral, placement, and egress?
- How had UDIS differed from your early expectations of it?
- How would you change UDIS?

The responses to each item are discussed below.

What is and What Should be Your Contact with the CM during Referral, Placement, and Egress?

Most POs had dealt with only a small number of Case Managers, thereby permitting them to focus on specific work relationships.

Nine of the 16 Probation Officers who responded to this question indicated that they were satisfied with their contact with the Case Managers, and said that it conformed closely to what they believed to be the ideal. These Probation Officers emphasized the frequency of contact with individual Case Managers, easy sharing of information, and cooperation in making the key decisions about the youth's program. One asserted that the Case Manager with whom he had the most contact did a "dynamite job" and was "more like another PO in the unit," was able to deal with all of the PO's, was free with information, and stated his own feelings honestly. Another observed that contact was on a crisis-oriented basis but that this was appropriate because of the Case Manager's role as a resource-finder. Another said that he and the CM talked on the phone, visited regularly, and jointly reviewed progress reports and case presentations. He pointed out that he had a good relationship with them partly as a result of his own behavior--he chose to stay involved in UDIS cases--and because of the comraderie he enjoyed with a particular CM. It is also worth noting that one PO who reported positive experience with Case Managers also stated that his was a perception shared by the rest of his unit and its supervisor.

Five Probation Officers offered responses to the quality of contact question that can best be classified as neutral or mixed. All noted deficiencies in communication.

They also recognized constraints on UDIS which made better communication difficult, or cited positive aspects of the relationship.

Three of the 16 Probation Officers who responded to the item indicated that the gap between the actual and the ideal was substantial. They cited information flow that was more perfunctory than mutual. One said that the Case Managers "aren't really coordinating services properly... aren't well-organized yet." He also thought that part of the problem was caused by lackadaisical followup on the part of some Probation Officers. Still, he noted, "it's like pulling teeth to get a contract written up properly," and very rarely had he found that a Case Manager would genuinely try to bring everyone together in a spirit of a collaborative decision-making process.

How has UDIS Differed from Your Early Expectations of it?

Not surprisingly, there was a visible relationship between the answers to the preceding question and this one: those reporting positive experiences with CMs tended to believe that UDIS had met or exceeded their expectations; those reporting mixed or negative experiences with CMs tended to be disappointed in UDIS. Nonetheless, some distinctive themes emerged.

Six Probation Officers responded with positive statements about UDIS' performance. One observed, "They did for my clients what they said they would in orientation and in guidelines." He added, however, that his "good experience with UDIS" was not representative of Probation Officers with whom he worked--partly, he said, because of their own uncooperative attitude. Another Probation Officer said that UDIS had not differed from his early expectations of it, that "UDIS was presented as a community alternative to commitment and it has turned out that way." Three of the five Probation Officers with positive assessments indicated originally that they had few expectations of UDIS or had heard negative things about it but tried it anyway.

The majority of the respondents expressed disappointment in one form or another.

Five of them had mixed reactions. They represented a group that was generally satisfied with their working relationships with UDIS Case Managers, but also believed

that the program had been oversold or exaggerated. For example, one of them said that UDIS had been a "mixed bag of surprises and disappointments." Initially, he had been suspicious anyway, thinking "what can they do that I haven't tried already?" But he then began to take a fresh look at the ability of UDIS to move their referrals out of the neighborhoods--through what we have called Level III placements. And he decided that it was a "good deal for the kid" since many needed to be removed for a while, but without going to DOC. UDIS did not turn out to be the cure-all that some of the rhetoric had implied, but it did have unique values.

Seven of the Probation Officers expressed overall disappointment with UDIS. The responses of several of them indicated that their early expectations of UDIS had been quite high. One characterized his early expectations of UDIS as "super high," thinking that it would make the Probation Officer's job easier. He said that this opinion resulted from a distorted picture presented by court administration of how much UDIS would do. Instead, he found that even the cases he referred to UDIS still required considerable followup by the Probation Officer. He suggested that UDIS needed more and better placements, better communication (although he reported that this had improved), and more therapeutically-oriented services.

Another Probation Officer said that he had been disappointed for two reasons. First, the services available from UDIS were not unusual. There was a lack of new, comprehensive resources specifically designed for these juveniles, with the single exception of Riveredge Hospital (an intensive care facility). Second, he stated that there was a lack of follow-through on contracts: UDIS did not hold the youth accountable.

How Would You Change UDIS?

Although we array the recommendations of the Probation Officers under several topic headings, they collapse into two sorts: recommendations for redefinition in UDIS's approach, and recommendations for specific changes in managerial procedure. The former type were much more numerous, and they broadly pointed in the direction of a more conservative, less tolerant stance. We begin with them.

Expanded Use of Residential Services. Twelve of the 22 probation officers recommended the expanded use of out-of-community and residential placements. This recommendation is consistent with the ways in which many of the Probation Officers have used the program. As the case histories indicated, Probation Officers have frequently asked judges to stipulate out-of-community placements as a condition of referral to UDIS. Also, it must be remembered that the Probation Officers typically had already tried the community-based approach with the youth they referred to UDIS, without success. From their perspective, the boy was not a fresh case (as it was for UDIS) but a boy with a discouraging track record on any intervention short of DOC.

Thus, among the reasons for wanting to increase the use of residential placements, the most common response (five interviewees) was that experience had led to a belief that community-based alternatives just do not work for the type of boy who is committable. As one pointed out, the referrals he had sent to UDIS who had gone first to a community-based program had invariably later ended up in a more drastic, residential program. Three respondents felt that placement outside of the community gave the youngsters a chance to "cool off" and to spend time reflecting on themselves rather than having to deal with family problems and delinquent peers in the community. Several others indicated that for certain types of youngsters, residential placement was imperative: both the violent and disturbed offender needed the strict controls and intensive treatment offered by the closed setting. And, finally, one Probation Officer questioned the appropriateness of community-based placement for the repeat offender: "When a kid has gotten in a lot of trouble, he expects DOC. When it doesn't happen, he figures he got away with something."

Setting Realistic Limits. An overlapping theme in the Probation Officer's recommendations was that UDIS needed to set some realistic limits for itself, both in the kinds of youth it accepts for referral and in the amount of energy it expends on youngsters who continue to act out once in the program. In almost all of these responses, the recommendation was essentially that DOC be used more readily. Five of the nine respondents who touched on this theme felt that UDIS ought to be more willing to commit to the Department of Corrections when

it was clear that a youth was not responding to the program. One specifically argued that commitment was indicated after a UDIS youth had picked up a supplemental petition and a finding of delinquency while in UDIS: "If a kid goofs up, don't reward him with a new program." Another argued generally that UDIS Case Managers needed a more "reality-based orientation." Two Probation Officers expressed concern that UDIS was accepting youth who really belonged in DOC.* For at least two of the Probation Officers, DOC was identified as serving an independently important function. One found its incapacitation quality necessary for kids who have been given several chances and continued to get in trouble. The other had "faith in DOC because they have some good programs."

Expansion or Change in the Population Serviced. Four Probation Officers suggested changes or expansion in the population of youth that UDIS handled. Three felt that UDIS should take the "less hard-core" kids rather than those who were ripe for DOC commitment--perhaps boys on probation or supervision who had serious problems. The fourth officer recommended that referral to UDIS be based on the needs of the youth rather than on the amount of involvement he had had with the court.

Longer Intervention. Three Probation Officers called for less emphasis on short-term intervention.

Changes in the Development of Services. Seven of the respondents called for changes in the development of the vendor roster. Two of the Probation Officers would select advocates more carefully and monitor them more closely than in current practice; both of them related incidents in which advocates had been irresponsible in handling UDIS clients. There were several suggestions for changes in the type of resources offered. Two asked for a wider selection of tutorial programs and alternative schools for youth remaining in the community; one called for doing away with the wilderness programs; another wanted to deemphasize counseling. A few others offered more general suggestions for improvement of services: the need to get the right resource to assist and motivate the youth, the need to

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* Another, however, had a more positive reaction. When UDIS first started, he had thought it was unrealistic for UDIS to accept street-wise, manipulative kids. Now, he was ready to recommend that UDIS deal with them.

find community-based programs that will "reach out more," and the need to contract with vendors with more highly trained staff.

Changes in Case Management Orientation. In addition to recommending that Case Managers generally become more realistic, five Probation Officers mentioned other ways in which the Case Manager's job should be changed. One asked that UDIS reassess the manageability of the caseloads. He thought that perhaps the Case Managers were "overwhelmed." He had found that gaps in the provision of services were occurring, gaps that had lasted as long as three months. Occasionally, court appearances were being missed. It was suggested that better organization and scheduling of time might solve some of these problems. A second respondent thought decentralized offices might improve case management. Two other POs had some trouble with the postures assumed by Case Managers. One felt that the relationship between the Case Manager and the agency worker needed to be redefined. Another told us that Case Managers "should not try to play therapist or consultant or public defender." He also felt that they were too involved in diagnosis.

Better Coordination with the Court. Seven of the respondents indicated a desire for closer contact between UDIS and the juvenile court. The acceptance of UDIS as an integral part of the juvenile justice system was at the center of the comments. Six of the probation officers suggested better avenues of communication between the two departments: more frequent staffings and group meetings, greater punctuality in filing progress reports, and more regular notification to the probation staff about unusual incidents. One respondent asked that UDIS pay more attention to the social investigations prepared by the court staff. Another found it difficult to contact UDIS Case Managers--"I would love UDIS if I could talk to them." Two respondents called for better coordination between probation and UDIS resources, to promote greater understanding of the type of services each agency could offer. Two Probation Officers suggested that UDIS workers and Probation Officers operate on the team approach. One of the two suggested that a UDIS Case Manager be attached to each probation unit, so that UDIS and the probation department would be "close physically as well as professionally."

Part III. THE RESULTS

Introductory Note

We turn now to the central topic of the evaluation, the assessment of impact. What was achieved by UDIS and DOC in reducing delinquent behavior and at what cost to the public?

It is a longitudinal topic. It inquires not only about the behavior of the youth after intervention, but also how this behavior relates to a history of delinquent activity that may stretch many years back.

The issue then is the classic one of pretreatment/post-treatment comparison. Before we begin the long and frequently complex analysis that the comparison requires, it may be helpful to see the general shape of the data, as shown in the figure on the following page.

The figure plots the rate of delinquent activity among three sets of Chicago youth. The period covered by the graph extends over the four years before these boys were first sent to UDIS or to an institution, through the time they were in the program (starting at month zero), and, for those who were released before the cutoff date of 31 December 1976, on into the months after they left the program.*

The solid line represents delinquents who went to UDIS. The broken line represents the sample of delinquents who were sent to DOC institutions during the same time period. The dotted line represents the baseline sample of delinquents who were sent to DOC during the 21 months before UDIS was established.

Three features of the plot stand out. The first is the nearly exponential acceleration in delinquent activity

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* Note an important distinction between this figure and all the others that follow it: this is the only one that displays the "during" offenses; all of the others compare preintervention with post-release activity.



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Figure III.1 An Overview of the Arrest Records of UDIS, DOC, and the Pre-UDIS Baseline

prior to intervention. The second is the sharp and continuing drop in rate of activity at month zero for all three samples. The third is the gap between the UDIS and DOC samples in the postintervention period, wide during the early months (when the DOC delinquents were in institutions) and diminishing at the end of the plot. In one way or another, the following four chapters are an exegesis of what the data really mean with regard to these three time series phenomena.

Part III begins with Chapter 8 on the topic that was initially the center of attention of the evaluation: the comparative reduction in delinquent activity achieved by UDIS and DOC. The discussion then turns in Chapter 9 to a more detailed examination of the interaction between intervention strategies and recidivism. Then, in Chapter 10, we take up the finding that has turned out to be the real center of attention: the unexpectedly large "suppression effect" achieved among the UDIS, DOC, and the Pre-UDIS Baseline samples alike. In Chapter 11, we turn to the cost issue, again comparing UDIS and DOC. The report ends with Chapter 12, *Conclusions and Recommendations*.

8. Recidivism: UDIS Compared to DOC

UDIS exists finally to reduce delinquency. Its many other potential values--keeping youth out of institutions and in their communities, providing them with better services, lowering the costs of correctional intervention, and the rest--are important and could even justify the program. But UDIS ultimately reflects important concepts about how to deal with delinquency, and recidivism remains the most direct measure of whether the UDIS idea works. This chapter is devoted to an extended analysis of the recidivism outcomes of UDIS. The first part deals with the technical approach. The second part examines the comparisons between UDIS and DOC.

Many readers will find it appropriate to turn directly to the summary at the end of this chapter, and refer as needed to the full discussion of each measure. In addition to comparing the performance of UDIS and DOC, the analysis lays out the definitions and the data that will underpin discussions of recidivism outcomes in subsequent chapters.

TECHNICAL APPROACH

"Recidivism" has a deceptively simple common-sense meaning. If a delinquent recidivates, he breaks the law again. He continues to behave in the ways that got him in trouble in the first place. He is not "cured" of his criminal behavior or scared away from it by society's efforts on his behalf. He is still a delinquent. If he is past his seventeenth birthday, we may start calling him a criminal instead of a delinquent.

A number of complexities interfere when it comes to specifying how this common understanding is to be translated into statistics. What if a youth who was getting picked up by the police a dozen times a year before UDIS gets picked up once after leaving UDIS, a year later? He has "recidivated," but he is clearly less than a failure.

What about the youth who went to DOC for a succession of violent offenses and who continued to be picked up after discharge from DOC--but on charges of disorderly conduct or shoplifting instead of armed robbery or assault and battery? Has he "fully" recidivated, given the nature of his former offenses? Or how do we classify the youth who goes to UDIS or DOC, gets out, and stays out--even though he continues to be picked up by the police? Perhaps he has learned how to protect his interests in the courts, or perhaps he can now show the court evidence of a steady job or steady attendance at school. Is the simple fact of staying out of the institution a measure of progress, despite the continued criminal activity?

Recidivism is not a yes/no proposition. The objective of our analysis of recidivism has been to slice it in a number of ways, leading, we hope, to a balanced profile.

The Comparison Groups

Three samples of delinquents are compared. In the tables and figures they are labeled "UDIS," "DOC," and "The Pre-UDIS Baseline."

To recapitulate the discussion of the samples as given in Chapter 2, "Design of the Study": *UDIS* refers to the 144 male UDIS referrals released from UDIS, and not sent directly to DOC prior to the 31 December 1976 cutoff date for data on recidivism, out of the 191 for whom police contact data were collected. *DOC* refers to 104 males committed to DOC and released prior to the cutoff date, out of the 159 in the total police contact sample for DOC. The UDIS and DOC samples were drawn randomly from the populations that entered the respective programs during identical time periods of 1 October 1974 to 30 June 1976. The *Pre-UDIS Baseline* refers to the 130 exited boys out of a random sample of 142 males committed to DOC during the period of 1 January 1973 and 30 September 1974 and released prior to the cutoff date.* Table 8.1 shows the distribution of number

*Recall that we use the word "release" to denote parole or discharge from DOC, egress from UDIS, and termination from UDIS *when it does not lead directly to commitment*. "Exit" means any parole, egress, or termination. One anomaly should be noted: a boy in the Pre-UDIS Baseline who apparently was arrested within a day or two of parole and returned to DOC. He is not counted as having a "released" history, but he is included in the count of boys who were arrested or reinstitutionalized following exit; hence the sample size of 131 for the Pre-UDIS Baseline figures on those two measures.

Table 8.1 Month-by-month Sample Sizes for the Recidivism Analyses

		Number of full months between release and 12/31/76 or re-entry																							
		Less than 1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	24+
Number of youth out at least that many months	**UDIS**	144	125	115	108	96	83	80	70	62	54	45	43	34	25	20	17	9	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	DOC	104	96	84	88	83	80	75	68	59	53	48	41	34	28	22	15	14	12	9	5	4	3	1	0	0	0
	Pre-UDIS Baseline	130	124	119	114	108	102	100	95	95	93	87	85	84	82	81	78	75	73	70	66	62	58	57	53	48	47

of months on the street after first release for the three samples.*

The DOC and Pre-UDIS Baseline both consist of committed delinquents, but they play different roles in the analysis. The Baseline sample is exactly that: a profile of the characteristics, background, and behavior of the delinquents who were being institutionalized just prior to the availability of UDIS as an alternative. As a comparison group, it suffers from the experimental defect of representing youth in a noncomparable time period. Its value for the analysis is predominately as a means of taking a longer view of recidivism phenomena; of 142 in the Baseline sample, 49 had been out of DOC for at least two years before the end of the observation period, providing some assistance in interpreting what lies beyond the shorter time spans during which the UDIS and contemporary DOC delinquents were observed. For other purposes, however, it is the DOC sample drawn from commitments *after* 1 October 1974 that will be compared statistically to UDIS. The DOC and the UDIS youth underwent their correctional experiences during the same time period, thereby avoiding confounding effects of the historical context.

The Definition of "Contact" with the Criminal Justice System

The measures of delinquency used in this study are all based on official records. No self-report data were obtained.†

*There is a distinction drawn between "number of months since first release" and "number of months on the street after first release," because of the many sample subjects who went back into an institution sometime after first release. The latter data are used for all measures except cumulative recidivism measures (Measure 1 and Measure 2).

†See Chapter 2 for a discussion of this issue.

Given the official records as a data base, the choices for defining "contact" are (1) to include any time that a youth is taken into custody by the police; (2) to include only those instances which involve an offense beyond a certain "seriousness" threshold; (3) to include only those cases that are referred to court; or (4) to include only cases in which the youth is adjudicated delinquent by the court.

The last option was considered only briefly. Whether a youth is adjudicated delinquent on a given offense depends on many factors in addition to the nature of the offense itself. The juvenile court deliberately seeks to exhaust less severe alternatives before reaching the adjudicatory stage.

Each of the other three options has a significant element to add to the profile, so we chose all of them. For each of the analyses that are based on number of occurrences we report three data: *the total number of police contacts*, including offenses that were adjusted at the station; *the number of appearances in court*, defined broadly to include all instances when the police contact was referred to the jurisdiction of the court; and *the number of violence-related offenses*, whatever the disposition. The final category includes all instances involving the following charges, whether the offense was fully carried out or attempted: homicide, rape or other sexual assault, simple and aggravated assault, battery, intimidation, armed robbery, and strong-arm robbery. Additional data on seriousness of offense, utilizing the Sellin-Wolfgang seriousness index, are also analyzed in detail.

Note that the three types of contact are not mutually exclusive. Diagrammatically, they have this relationship,

The interrelationship of the samples is important to keep in mind while reading the analysis. When, for example, parallel results are found for the count of police contacts and the count of court appearances, the meaning is simply

that the finding is stable either way one looks at it. That is the purpose of the overlapping counts--to give the reader more than one way to view the results. The two parallel results do not constitute independent confirmation that the finding is valid.

THE RESULTS

We now turn to a consideration of the separate measures. There are four sets. Two of them are amenable only to a posttreatment analysis: (1) any reencounter with the criminal justice system, and (2) subsequent institutionalization. The other two are analyzed for UDIS-DOC differences and for before-after differences. They are: (3) number of encounters, subdivided by the categories of any police contact, violence-related offenses, and reappearances in court, and (4) seriousness of the offense.

Measure 1: Any Relapse (Percentage of Delinquents who Reenter the Criminal Justice System Following Release)

The most commonly applied operational definition of recidivism has been the percentage of offenders who repeat even once, as measured by renewed contact with the criminal justice system within a specified time period.

This definition of recidivism makes virtually all correctional programs look bad, including UDIS and DOC. The figures for the three types of reentry--any police contact, a violence-related offense, and reappearance in court--are shown in Table 8.2.*

Note that the measure as defined here gives a major advantage to UDIS: all subjects who were committed *directly* from UDIS to DOC technically had no arrests "after" UDIS, because there was no "after" period for them. If those 33 boys were to be counted, the UDIS percentage for "any police contact" by the end of one year would be 77.8 percent (n=90) rather than the 64.9 percent reported in Table 8.2.

For UDIS and DOC alike, more than half of the boys got into some kind of trouble with the police within six months

*Remember that sample sizes cannot be compared to those in Table 8.1, because sample sizes in Table 8.2 denote number of subjects whose first exit date was at least x months before 12/31/76, *not* the number of subjects released and on the streets for x months by 12/31/76.

Table 8.2 Renewed Contact with the Criminal Justice System During First Year After Release

			Months After Release 3	6	9	12
ANY POLICE CONTACT	UDIS	Percentage	30.4	51.4	61.9	64.9
		(n)	138	109	84	57
	DOC	Percentage	23.0	51.1	62.9	69.2
		(n)	100	88	70	52
	PRE-UDIS BASELINE	Percentage	29.0	50.4	63.0	63.7
		(n)	131	127	127	124
VIOLENCE-RELATED OFFENSE	UDIS	Percentage	5.8	13.8	17.9	19.3
		(n)	138	109	84	57
	DOC	Percentage	6.0	17.0	25.7	28.8
		(n)	100	88	70	52
	PRE-UDIS BASELINE	Percentage	6.1	17.3	24.4	27.4
		(n)	131	127	127	124
REAPPEAR-ANCE IN COURT	UDIS	Percentage	21.0	44.0	54.8	56.1
		(n)	138	109	84	57
	DOC	Percentage	14.0	39.8	52.9	57.7
		(n)	100	88	70	52
	PRE-UDIS BASELINE	Percentage	22.9	41.7	55.1	58.1
		(n)	131	127	127	124

Statistical significance of the UDIS-DOC differences at the twelve-month point:	χ^2	p<
Any police contact	.23	ns
Violence-related offense	1.36	ns
Reappearance in court	.03	ns

Note: "n" denotes the number of subjects whose first exit date was at least that many months prior to 12/31/76.

after release. By the end of the first year, the proportion was up to about two out of three. As indicated in Table 8.2, none of the UDIS-DOC differences were statistically significant at the end of the first year after release.

Because this measure of recidivism is so often the one cited in articles about the failure of correctional programs, a few words of caution about its interpretation are in order. The boys in these samples had accumulated, on the average, over a dozen arrests by the time they entered UDIS or DOC. One arrest after release does not have to mean that much,

especially in light of their high visibility to the police and people in the neighborhood, by virtue of their past notoriety. The percentages of these delinquents who reappeared in the criminal justice system at least once are in this context less dismaying than they may appear at first glance. The indicator has the virtue of being simple to understand and, at least in the case of the chronic delinquent, the defect of conveying little information of interest.

Measure 2: Subsequent Institutionalization (The Proportion of Delinquents who are Committed or Returned to DOC after Entry into the Program)

A more telling indication of recidivism than simple relapse is a subsequent decision to institutionalize the youth.* What percentages of subjects in the three samples were not only returning to the police stations and to the courts, but to incarceration?

It is a straightforward question with no straightforward answer.

Of the 191 youth in the UDIS sample, 33 had been sent to DOC directly or within two weeks of exit. An additional 19 had been committed to DOC sometime later after release. Overall, then, *27.2 percent of the UDIS sample had gone to DOC at the time that the observation period ended. The figure is certain to grow as time goes on.* Only 57 of the 191 had been out of the program for even a year when the observation period ended; 47 were still in the program.

These 27.2 percent of the sample are classified as UDIS failures. The alternative to incarceration did not prevent eventual incarceration. Difficulties arise when we try to compare this record to DOC's performance.

To compare UDIS and DOC over a comparable number of months, we first take the simplest approach. It assumes that the time spent in UDIS and DOC is the "treatment" period, and that we start to count "months of success"--that is, months during which the youth is *not* returned to incarceration--following the attempt at treatment. For DOC, this means that months of success are counted from

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*Institutionalization includes the adult division of DOC. All but three of 17 such cases involved subjects in the Pre-UDIS Baseline sample.

the date of parole. For UDIS, they are counted from the day that the youth leaves UDIS, whether he leaves by termination or egress. The results for the first year following exit from the program are shown in Table 8.3

Table 8.3 Institutionalization Following First Exit From UDIS or DOC

		MONTHS			
		3	6	9	12
UDIS	Cumulative Percentage	23.9	33.0	31.0	36.8
	(n)	138	109	84	57
DOC	Cumulative Percentage	5.0	11.4	18.6	25.0
	(n)	100	88	70	52
PRE-UDIS BASELINE	Cumulative Percentage	10.7	18.9	23.6	27.4
	(n)	131	127	127	124

Statistical significance of UDIS-DOC differences at the 1-year point: $X^2 = 1.78$ (ns)

Note: "N" denotes the number of subjects whose first exit date was at least X months before 12/31/76.

On this comparison, UDIS showed substantially higher rates of failure than DOC during the first nine months. For example, 33.0 percent of UDIS referrals went to DOC within six months of exit, compared with only 11.4 percent of contemporary DOC releases--a recidivism rate by this definition nearly three times higher for UDIS than for DOC. But by the end of the twelfth month, the gap had narrowed. DOC's margin--25.0 percent returnees versus 36.8 percent for UDIS--was no longer statistically significant, even through it looks large in raw percentages.

Three problems interfere with this comparison. We continue the analysis by examining each in turn.

The Starting Point for the Count. The count of returnees in Table 8.3 starts from the day that the delinquent left the program, and this puts UDIS at a disadvantage. When a DOC youth is returned to an institution six months after the date of parole, he has been on the streets (and therefore had a chance to *return* to DOC) for six months. But a UDIS youth who has been egressed for six months may

Table 8.4 Institutionalization Following First Release From DOC and First Entry Into UDIS

		Months						
		3	6	9	12	15	18	21
UDIS	Cumulative Percentage	4.2	10.2	15.7	21.1	24.0	26.3	29.1
	(n)	191	187	153	123	100	76	55
DOC	Cumulative Percentage	5.0	11.4	18.6	25.0	*	*	*
	(n)	100	88	70	52	*	*	*
PRE-UDIS BASELINE	Cumulative Percentage	10.7	18.9	23.6	27.4	31.7	36.8	40.2
	(n)	131	127	127	124	120	114	102

Statistical significance of UDIS-DOC differences at the 1-year point: $X^2 = .31$ (ns)

Notes: * Omitted because of sample size (e.g., 29 at month 15, 6 at month 21).

For UDIS, "n" denotes number of subjects whose first entry date into UDIS was at least X months before 12/31/76. For DOC and Pre-UDIS Baseline, "n" denotes number of subjects whose first exit date from DOC was at least X months before 12/31/76.

have been on the streets for nine months, or a year, or even a year and a half--if his time in UDIS is added to the total.

"Hidden Returns." Another built-in bias in DOC's favor is that its problem cases *stay* in DOC while UDIS's problem cases *go* to DOC. If a delinquent has been in DOC for six months and continues to act out, his parole can be delayed in hopes of some improvement by a later date. Given the same type of case, the UDIS delinquent may "act out" by committing a crime that puts him in DOC. Both programs have experienced a similar sort of failure, but only UDIS's failure can show up in the statistic we are using.

Both the start-point problem and the hidden returns problem argue for another way of counting: to consider the active UDIS referral as being analogous to the DOC parolee, and therefore to start counting from the day that he enters UDIS, not from the day that he is terminated or egressed. The analogy is not altogether apt. If the logic behind it were to be followed throughout the analysis of recidivism, the "during-program" offenses should be lumped with the "postprogram" offenses, a procedure which definitely

would not work in favor of UDIS. And if DOC and the Pre-UDIS Baseline figures were also started from the day of entry into DOC, UDIS would gain nothing in the comparison. But for the moment, looking at the problem from this point of view is a useful contrast to Table 8.3. Note that because the count is started at UDIS entry, we are able to extend the followup period to 21 months from the usual twelve.

The UDIS and DOC rates of return to institutions by this calculation are statistically equivalent at all four time points. There are two ways of interpreting this outcome. On the one hand, the figures suggest that the likelihood of return for a delinquent on the day he is paroled, after months of institutionalization, is almost exactly the same as for a delinquent on the day he enters UDIS. Why go to the time and expense of institutionalizing him in the first place? From another perspective, the figures suggest that a parolee who typically receives a low level of supervision and services has a return rate no higher than that of the UDIS referrals, with their Case Managers and advocates and multiservice programs.

There is nothing in the analysis to drive an observer toward one of these views rather than the other. It is very much a matter of perspective. The unanswered question is whether the rates of subsequent institutionalization would have been the same even if nothing had been done at the time that the youth was sent to UDIS or DOC. It is inherently a "what might have been" mystery, because it is operationally impossible to define a genuine control group.*

Revocation of Parole, Commitment, and Recommitment. Throughout the preceding discussion, one major factor has been ignored: the distinction between revocation of parole and commitment. To commit a UDIS referral to DOC requires a hearing in Cook County Juvenile Court before a judge and with the ordinary rules of juvenile court procedure in force. Revocation of parole is a less demanding process. Parole can be revoked for a technical violation (such as not reporting to the case worker) as well as for new criminal offenses. The hearing, called a "Morrissey-Brewer" hearing after the Supreme Court case of the same name, is an administrative one in which the evidence is demonstrated. Attorneys are not ordinarily present. If probable cause is found to

*Any control group would be conceptually indistinguishable from the samples of UDIS or DOC youth as observed the-time-before they ended up in UDIS or DOC.

believe a violation has occurred, this is sufficient to return a parolee to custody pending review by the parole board, and the parole board rarely reverses the decision of the hearing panel.

Under these conditions, youth often are returned from parole for violations which very rarely if ever would cause a youth to be committed in the first place. This occurred in 10 cases out of 66 returns-from-parole in the DOC and Pre-UDIS Baseline combined samples (15.2 percent), when the offense was "absconding," "poor adjustment," or "inhaling." In other cases, a single offense of a serious but not violent nature--theft, burglary, criminal trespass to vehicle--led to revocation of parole when it is problematic whether the offense would have led to institutionalization if the youth had not already been in DOC. The rationale for this procedure is not at issue here; the point is simply that it interferes with a comparison of DOC and UDIS.

Still other factors complicate this already tangled comparison. It is likely--we cannot demonstrate it--that the UDIS referral, even though technically not yet committed to DOC, is often treated as "nearly committed" by some judges. A violation of probation may have tipped the scales more easily for the UDIS referral than for the ordinary probationer. It should also be noted that a supplementary petition requires a lesser degree of proof--"preponderance of evidence"--than the initial petition. Both factors suggest that a UDIS youth could be committed easily. Yet, against these considerations is the influence of the Case Managers and advocate for the UDIS referrals. They under almost all circumstances actively sought new program plans (for example, sending the youth to a controlled environment such as a group home) that would persuade the judge to let the boy stay out of DOC despite the violation.* Often they were successful.

There is also the tendency of at least some UDIS Case Managers to try to cover for their cases when an offense has occurred, also as mentioned in Chapter 7. Again, the rationale behind the procedure is not at issue. It is widely said to happen more frequently with UDIS Case Managers than with DOC field services workers, and, if so, it would tend to artificially lower UDIS's rate of institutionalization relative to DOC's.

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*See Chapters 6 and 7.

The balance of the evidence leads us to conclude that parole was revoked for a DOC youth somewhat more readily than commitment was ordered for a UDIS youth; that given identical criteria and procedures with UDIS, the DOC rate of return-to-institution would be lower than shown in this presentation. But from a quantitative point of view, there is little we can do to estimate the magnitude of the inflationary effect at work.*

Taken overall, the evidence on this indicator is not favorable to UDIS. The best that can be said for UDIS, giving it all of the breaks in the calculation, is that its record is no worse than DOC's. A more stringent interpretation can be defended, arguing that UDIS has a higher rate of subsequent institutionalization than DOC.

Measure 3: Before and After Gross Level of Activity (Number of Events per Month per Hundred Delinquents)

The preceding measures were restricted to the post-program period; no "before" and "after" comparisons were possible. We now move to measures that do permit an examination of the preprogram to postprogram trendline, beginning with the basic measure of total number of events per month for every 100 youth in the samples.

Figure 8.1 depicts the trendlines for one year before and after intervention. The most remarkable feature of the graphs is not the comparison of UDIS and DOC at all, but the precipitous drop from the preintervention to the postintervention level. We discuss the nature of the drop in detail in Chapter 10; for now, we will focus on the comparative performance of the three samples.

Careful visual inspection of Figure 8.1 indicates that both DOC and the Pre-UDIS Baseline did better than UDIS during the first six months on rate of police contacts and rate of reappearances in court. During the second six months, the DOC and Pre-UDIS Baseline advantage disappeared.

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* Limiting the tabulation to recommitments and ignoring parole revocations would be unrealistic (there were only eight of them for the Pre-UDIS Baseline sample and only one for the DOC sample) because of the capricious way in which they came about. If the state's attorney wishes, he or she can take an offense to the court for recommitment rather than let it remain on the Morrissey-Brewer route. Usually this happens, if at all, for serious crimes, but by no means for all or even most serious crimes.



Figure 8.1 "Before" and "After" Comparison of Level of Contact with the Criminal Justice System

The rising trendline for DOC in the last quarter is somewhat misleading--in the thirteenth month the rate fell to zero. In all, DOC subjects were "out" for 112 person-months beyond the first 12 months, and recorded a total of eight police contacts during those months--a 7.1 percent overall rate that puts the DOC sample in line with the trends for UDIS and the Pre-UDIS Baseline. In contrast, UDIS had 11 police contacts in 77 person-months-out following the first year, for a rate of 14.3 percent for that period. The Pre-UDIS Baseline had 140 contacts in 1,243 person-months, for a rate of 11.3 percent.

Another way of looking at the data is to ask how much *reduction* was achieved compared to preintervention offenses. Table 8.5 reports the results. Patterns vary--again, DOC appeared to be stronger during the first six months, UDIS during the second six months. But taking the year before and the year after as wholes, the records are remarkably similar--only seven percentage points separate UDIS and DOC for police contacts; about three points separate them on violence-related offenses; and less than one point on court appearances. See Table 8.1 for the monthly sample sizes used to compute the quarterly rates.

Table 8.5 Proportionate Reductions Relative to Pre-Intervention Activity

		ANY POLICE CONTACT					VIOLENCE-RELATED OFFENSES					APPEARANCE IN COURT				
	Comparison Months*	1–3	4–6	7–9	10–12	1 year average	1–3	4–6	7–9	10–12	1 year average	1–3	4–6	7–9	10–12	1 year average
UDIS	Mean Number Before per person-month	.586	.536	.414	.394	.483	.136	.092	.063	.058	.087	.433	.356	.255	.209	.313
	Mean Number After per person-month	.228	.208	.102	.098	.180	.035	.027	.016	.025	.027	.127	.151	.075	.066	.115
	Proportionate Reduction	.611	.612	.754	.751	.627	.743	.707	.746	.569	.690	.707	.576	.706	.684	.633
DOC	Mean Number Before per person-month	.574	.424	.295	.277	.472	.197	.099	.069	.057	.105	.522	.296	.187	.159	.291
	Mean Number After per person-month	.128	.160	.139	.154	.144	.039	.021	.028	.024	.029	.089	.109	.122	.138	.109
	Proportionate Reduction	.777	.623	.529	.444	.695	.802	.788	.594	.579	.724	.830	.632	.348	.132	.625
Pre-UDIS Baseline	Mean Number Before per person-month	.401	.271	.302	.220	.401	.148	.059	.096	.075	.094	.404	.230	.228	.160	.253
	Mean Number After per person-month	.171	.152	.141	.105	.143	.028	.061	.049	.012	.038	.123	.106	.113	.078	.107
	Proportionate Reduction	.574	.439	.533	.523	.643	.811	.034	.490	.840	.596	.696	.539	.504	.513	.577

* E.g., "4-6" indicates the record during the fourth through sixth months after release compared to the fourth through sixth months prior to intervention.

A statistical analysis of the six-month followup sample produced inconclusive results. If only the post-program results were compared, a *t*-test showed a significant difference favoring DOC (t=2.21, $p \leq .03$). But the two-way analysis of variance revealed that this difference can be explained by taking into account the preintervention behavior of the two samples. Table 8.6 shows the results of the analysis using three semesters (two pre- and one postintervention), and of the planned comparisons in which the two preintervention semesters were pooled.

Table 8.6 Analysis of Variance of Total Police Contacts: The Six Month Followup Sample

THE 3 SEMESTER ANOVA				
	Number of Police Contacts Per Semester			
MEANS	7-12 months preintervention	1-6 months preintervention	1-6 months postintervention	
UDIS (n=79)	2.4	3.2	1.3	
DOC (n=75)	2.0	3.4	.8	
SOURCE	df	Mean square	F	p<
Between groups main effect	1	5.76	1.37	ns
Between groups error	152	4.21		
Time main effect	2	196.85	67.81	.001
Time by group	2	4.87	1.68	ns
Residual error	304	2.90		
PLANNED COMPARISONS				
Before-After main effect	1	3.425	103.81	.001
Before-After by group	1	.362	1.16	ns

Note the highly significant F ratio for the before-after difference. Note also the importance of the pre-post comparison. Without the preprogram data, the analysis would have concluded that DOC's performance was significantly superior to that of UDIS on this indicator. The conservative assumption must be that the preintervention differences are relevant, and that therefore *a significant difference in the UDIS and DOC levels of postintervention police contacts was not observed.*

The difference on appearances in court followed a parallel pattern. The difference in violence-related offenses was virtually zero for the six-month followup.

Measure 4: Seriousness of the Offense (An Index of Social Costs Inflicted by the Offense)

We have reported a partial measure of seriousness of the offense in the form of the category of "violence-related offense." A more detailed approach is presented below, using the Sellin-Wolfgang seriousness scale for delinquent offenses.

The Sellin-Wolfgang scale is described in detail in their book (Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964). Very briefly, it assigns weights to the component of an offense--for example, the number of premises entered, number and extent of injuries, or value of property stolen or destroyed--based on extensive attitude tests which scaled 141 different "offensive events." The scale has the effect of giving the greatest weight to injury and intimidation components and lesser ones to property components. If no one was hurt or intimidated, and no property stolen or damaged, the score is zero.*

We have followed Sellin and Wolfgang's procedure of treating scores of 0 or 1 as representing trivial offenses. Any event included as a "serious" offense in the analysis, one crossing the threshold between trivial and nontrivial, met one or more of these criteria: (1) intimidation, (2) property loss or damage of $10 or more, (3) any injury requiring medical attention, (4) illegal entry involving even minor theft, damage, or injury, or (5) any theft or damage involving even a minor injury.

In drawing comparisons between UDIS and DOC, three separate statistics will be considered. The first is the *percentage of all police contacts that met one of the seriousness criteria*: in effect, "What proportion of the offenses inflicted nontrivial costs on the community?" The second is *the mean seriousness score of those offenses which crossed the seriousness threshold*--"How serious were the nontrivial offenses?" The third statistic takes into account that some youth were committing no offenses at all, and looks at the total from the public's point of view. The statistic is *aggregate seriousness scores divided by the aggregate person-years in the sample*: "How much cost was inflicted on the community by the average youth?"

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*Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin extended the seriousness scale to the lesser offenses for the Philadelphia cohort study.

What proportion of the offenses inflicted nontrivial costs on the community? The effect of the seriousness threshold suggested by Sellin and Wolfgang is to separate instances of petty misconduct from offenses that inflict personal injuries, property loss, or both. "Petty misconduct" is, of course, a subjective term. But the the criteria for the seriousness threshold are reviewed, it will be apparent that an offense which fails to meet even one of them must by definition be trivial in terms of the direct costs it inflicts on the community. It therefore is important to ask whether UDIS and DOC are affecting the proportion of offenses that fall into the "serious" category.

The results, shown in Table 8.7, show a less graphic upward trend than we expected. Only the UDIS sample showed a steady rise. And in magnitude, only in the last six to 12 months prior to UDIS or DOC intervention did the percentages rise noticeably above those which were found three or sometimes even four years before intervention.

The proportions of "serious" offenses dropped following intervention for DOC and UDIS. The drop was greater for UDIS. Whereas one in two UDIS-sample offenses had been beyond the seriousness threshold during the year prior to intervention, only about one in three met the same standard following intervention. For DOC, the drop was less substantial, from 43.8 percent to 36.9 percent (combined offenses in the two periods).

Table 8.7 Proportion of Offenses Beyond the Seriousness Threshold Over Time

		Months Before Intervention								During Intervention	Months After Intervention		
		43-47	37-42	31-36	25-30	19-24	13-18	7-12	1-6		1-6	7-12	13+
UDIS	Proportion "serious" (%)	29.6	38.0	43.9	41.2	46.2	40.7	47.1	53.3	34.3	28.8	29.3	90.0
	Total no. of offenses	54	50	66	131	156	189	278	349	207	73	31	10
DOC	Proportion "serious" (%)	33.3	34.4	46.3	36.8	27.5	36.8	38.6	47.4	37.9	45.7	24.0	40.0
	Total no. of offenses	21	32	41	68	120	155	179	264	29	35	25	5
Pre-UDIS Baseline	Proportion "serious" (%)	44.4	11.1	46.2	30.0	34.7	32.0	36.4	43.7	39.2	60.0	38.2	30.3
	Total no. of offenses	18	9	26	30	75	100	162	174	51	51	34	33

Numbers are percentages of total police contacts that had a seriousness score greater than 1.
If more than 25% of a youth's offenses were missing data for the seriousness score, all of his offenses were deleted from the analysis.

The postintervention proportions for DOC and UDIS were virtually equal. This was not true of the period prior to intervention. UDIS referrals consistently had *higher* proportions of nontrivial offenses than DOC. A discussion of the difference was given in Chapter 4. Briefly, it appears that the difference reflected a selection effect on the part of the judges, whereby the youth with a long history of trivial offenses (and who therefore would not ordinarily be considered for DOC) committed one or two violent crimes and was sent to DOC rather than to UDIS.

A log-linear analysis of the UDIS and DOC differences was conducted. Because "offense" is the unit of analysis, we are not constrained to limit the data to the six-month followup. The sample includes all released subjects, comparing offenses that occurred within the year prior to intervention with the offenses during the year following intervention. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 8.8.*

Table 8.8 Log-Linear Analysis of the Proportion of Nontrivial Offenses

FREQUENCIES OF OFFENSE TYPES	Before		After	
	Trivial	Nontrivial	Trivial	Nontrivial
UDIS	310	317	74	30
DOC	249	194	38	22

SOURCE	S	V	df	χ^2	p<
Between groups main effect	.08	.13	1	.05	ns
Before-After main effect	1.22	.13	1	11.49	.001
Before-After by group	.63	.13	1	3.05	ns

*Log-linear analysis is a relatively recent development (see Shaffer, 1973) which many readers may not have encountered. In essence, it permits analyses of multidimensional contingency tables analogous to those which have long been conducted via ANOVA for means of frequency distributions. In the present case, it permits an estimation of the interaction effect between time (before-after) and group (UDIS or DOC).

Again, the before-after difference is the only significant result. The UDIS reduction was greater than DOC's, but not to a point of statistical significance. The upswing in the UDIS proportion *after* month 12 (with a very small sample) also diminishes confidence in the reality of the UDIS-DOC difference. If preintervention behavior is ignored and only the one-year postprogram results are compared, the results fall far short of significance (χ^2=1.07).

Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that *UDIS achieved clearly positive results on this indicator of effectiveness.* Case Managers commonly made the point that their clients often continued to get in trouble with the police, but more often for minor types of offenses. The numbers support this claim. Roughly the same can be said of DOC, with evidence that the reductions it achieved may have been smaller.

How serious were the offenses which crossed the seriousness threshold? Table 8.9 displays the mean seriousness scores when the set is restricted to those which met the seriousness criteria discussed above.

As the table indicates, both of the samples of institutionalized delinquents tended to have had higher means than the UDIS sample during the period prior to intervention. After intervention, the record is mixed. Taken as a whole, the UDIS mean (4.33) was substantially lower than DOC's (6.84), and about the same as those of the Pre-UDIS Baseline. For each of the three samples, the number of postintervention "serious events" was small.

Table 8.9 Mean Seriousness Scores Over Time

		Months Prior to Intervention								Months During Intervention	Months After Intervention		
		43-48	37-42	31-36	25-30	19-24	13-18	7-12	1-6		1-6	7-12	13+
UDIS	Mean	2.95	2.67	3.55	3.08	3.10	3.07	3.27	3.59	4.01	4.36	2.85	6.10
	N	21	39	42	72	105	108	203	283	117	42	13	10
DOC	Mean	3.42	2.81	3.10	2.85	4.20	3.89	3.67	5.13	3.95	6.87	5.70	9.50
	N	12	27	31	34	51	79	95	223	22	23	10	4
Pre-UDIS Baseline	Mean	3.33	3.11	3.32	2.78	3.08	4.68	4.64	4.38	4.86	3.77	4.44	4.42
	N	15	9	22	23	52	69	118	171	43	44	25	48

Note: Only offenses with a seriousness score greater than 1 are included in the calculation.

Both UDIS and DOC showed small numbers of "serious" events even when the entire sample was included. The six-month followup samples contained only 10 DOC and 23 UDIS subjects with a nontrivial offense, and we therefore decided to forego an analysis of variance. To give the reader a general picture of the UDIS-DOC differences, we did compute *t*-test comparisons of means for the entire sample, using the offense as the unit of analysis. The difference between UDIS and DOC during the year prior to intervention was significant at the .001 level (t=7.96), reflecting the tendency of judges to institutionalize delinquents who committed extremely severe offenses such as homicide, rape, and armed robbery, all of which have very high seriousness scores. Both UDIS and DOC showed significantly higher seriousness scores after intervention than before (t=6.33 for UDIS and 2.52 for DOC). The UDIS-DOC differences in postintervention scores were large in magnitude, as indicated in Table 8.9, but were not significant statistically (t=1.61). The reason was the small size of the samples of postprogram offenses and the large variance of the DOC sample introduced by the presence of a few extremely serious crimes. The standard deviation among the 37 DOC serious postprogram offenses was a fourth again as large as the mean (S.D.=8.50, mean=6.84).

Interpreting the substantive meaning of the data is equally slippery. To contribute to the mean score, it was necessary to commit a nontrivial offense. In effect, we are inquiring, "How bad were the failures?" The answer seems to be that there existed relatively small groups within both UDIS and DOC who not only kept on committing offenses, but also started committing more serious ones. They stand out from the trends in the samples as a whole; note the small numbers of serious offenses relative to the preintervention period. Because they are so conspicuous, it is worth exploring the possibility that an increase in seriousness of offense is a useful discriminator for identifying the incorrigible high-risk delinquent. But the existence of these subgroups does not mean that the boys who went to UDIS and DOC typically were committing more serious crimes after exit than before they went into the program.

What was the aggregate "damage" inflicted on the community by the average youth? From the public's point of view, this is the seriousness indicator of greatest interest. In all, how much damage are these youngsters

doing before they go into the program, compared to the damage they do after they come out? The seriousness scores cannot tell us in concrete terms but they do provide a yardstick for comparing relative levels. We may not know what an aggregate seriousness score of (say) 25 means in terms of people hurt and property stolen or destroyed, but there is reason to assume that it means a greater total amount of damage than is represented by an index aggregate of 10, or 15, or 20.

This is the basis for computing the following statistic, the aggregate seriousness per person-year. Mathematically, it is the sum of seriousness scores for all offenses during a given time period before or after intervention, divided by the cumulative person-years represented by the sample during that time period. Note that the calculation differs from the previous two in one important respect. Both of them worked exclusively with offenses that had been committed. A program with a very low recidivism rate comprised entirely of serious crimes would show up badly on them. Here, we take the rate of offenses into account as well as their seriousness. Table 8.10 displays the results for the three samples.

Table 8.10 Aggregate Seriousness Scores Per Person-Year Before, During, and After Intervention

		Months Before Intervention								During Intervention	Months After Intervention		
		43-48	37-42	31-36	25-30	19-24	13-18	7-12	1-6		1-6	7-12	13+
Seriousness Scores per Person-year	**UDIS**	.72	1.20	1.68	2.52	3.72	3.84	7.68	11.76	3.96	3.84	1.56	8.16
	No. person-yrs.	86.5	86.5	86.5	86.5	86.5	86.5	86.5	86.5	118.7	48.3	24.1	7.5
	DOC	.60	1.08	1.32	1.44	3.00	4.44	5.04	16.32	.60	4.08	2.40	4.08
	No. person-yrs.	70.0	70.0	70.0	70.0	70.0	70.0	70.0	70.0	139.2	38.6	23.9	9.4
	Pre-UDIS Baseline	.84	.48	1.32	1.08	2.76	5.64	9.48	13.08	1.20	3.60	3.12	2.40
	No. person-yrs.	57.5	57.5	57.5	57.5	57.5	57.5	57.5	57.7	168.3	45.4	35.2	86.8

Except for the previously observed tendency of the institutionalized samples to have higher mean scores than UDIS just prior to intervention, the three distributions are not markedly different.* The summary differences between UDIS and DOC are shown in Table 8.11.

* The sudden jump at the end of the postrelease UDIS figures should be read in light of the small base of the calculation (only 7.5 person-years).

The results of the analysis of variance for the six-month followup sample are shown below. There were no significant differences between UDIS and DOC.

Table 8.11 Analysis of Variance of Aggregate Seriousness Scores: the Six Month Followup Sample

THE 3 SEMESTER ANOVA

MEANS	Aggregate Seriousness Score Per Semester			
	7-12 months preintervention	1-6 months preintervention	1-6 months postintervention	
UDIS (n=48)	3.9	6.1	2.0	
DOC (n=37)	2.6	7.7	1.9	
SOURCE	**df**	**Mean square**	**F**	**p<**
Between groups main effect	1	1.08	.03	ns
Between groups error	83	336.16		
Time main effect	2	201.29	5.31	.006
Time by group	2	63.29	1.67	ns
Residual error	166	37.94		
PLANNED COMPARISONS				
Before-After main effect	1	2.87	3.03	ns
Before-After by group	1	2.06	1.56	ns

Note: Only subjects with at least a 6-month follow-up period and 75% of offenses scored for seriousness were included in the sample.

SUMMARY

Table 8.12 on the following page summarizes the offense data for UDIS and DOC on all of the indicators of recidivism that have been presented. When appropriate, the before-after comparisons are presented, using the year prior and year following as the basis for aggregation.

Examined as a profile, DOC had an edge in reducing the incidence of offenses; UDIS had an edge in reducing the seriousness of the offenses that continued to be committed. But *the numbers do not make a case for the overall superiority of either alternative.*

Table 8.12 Summary of the Recidivism Measures

	Twelve months prior to intervention		Post-release Period [1]		Proportionate Change [2]	
	UDIS	DOC	UDIS	DOC	UDIS	DOC
Annual rate of police contacts	5.8	5.7	2.1	1.6	−63.4%	−71.4%
Number of person-years	191.0	159.0	82.5	77.8		
Annual rate of violence-related offenses	1.0	1.3	.3	.3	−67.5%	−76.5%
Number of person-years	191.0	159.0	82.5	77.8		
Annual rate of appearances in court	3.8	3.5	1.4	1.2	−63.2%	−65.0%
Number of person-years	191.0	159.0	82.5	77.8		
Proportion of offenses classified nontrivial	50.6%	43.8%	34.2%	36.9%	−32.3%	−15.2%
Total number of offenses[3]	627	443	114	65		
Mean seriousness score of the nontrivial offenses	3.46	4.69	4.32	6.84	+24.9%	+45.8%
Number of nontrivial offenses	486	318	65	37		
Annual aggregate seriousness score per person-year in the program	9.71	10.66	3.55	3.50	−63.4%	−67.2%
Number of person-years	173.0	140.0	79.9	71.9		

	Elapsed months since first exit	
	UDIS	DOC
Percentage of sample with at least one police contact within 12 months after program exit	64.9%	69.2%
Number of subjects first exited 1 year prior to 12/31/76	57	52
Percentage of sample institutionalized within 1 year after first program exit [4]	36.8%	25.0%
Number of subjects first exited 1 year prior to 12/31/76	57	52

NOTES:
1. Post-release period: UDIS mean = 7.92 months, S.D. = 4.83; DOC mean = 9.43, S.D. = 5.25. Includes only months actually on street, not elapsed months since release.
2. Percentage reductions were computed from the original data and may therefore differ slightly from the reductions that can be calculated from the rounded before and after rates.
3. The samples for calculating the proportion of nontrivial offenses and the aggregate annual rate were based on samples with complete seriousness data on more than 75% of all offenses. Mean seriousness of nontrivial offenses was based on ALL such events.
4. See discussion of Measure 2 for qualifications relating to this indicator.

Uncertainty about the results persists, however, because of the selection biases at work. They were potent ones. First, it must be remembered that *33 UDIS "failures," a number equal to 18.6 percent of the UDIS sample who had exited the program, were sent directly from UDIS to DOC and therefore never were part of the recidivism analysis.* We must ask: How much better would DOC have worked if we had deleted 18.6 percent of the most troublesome DOC commitments from its sample?

The second source of bias has been discussed at several points throughout the report. Most judges and probation officers said they tried to identify the hardcore, dangerous offender and put him in DOC, while sending the more manageable-but-committable offender to UDIS. How accurately did they discriminate on the basis of the many intangible factors that we did not measure? To the extent that they were accurate, DOC started with more intractable delinquents than did UDIS, and had to do better just to stay even with UDIS's results.

Perhaps the best way to express the significance of the selection biases is this. If UDIS had shown superior results on the recidivism measures, even major ones, we would have been forced to discount them because of selection bias. As it turned out, UDIS did not show better results on the recidivism measures. UDIS was barely on a par with DOC. *The possibility that selection biases masked superior effectiveness of institutionalization cannot be ignored.* The biases toward the UDIS sample could easily have wiped out even quite large differences in favor of DOC.

9. Recidivism and the UDIS Approach

UDIS set out to apply three programming principles: short-term programming, the least drastic alternative principle, and individualized treatment. We did not attempt to scale the degree of "individualization" in a given youngster's program or to relate individualization to recidivism. But we can review the recidivism evidence as it relates to the remaining two strategy options.

RECIDIVISM AND SHORT-TERM PROGRAMMING

Proponents of short-term treatment strategies argue that (a) long-term treatment is expensive, (b) the notion that a few extra months will make the difference is usually fallacious, and (c) it is intrinsically wrong to keep a youngster in the juvenile justice system any longer than absolutely necessary. Speaking on the other side of the question, service providers repeatedly argued that the UDIS ideal takes clients away just when real progress is beginning. Six months is not enough time to compensate for years of disadvantage.

To test the association between recidivism and time-in-program, two within-UDIS comparison groups were defined. Group 1 consisted of 47 egressed UDIS referrals who had been in the program for no more than six months. Group 2 consisted of 67 egressed UDIS referrals who had been in the program for seven months or longer. Note that youth who had been terminated were excluded from the analysis.

Probable Bias in the Comparison Groups. A substantial bias would be predicted, on the supposition that early egress tends to go with the set of referrals who did well and late egress tends to go with the set of

referrals who had problems. Short-term programming would therefore show positive results compared to long-term programming because the low-risk boys were concentrated in the short-term group. But the examination of the case histories (pp. 89-93) indicated no basis for concluding that this predictable source of bias did in fact materialize. Of the 20 case histories egressed within six full months, 14 (70.0 percent) were egressed for reasons unrelated to their progress in the program. The 30.0 percent proportion who were egressed early because of their progress is not out of line with the overall "success" rates of UDIS.* It is also no greater than the proportion of youth in the long-term group who were released because of their progress.† Insofar as we were able to determine, the comparison groups were free of systematic bias that would artifically improve the recidivism results of either sample.

The results. The comparison produced no significant differences. As the data in Table 9.1 indicate, the recidivism records of the two groups were very similar.

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* For example, "success" defined as no arrests within a year after exit occurred in 35.1 percent of the cases who had been out for at least that period of time.

† Determining an exact count is not realistic because the longer amount of time spent in the program by these boys was a confounding factor in the Case Manager's assessment that a boy was ready to egress. The 14 boys in the "reintegration into the community" and "inertia" categories (31.8 percent of the 44 boys in the long-term case history sample) would seem to constitute a minimum number of boys who were genuinely seen as doing well when they were egressed.

Table 9.1 A Comparison of Recidivism Results Within UDIS: Short-term Versus Long-term Referrals

		Short-term (egressed within 6 months) n = 47	Long-term (egressed after 7 months or longer) n = 67
Average annual rate of police contact per 100	Post-release rate	2.1	2.1
	Change from pre-intervention level	–62.2%	–65.0%
Proportion of police contacts beyond the seriousness threshold	Post-release rate	.326	.452
	Change from pre-intervention level	–25.9%	–4.7%
Mean seriousness score of contacts beyond the seriousness threshold	Mean	5.00	4.24
	Change from pre-intervention level	+50.2%	+36.8%
Mean aggregate seriousness score per person-year	Mean	2.95	3.29
	Change from pre-intervention level	–65.9%	–60.1%

Note: All figures are based on the year preceding entry into UDIS and the period following egress. Terminated subjects are excluded from the samples.

The aggregate groupings of short- and long-term egresses indicate that *rate or type of recidivism was essentially indifferent to time spent in UDIS.* A review of the case histories tends to reinforce this conclusion, and at the same time to provide evidence discouraging the use of UDIS resources on extended efforts to deal with youngsters who are not initially responsive. In Chapter 6 (p. 92), it was noted that almost half of the 44 egressed youth in the case history sample who stayed longer than 6 months did so because the Case Manager was trying to find a service that would finally work (the Trial and Error reason for extending the length of time in the program) or because the referral was getting a second chance after being brought back before the court on a new petition. Of the 19 youth in these two categories, 14 had been egressed from UDIS for more than 30 days by the time the observation period had ended and police contact data had been collected for the 10 who

were nonsuburban youth. As a group, they had been arrested following release a median of 3 times. Only two of them had not been arrested for a post-release offense, and those two had been egressed for only 4.7 and 6.6 months respectively. In all, the ten in this group had accumulated 29 offenses in 87.7 person-months after egress--a monthly rate per hundred youth of 33.0 offenses, nearly twice as high as the post-release monthly rate for UDIS as a whole (18.0).

They also had accumulated nine arrests for violence-related offenses during that period--a monthly rate of 10.3 per 100, nearly four times larger than the rate of 2.7 for UDIS as a whole.

And it must be remembered that these were *egressed* youth in the Second Chance and the Trial and Error categories: the ones who, officially, had successfully completed their UDIS program. The figures exclude the "unsuccessful"--i.e., terminated--boys who would have fallen into the two categories and inflated the offense rates to even higher levels.

The sample is small, and the evidence should be read as only indicative. But, such as it is, *the available evidence is highly inconsistent with the argument that repeated placements can turn around a referral who is unreceptive to the first ones.* It can be added that *the evidence calls into question the wisdom of maintaining a boy in the program despite new petitions.* UDIS took pride in not giving up on a case. That (in general) they truly did not give up is witnessed by the many instances we found in which the Case Manager successfully persuaded a judge to leave a boy in UDIS despite new petitions, and the many instances in which a Case Manager would doggedly try a new placement for a boy who had been ejected for cause from all his previous ones. But the recidivism results do not support the utility of such perseverence, either for the boy or for the community.

RECIDIVISM AND THE LEAST DRASTIC ALTERNATIVE PRINCIPLE

If the objective is to reduce crime, does the least drastic alternative principle make sense? Did the UDIS experience provide evidence that the chronic delinquent can best be handled by disrupting the youth's normal environment as little as possible?

The Level of First Placement

To examine this issue, we first return to the grouping of placements used in Chapter 6:

Level I:	Placement in the community, at home, (e.g., counseling and advocacy services, educational/vocational services).
Level II:	Placement in the community, in a group home or foster home.
Level III:	Placement out of the community, in a residential program (e.g., a rural work camp, wilderness program, an intensive psychological treatment program).

The discussion that follows analyzes the recidivism records of boys sent to these three levels as a *first placement*. That is, we focus on the degree of disruption in the pre-referral environment that UDIS imposed on a boy just entering the program.* The results do not reflect favorably on the least drastic alternative principle.

First, consider the pre-post comparison of police contacts per 100 youth per month during the first year before and after intervention, as shown in Table 9.2.

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*We conducted supplementary analyses, comparing recidivism rates of boys who had gone from a Level I to a Level III placement with those boys who had gone from Level I to Level II (*but never to a Level III*) placement, and with those boys who stayed in Level I placements throughout. For technical reasons, this comparison is much less clear-cut than the first-placement approach. The results, however, were consistent. For example, the boys who went from Level I to Level III placement (n = 46) showed before-after reductions of 65.4 percent in arrests compared to a 56.4 percent reduction among boys who stayed in Level I placements throughout (n = 36). Note, however, that the 10 boys who went from Level I to Level II placement showed a lower (48.2 percent) reduction. The sample was so small that it was virtually anecdotal, but the results were consistent with doubts raised elsewhere about the efficacy of the group home/foster care approach.

Table 9.2 Annual Rate of Police Contacts by Level of First Placement

First Placement	Annual No. of Offenses per Youth: Year Before UDIS	After Release	Change
Level I	**5.4**	**2.4**	**–55.6%**
Number of person-years	115.0	52.4	
Level II	**5.4**	**2.1**	**–61.1%**
Number of person-years	29.0	11.4	
Level III	**7.1**	**2.2**	**–69.0%**
Number of person-years	46.0	24.0	

The reductions grew as the severity of the intervention increased. This finding is tempered by the higher pre-UDIS offense rate for the Level III group; it is easier to get a large percentage drop from the higher base. On the other hand, it is important to remember that this *ex post facto* analysis is loaded against a good showing for the more drastic interventions. We can expect that more than half of the boys who were sent to more drastic placements were ones who had been placed there at the judge's insistence, usually because of the judge's belief that they were the most incorrigible or most dangerous.* To the extent they were correct in their assessment, the comparison is biased in favor of the Level I interventions with their presumptively more tractable clients.

This consideration is of special interest when the seriousness scores are compared (Table 9.3). First, we consider the mean seriousness score for all nontrivial offenses.

The increases for the Level II and III samples were small, less than a third as large as the increase associated with the Level I first placement. In view of the small post-program sample sizes for Levels II and III, their apparently

*See p. 87.

good showing cannot be given much weight in isolation from the other findings on first placement. But the pattern of the data in Table 9.3 and the logic of the least drastic alternative principle are, at the least, inconsistent.

Table 9.3 Mean Seriousness Score for Nontrivial Offenses by Level of First Placement

First Placement	Mean Seriousness Score: Year Before UDIS	Mean Seriousness Score: After Release	Change
Level I	3.42	4.79	+40.1%
No. of offenses	545	47	
Level II	3.35	3.90	+16.4%
No. of offenses	147	10	
Level III	3.11	3.44	+10.6%
No. of offenses	236	9	

Next, we examine proportion of offenses which qualified as nontrivial under the seriousness criterion.

Table 9.4 Proportion of Offenses Beyond the Seriousness Threshold by Level of First Placement

First Placement	Proportion of Nontrivial Offenses: Year Before UDIS	Proportion of Nontrivial Offenses: After Release	Change
Level I	.487	.409	−16.0%
Total offenses	1,119	115	
Level II	.538	.526	−2.2%
Total offenses	273	19	
Level III	.429	.225	−47.6%
Total offenses	77	40	

Again, the best results were recorded among those sent first to the most drastic placement. In this case, however, note that the group homes show up poorly compared to Level I as well as Level III first placements.

Finally, we consider aggregate "social costs" inflicted on the community per person-year (the aggregated seriousness scores for a sample of youth, divided by the number of person-years represented by the period in question). As discussed in Chapter 8, this measure takes into account the youth who were committing no offenses at all, serious or otherwise.

Table 9.5 Aggregate Seriousness Score per Person-year by Level of First Placement

First Placement	Mean Aggregate Seriousness Score per person-year: Year Before UDIS	After Release	Change
Level I	**13.9**	**6.4**	**−54.0%**
No. of person-years	75.0	27.8	
Level II	**15.7**	**6.3**	**−59.9%**
No. of person-years	20.0	6.5	
Level III	**14.1**	**1.9**	**−86.5%**
No. of person-years	32.0	14.5	

The aggregate score per person-year for the Level III sample was less than a third of the aggregates for the other two levels.

In sum, the most drastic first placement--in a residential facility out of the community--was associated with superior recidivism results whether the issue was reduction in raw numbers, reduced seriousness of the offenses that

were committed, or reduced aggregate "seriousness" costs to the community.*

These data on recidivism take on added meaning when the case histories are reviewed, and with them, the Case Manager's opinions about the effects of the placements.

For each placement, the Case Manager's evaluative comments were coded as indicating a positive, mixed/neutral, or negative assessment of that specific placement for that specific youngster. The results are shown in Table 9.7, and they reveal that Case Managers, who were assessing the placements without knowledge of the recidivism results, accorded a strikingly higher proportion of positive ratings to Level III projects than to either of the other two levels: 57.3 percent of the Level III placements got positive ratings, compared to 30.0 and 25.0 percent of Levels I and II respectively.

Table 9.6 Case Managers' Assessments of the Placements for the Case History Sample

	Total number of placements	(Number of cases involved)	Percentage of placements believed to have been . . . Positive	Mixed or Neutral	Negative	Ratio of positive to negative assessment
Level I Overall	**210**	**(102)**	**30.0**	**40.0**	**30.0**	**1.0:1**
Advocacy	118	(95)	29.7	37.3	33.1	.9:1
Educational/ Vocational	58	(34)	34.5	39.7	25.9	1.3:1
Counseling	34	(49)	23.5	50.0	26.5	.9:1
Level II Overall	**44**	**(37)**	**25.0**	**31.8**	**43.2**	**.6:1**
Group homes	39	(33)	25.6	30.8	43.6	.6:1
Foster Care	5	(5)	20.0	40.0	40.0	.5:1
Level III Overall	**75**	**(65)**	**57.3**	**24.0**	**18.7**	**3.1:1**
Rural	62	(57)	56.5	25.8	17.7	3.2:1
Intensive Care	13	(12)	61.5	15.4	23.1	2.7:1
TOTAL	**329**	**(110)**	**35.6**	**35.3**	**29.2**	**1.2:1**

*These results are not consistent with the preliminary findings of the assessment of the Massachusetts deinstitutionalization experience. The

The *ratio* of positive to negative comments was even more decisively positive for Level III placements in comparison with the others--three times large than Level I's ratio, and five times larger than Level II's.

When Case Managers were asked to specify the most successful and least successful of a boy's placements, the same pattern was obtained. Of the 33 instances in which Case Managers made a judgment about Case Histories involving placements in more than one level, a Level III placement was said to have been the *most* successful in an extremely high 72.7 percent of the relevant cases, and the *least* successful in only 12.1 percent. Compare this with the 41 judged cases in which a boy had been in a Level I and at least one other level: the Level I placement was said to have been "most successful" less than half as often (34.1 percent of the cases) and "least successful" more than four times as often (51.2 percent of the cases). For the Level II case, the record was even worse: "most successful" in only 22.2 percent of the 18 relevant cases, and "least successful" in 61.1 percent of them.

In short, *the Level III placement was found to have superior marks in comparison with its less drastic alternatives, whether the measure was recidivism or the Case Managers perceptions of its effects on specific cases.* But it must equally be emphasized that the Level II placement--the group home and foster case--showed very poor ratings from the Case Managers and inconsistent (and very unstable because of the sample size) recidivism outcomes. The interviews with the UDIS participants, the general comments of the Case Managers and Probation Officers, and the file materials also consistently revealed problems with the group home in particular

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(fn continued) highest rates of recidivism were found among youth placed in secure care and the lowest among youth in foster care programs (Ohlin, Miller, and Coates, pp. 76-78). Whether the differences with the UDIS results reflect differences in definition ("secure care" and "Level III" refer to very different program types, for example, and may not be comparable), in the study population (the Massachusetts study deals with the full range of delinquents; ours was much more restricted, to the chronic inner-city delinquent), or reflect genuinely contradictory results will be easier to determine when the full report of the Massachusetts experience is completed.

as a placement alternative. In the concluding section of the report, we speculate on reasons why these indications may point to some inherent shortcomings. For now, we note that *signs did exist that the Level II placement may be inferior to both its more drastic and less drastic alternatives.* Its use deserves at least a reassessment by the UDIS staff.

We may be more definite about the more general issue of the least drastic alternative principle: *Application of the least drastic alternative principle was not justified by the recidivism results,* and in fact appeared to be contra-indicated. If the principle is to be retained, it must rely on virtues that we were unable to assess.

10. The Main Effect: Suppression of Delinquent Activity

Despite their many differences, UDIS and DOC are both examples of what we will hereafter call *correctional intervention*, contrasting with warnings, adjustments at the police station, or ordinary probation. Both UDIS and DOC compel participation--on a residential basis, if need be--in activities that the Court hopes will eventually modify the youth's delinquent propensities. Correctional interventions as we refer to them do not call for an occasional meeting between the case worker and the boy, but instead exercise wide discretionary control over the youth's daily life. They do not wait on maturity, the youth's spontaneous changes, or on parental initiative. Their essential characteristic is activism in generating change: they take action to turn the youth around.

The issue addressed in this section is the utility of correctional interventions as a class. *Does Cook County benefit from UDIS and DOC, beyond whatever temporary savings are achieved by taking the delinquent off the street for a few months?*

A common conclusion, especially in the policy discussions on the topic, has been that the community does not gain; that children who begin to engage in delinquent behavior either grow out of it or do not, and that there is little we can do to affect the odds. At an extreme, this viewpoint has been expressed as "radical nonintervention," which broadly rejects the premises underlying programs that seek to treat delinquency as a problem residing in the youth. But its leading spokesman stated a much more broadly held view when he wrote that "Much of the disenchantment with current delinquency policy arises from the simple fact that it doesn't work....Neither the treatment reaction nor the reform response has provided any real basis for confidence that our measures are effective in preventing delinquent behavior or rehabilitating youthful offenders" (Schur, 1973, p. 117).

Incarceration in particular has been generally criticized as outmoded and ineffective. The assertion that institutionalization makes delinquents worse, not better, has attained the status of a truism. It is a view shared by administrators within the corrections establishment. Milton Luger, formerly the director of the Federal government's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and of New York State's juvenile corrections program, has observed "It would probably be better for all concerned if young delinquents were not detected, apprehended, or institutionalized. Too many of them get worse in our care" (Clark, 1970, pp. 240-241). It was this view that led the prestigious President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice to express grave doubts about the wisdom of trying to control undesirable conduct through treatment programs. The Commission recommended a broadened application of diversion and "deprisonization" (Ohlin, 1973, p. 26).

The scientific record on these sentiments is another question, and one to which we shall return. The point here is not what has been proved, but what has come to be the conventional wisdom about juvenile corrections: less drastic is better, because more drastic only makes things worse.

Among certain segments of the public and many law enforcement officials, the most vocal point of view is stridently the opposite. As accounts of violent juvenile crime continue to make cover stories for leading magazines and headlines for the daily newspapers, the opinion is widely expressed that young criminals are being let off too easily. Some observers continue to stress the rehabilitative role of correctional intervention; others argue that punishment is in itself a valuable deterrent. But the underlying theme echoes the rationale behind a compulsory, correctional intervention--that something can be done with the chronic delinquent besides putting him on probation.

The recidivism data collected for this study directly address this issue, and they are surprisingly unambiguous. *Correctional intervention in the life of the chronic juvenile offender in this study had a powerful and apparently long-term inhibiting effect on subsequent delinquent activity.* The implications of this finding--and there are obviously many--are discussed in Chapter 12, *Conclusions and Recommendations*. Here we confine

ourselves to a presentation of the data for the finding and a consideration of alternative explanations of them.

Below in Figure 10.1 we have combined the time-series data for UDIS, DOC, and the Pre-UDIS Baseline, before and after intervention. For the sake of simplicity, only the "any police contact" category is broken out.* The percentage for a given month represents the number of such events per hundred youth in the program. Linear regression trendlines are used to indicate the overall characteristics of the data.

The difference between the levels of pre and postintervention activity are striking. During the three months preceding intervention, for example, the average number of police contacts per 100 per month was 60.5. During the

Figure 10.1 Monthly Police Contacts for the Combined Sample Before and After Correctional Intervention



Number of Months Prior to Intervention

		24	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Police Contacts per 100 Youths	(%)	16.2	22.8	19.9	22.2	28.3	27.7	24.4	34.3	26.5	27.5	27.9	31.4	32.9	39.0	33.3	35.9	38.6	44.4	44.8	50.3	49.9	56.1	63.4	64.3
	(n)	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487	487

Number of Months Following Intervention

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Police Contacts per 100 Youths	(%)	15.2	18.0	22.1	13.9	24.5	18.4	15.5	16.7	9.0	11.1	11.2	15.8	8.1	17.1	17.3	11.2	13.3	16.3	12.7	13.6	27.9	8.6	24.5	16.3
	(n)	348	329	308	287	265	255	233	216	200	180	169	152	135	123	110	98	90	80	71	66	61	58	53	49

* As in the analysis of the separate samples in Chapter 8, the data on violence-related offenses and court appearances reveal no important pre-post differences from the general police contact indicator.

three months following release from the intervention program the average number was 17.7--a reduction of 71 percent. During the half year "before," the average number was 54.8; during the first half year "after," the average was 18.6--a drop of two-thirds. The reductions continued throughout the period of postprogram observation.

We label the phenomenon the "suppression effect." Delinquent activity did not stop altogether. Evidence is not invoked that any of the youth was rehabilitated or inspired to go straight, or that any other change in the youth's internal state took place. Behaviorally, a certain type of activity appears to have been suppressed to a point far below its level prior to intervention, for whatever reasons.

Reductions of better than two-thirds are substantial. They are, in fact, material for headlines. The data appear to say that something *can* be done about the behavior of the chronic juvenile offender, and that the "something" is in the direction of active intervention. It is a conclusion that raises a number of issues about validity and generalizability. Below are the principal analytic questions that we examined.

THE ROLE OF THE REGRESSION ARTIFACT

"Regression artifact" as used here refers to a common fallacy in the interpretation of pre-post measures when the treatment group was selected *because* it was unusually high (or low) on the measure at issue. Some part of that extremity is artificial, and the posttreatment measure will tend to regress toward the mean over the entire pre-post period, regardless of the efficacy of the treatment (see Campbell and Stanley, 1963, pp. 10-12).

In the case of correctional interventions for delinquents, some regression effect must be assumed; the fact that intervention took place implies either an unusually high or a serious level of delinquent activity at that time. It is a classic setting for a regression effect. But we question whether the proportion is large. Some of the reasons for that conclusion will be found throughout the rest of the chapter, as we report analyses that used different cutoff points and different population aggregates. But the simplest reason can be seen in Figure 10.1 above. Both the magnitude and the regularity of the pre- and postprogram sequences argue

against the overall importance of the regression artifact in the results. For example, the *highest* rate of UDIS police contacts in the first 12 months following release from UDIS or DOC was 24.5 per hundred, while the *lowest* rate in the 12 months preceding intervention had been 32.6. The unambiguous pattern was a building rate in the year preceding intervention, followed by a sudden drop and a trendless low rate in the year after release at a level far lower than the preintervention behavior. It is not characteristic of a dominant regression effect.

Statistically, the reduction remains significant in tests that discount the regression effect. For example, the steepest portion of the preintervention curve can be ignored altogether. Table 10.1 shows the results when the police contacts in the second semester prior to intervention were compared with police contacts during the first semester after release. The sample is the UDIS and DOC six-month followup (we continue to omit the Pre-UDIS Baseline from statistical comparisons involving significance tests).

Table 10.1 The Prepost Comparison of Police Contacts, Ignoring the Semester Immediately Prior to Intervention

Time Period	n	Mean Number of Police Contacts	Standard Deviation
7 to 12 months prior to intervention	n = 154	2.23	1.84
6 months after program exit	n = 154	1.06	1.33

t = 6.35 p<.001

The proportionate reduction is still large--52.5 percent--and still highly significant.

THE PERMANENCE OF THE REDUCTION

The combined sample had monthly sample sizes of more than 100 through the first 15 months after release and more than 50 until the 24th month. They were thus large enough to reveal any major resurgence of arrest rates during the first two years following release. As figure 10.1 above indicated, none occurred. The slope of the trendline is very slightly negative: -.026. It is not a statistically significant downward trend. But, whatever else, the trend is not up. *The two-year followup shows no evidence of a tendency to resume preintervention levels of activity,*

nor even a tendency to slip back from the initial sharp reductions in activity.

This finding was further supported when we investigated the hypothesis that parole supervision accounted for the reduction in police contacts, and that offensive activity resumed once the parole supervision was lifted. The DOC and Pre-UDIS Baseline samples were combined. For all those who had been discharged before 12/31/76, we examined the mean number of police contacts per 100 youth in the 12 months preceding discharge (while on parole) and the 12 months following discharge. The mean annual number of arrests per parolee in the "before" period was 1.03 compared to an annual rate of 1.07 arrests per discharged youth in the "after" period--an insignificant increase of 3.9 percent. Sample sizes were at least 57 (maximum of 78) for the predischarge monthly samples and at least 40 (maximum of 84) for the postdischarge samples. No time-series trends were observed in either period.

THE EFFECTS OF MILDER INTERVENTIONS

DOC is the last resort and UDIS the next-to-last. Other, less severe alternatives had been tried earlier with delinquents in all three samples. We examined the effects of two of those earlier steps: the first time that the youth was referred to court and first time he was detained. The question at issue was whether a temporary drop in activity occurred after these earlier, less drastic steps.

Referral to Court

Almost without exception, a child's initial encounters with the police were settled at the precinct station. The nature of the offenses and the circumstances were recorded on a "community adjustment" form, but the matter went no further than the police records. At the third or fourth police contact for a nonstatus offense, the police department typically referred the matter to the Cook County Juvenile Court. It was the youth's first major step into the juvenile justice system. Were there any signs of an effect?*

* Probation follows if the youth is adjudicated delinquent. A youth may, however, be assigned to a probation officer without being found delinquent, and the conditions of probation vary widely. Referral to court appears to be a more clear-cut escalation of response to the juvenile's offense.

Figure 10.2 shows the levels of police contact that occurred before and after the first referral in court.*

As the figure indicates, the rate of police contacts resumed at a substantially higher level after the first appearance in court. The mean annual rate during the year before referral was 1.4 arrests per youth; it jumped by 185.7 percent to a mean annual rate of 4.0 arrests per youth during the year after first referral. No suppression effects, temporary or long-term, were observed; on the contrary, *the first referral, if it played a causal role at all, appears to have exacerbated the problem.*

Figure 10.2 First Referral to Court and Subsequent Police Contacts



Detention

The other pre-UDIS or pre-DOC landmark considered in the analysis was detention at Audy Home, the detention facility of the Cook County Juvenile Court. The length of stay varied from less than one night to more than a month. The mean stay is 9.0 days. It is unmistakably a harsher outcome than simple referral; it constitutes the first exposure to confinement. The rates of police contact before and after first detention are shown in Figure 10.3.

* The "after" period ends at the point of eventual referral to UDIS or commitment to DOC.

Figure 10.3 First Detention and Subsequent Police Contacts



The results of the first detention were positive only by comparison with those of first referral to court. The trendline falls slightly (in a pattern that does suggest the existence of the regression artifact), but remains at levels higher than those in all but the last three months before detention. The annual rate grew substantially, from a mean of 3.3 arrests per youth in the year prior to a mean of 4.7 during the year after--an increase of 42.4 percent. Overall, *the deterrent effect of first detention appeared to be slight, if it existed at all,* in the interim between first detention and the eventual decision to try UDIS or DOC.

These conclusions are warranted from the comparison of earlier interventions with UDIS and DOC.

First, among those chronic delinquents who eventually were sent to DOC or UDIS, *neither referral to court nor short-term detention had a suppression effect on delinquent behavior, in sharp contrast to the suppression effects of UDIS and DOC.*

Second, the results are consistent with the get-tough arguments: *the reductions in incidence increased as the severity of the official response increased.**

*Note, however, that the pronounced increase in offenses after first referral to court could be interpreted consistently with either a get-tough or go-easy logic. See pages 193 and 196.

Third, however, and this point must be stressed, *neither of the above results can be interpreted to mean that referral to court or short-term detention have no effect on the general population of delinquents.* On the contrary, the majority of young offenders appear at the police station only once or twice (see Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972). A lecture from a policeman or probationary supervision often does the job, much more inexpensively than a correctional intervention. The UDIS evaluation dealt with *persistent, chronic offenders,* who by definition continued to get in trouble after earlier, milder responses. For this population, both UDIS and DOC produced a steep drop; no prior intervention produced a significant drop at all.

TIMING OF THE INTERVENTION: AGE

The interaction between age and delinquency raises two distinct issues. The policy issue is when to intervene--at what age is the youth most responsive? The analytic issue is the extent to which maturation accounts for the reduction in delinquent activity.

To test the impact of age on the suppression effect, the youth in the combined samples were reaggregated into three groups, based on age at first entry into UDIS or DOC: 14 years or younger, 15 years, and 16 years or older. The plot of offenses per 100 youth per month during the first year before and after is displayed in Figure 10.4.

Evidence of some maturation effect can be inferred. The overall suppression effect during the first year after release became progressively larger as the boys got older. Similarly, preintervention rates of activity dropped as age rose. But the strength of the maturation effect appeared to be small relative to the suppression effect. Even among the youngest sample, 14 and under, the first-year reduction in police contacts was 58.7 percent, only 8 percentage points below that of the oldest sample.

An apparent maturation effect existed, but its practical significance is limited. The data indicate that *a major reduction in activity occurred at all age levels.*

Figure 10.4 Before and After Rates of Police Contact for Three Age Groups



Police Contacts per 100 Youth

Age in years at time of first correctional intervention		12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
14 or Younger	(%)	40.7	39.0	43.9	31.7	46.5	54.5	45.5	48.3	61.0	74.0	82.9	66.7	12.5	24.7	28.2	20.9	33.3	32.8	15.7	21.7	11.4	5.4	25.0	22.6
	(n)	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	80	77	71	67	60	58	51	46	44	37	36	31
15 Years	(%)	30.4	42.8	34.4	34.8	40.0	45.6	47.6	55.6	52.8	66.8	69.6	68.8	18.6	23.3	24.8	11.7	29.1	17.4	17.9	19.8	11.6	14.3	11.3	14.3
	(n)	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	172	158	148	137	127	121	112	101	95	84	80	70
16 or Older	(%)	30.2	39.1	29.9	36.9	35.8	41.6	45.0	52.0	45.5	48.6	55.9	63.4	15.6	16.2	18.7	11.6	21.9	13.9	14.5	15.8	7.2	12.6	7.5	14.0
	(n)	358	358	358	358	358	358	358	358	358	358	358	358	263	247	233	216	201	194	179	165	153	143	133	121

TIMING OF THE INTERVENTION: OFFENSE HISTORY

We now ask whether the suppression effect can be explained as a function of the intensity of preintervention activity as measured by total number of police contacts prior to the correctional intervention.* Two competing hypotheses motivated this approach.

The first hypothesis is that what we call a suppression effect reflects a behavior pattern that has run its course. The higher the number of police contacts prior to the correctional intervention, the greater the likelihood that the intervention will have caught the youth at a point when his delinquent activity was subsiding anyway. And apart from the validity or lack of it in the logic, it is generally easier to obtain a reduction from a high base than from a low one; remember the artifact of regression discussed earlier

* The analysis is not confounded with age. The correlation between age at intervention and number of police contacts at intervention was negative: -.11 for the combined sample of 452.

The second hypothesis predicts the opposite effect: the longer a youth "gets away with it," the more entrenched his behavior pattern. The time to intervene, then, is in the early phases of the child's offensive activity.

The relationship that existed in fact was examined by dividing the combined sample into three subsamples: boys who had been sent to UDIS or DOC after eight or fewer police contacts, after 9 to 16 contacts, and more than 16 contacts. Monthly contacts-per-hundred were computed for the first year preceding and following entry into UDIS or DOC. The results are shown in Figure 10.5.

Figure 10.5 Before and After Rates of Police Contact for Groups Aggregated by Number of Pre-intervention Contacts


Delinquents sent to UDIS or DOC after more than 16 police contacts
Delinquents sent to UDIS or DOC after 9-16 police contacts
Delinquents sent to UDIS or DOC after 1-8 police contacts
Number of police contacts per 100 delinquents
100
50
0
1
12
Months prior to intervention
Months following release

Total number of police contacts prior to first correctional intervention (UDIS or DOC)		12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1-8	Number per 100	12.2	21.1	19.5	21.1	23.6	24.4	31.7	35.0	32.5	43.9	43.1	45.5	10.9	10.0	10.8	7.6	16.7	15.7	12.9	20.8	8.0	10.9	4.4	4.8
	n	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	92	90	88	77	72	70	62	53	50	46	45	42
9-16	Number per 100	34.0	38.9	30.4	34.0	40.5	53.0	44.5	48.2	52.2	53.8	65.2	65.6	16.4	19.5	28.8	17.8	23.0	18.9	20.3	10.3	9.3	6.5	6.8	16.7
	n	247	247	247	247	247	247	247	247	247	247	247	247	183	169	160	152	139	132	123	116	107	93	88	78
More than 16	Number per 100	58.1	63.6	58.9	60.7	55.1	51.4	64.5	77.6	69.2	80.4	88.8	88.8	18.8	25.0	16.7	12.0	27.7	15.2	7.3	18.4	11.1	17.6	24.1	32.0
	n	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	64	60	54	50	47	46	41	38	36	34	29	25

There are a number of intriguing aspects to the results. Chief among them is the relative uniformity of the proportionate drops in activity. Comparing the three months before and after intervention, the proportionate reductions were:

Sample with 1-8 total prior contacts:	−76.3%
Sample with 9-16 total prior contacts:	−65.4%
Sample with more than 16 total prior contacts:	−76.5%

Taking the 12 months before and after as the comparison period, the reductions were 61.6 percent, 63.2 percent, and 72.8 percent for the three samples respectively. Thus, as in the case with the age analysis, the data indicated that some drop-off in activity was associated with the later stages of the youth's delinquency career, but that the main effect remained substantially constant across stages: *a large proportionate drop in offenses occurred whether intervention came early or late.*

In absolute figures instead of proportions, the advantage lies in intervening early, as indicated by the number of police contacts per person-year during the first 12 months after release:

	Per person-year "after"
Sample with 1-8 total prior contacts:	1.4
Sample with 9-16 total prior contacts:	2.1
Sample with more than 16 total prior contacts:	2.2

Given comparable proportionate reductions, the actual numbers of police contacts were, of course, lower for the sample with the lowest baseline to begin with, and this resulted in the lower absolute figures.

Added to this advantage is the probability that early intervention *prevents* offenses. The data suggest--again, we caution, only with respect to the chronic juvenile offender--that late intervention increased police contacts in two ways: it delayed the imposition of the suppression

effect and, after intervention had occurred, the level of delinquent activity was still higher than "it would have been" if intervention had occurred earlier. We are moving into speculation; projections of what-might-have-beens are always hazardous. Undoubtedly some of the sample subjects in the 1-8 contact category would have become inactive, regardless of whether the correctional intervention had occurred. But, to argue from the other direction, the data gave no reason to believe that earlier intervention for the 9-16 contact and 17+ contact categories would have failed to produce a suppression effect at the earlier stage, thereby preventing a major proportion of the subsequent offenses that did occur in the event.

CONSISTENCY OF THE SUPPRESSION EFFECT WITH OTHER RESEARCH

The final question we raised is an obvious one: if the drop in delinquent activity is as sharp and consistent as these data suggest, why has it not been common knowledge for years? More to the point, aren't these data contradicted by well-established findings that correctional interventions do *not* work?

No. *The widespread impression that correctional intervention for juveniles has been proved ineffective is an erroneous one.* Three characteristics of the existing research literature have led to the misapprehension.

First, the *claims are very numerous relative to the body of data.* Many of the assertions that correctional interventions fail are just that: undocumented assertions, perhaps referencing an equally undocumented assertion by a public official. The citations at the beginning of this chapter are cases in point. When it comes to identifying systematic, data-based impact assessments of juvenile correctional programs compared to an alternative, the list of evaluations is much shorter than the topic would lead one to predict. For example, the encyclopaedic review by Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks (1976) of corrections evaluations since 1945 includes not a single evaluation comparing confinement and ordinary probation.

Second, the *results of probationary interventions are often grouped with the results of correctional interventions.* For example, the landmark cohort study in Philadelphia observed that "a greater number of those who receive punitive punishment (institutionalization, fine, or probation) continue to violate the law....than those who experience a less constraining contact with the judicial and correctional systems," and concluded that "the juvenile justice system, at its best, has no effect on the subsequent behavior of adolescent boys and, at its worst, has a deleterious effect on future behavior" (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin, 1972, p. 252). But the UDIS data indicate that combining the warnings and probation with institutionalization would wash out the major suppression effect of *correctional* intervention because of the apparent inflation of offensive activity that accompanies *probationary* intervention among chronic delinquents. When reading negative assessments of the effects of intervention, a critical first question to ask is whether lesser interventions are lumped with institutionalization in the discussion.

The third and the decisive source of misapprehension about correctional intervention is the *reliance on post-program measures alone.* Evaluations do exist that compare some form of intensive treatment to ordinary probation, or forms of community-based "milieu therapy" with confinement. But (with two exceptions we shall discuss shortly) these measures of outcomes are based instead on the kinds of absolute measures discussed in the first part of Chapter 8, such as cumulative percentage of subjects who commit an offense or who are returned to institutions. *Using these measures, UDIS and DOC show high recidivism rates, comparable to those reported elsewhere.* Remember the figures of 65 and 69 percent of UDIS and DOC graduates who had at least one police contact during the first year after release. It is these kinds of measures of absolute rates that have filled the evaluation literature and eventually tend to establish in the reader's mind the conviction that, after all, very little can be done to deal with the chronic delinquent.

The trick in interpreting these studies is to keep separate the question, "Does correctional intervention *stop* delinquency?", which the literature does address and answers with a well-documented "no," from the question, "Does correctional intervention *reduce* delinquency?"--which, lacking preintervention data, the literature does not and cannot address. Before-after comparisons have been nearly non-existent.

There are two conspicuous exceptions to the rule: a pair of major studies coauthored by LaMar T. Empey: *The Silverlake Experiment: Testing Delinquency Theory and Community Intervention* (with Steven G. Lubeck, 1971); and *The Provo Experiment: Evaluating Community Control of Delinquency* (with Maynard L. Erickson, 1972).*

The Silverlake Experiment compared an experimental institutional program with a standard institutional program. In volume of offenses during the 12 months before and after assignment to the programs, the experimental group showed a reduction of 73.1 percent and the control group showed a reduction of 71.1 percent (pp. 259-260)--slightly greater reductions than found in the assessment of UDIS.

The project assessed in *The Provo Experiment* was an experimental community-based program conducted in the late 1950s in Utah. The before-after comparisons from that study parallel those of the UDIS evaluation, and permit a direct comparison. The one-year reduction in arrests for UDIS was 62.8 percent; for the comparable Provo experimental group (the "incarceration experimental" group), the reduction was 68.9 percent. The one-year reduction for DOC was 69.6 percent; it was 61.4 percent for the Provo incarceration group (Table 10.3, p. 211). Given the differences between Provo, Utah, in the late 1950s and Cook County, Illinois, in the mid-1970s, the similarity in the reduction is striking.†

Empey and Erickson drew from their findings a point that we emphatically second:

> Since the use of before-and-after analysis is uncommon in corrections, it is possible that evaluative research, like correctional programming itself, may be the victim of a pervasive myth; namely, that absolute and irrevocable change in delinquents is a realistic goal. . . .If that

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*The Massachusetts study (see Ohlin, Miller, and Coates, 1976) will apparently include longitudinal comparisons in the final report in preparation.

†The two studies provide consistent evidence on other issues as well. The effect of maturation on the reductions was tested in the Silverlake study and found to be negligible (Empey and Lubeck, p. 265). The permanence of the reduction was examined in the Provo study through a four-year followup and showed a continuing drop, not a resurgence, of delinquent activity (Empey and Erickson, pp. 208-221).

> goal is accepted as reasonable, then it follows that research should be designed to determine whether it is achieved. However, if that goal is not reasonable, research will be directed to the uncovering of evidence of limited significance.
>
> The absolutist approach. . .raises the haunting possibility that important changes are being overlooked by research. The insensitivity of evaluational measures to relative improvements may be doing harm both to delinquents, and to the correctional programs that work with them. Had only absolute measures been used in this study, significant reductions in criminal behavior would have been missed. The extent to which real changes had taken place would have been missed. (Empey and Erickson, 1972, p. 223)

Empey and his colleagues have been lonely exceptions. As the preliminary findings about the suppression effect of UDIS and DOC were circulated informally, the most common reaction was incredulity. Readers shared a nearly universal conviction that our results were anomalies relative to the weight of scientific evidence on the subject. We therefore wish to emphasize that *the findings of this study on the suppression effect of correctional intervention are highly consistent with comparable prior investigations.*

Perhaps the oddest, least explicable aspect of the suppression effect is not that it exists, but that it has been found to exist in other, carefully conducted, major research projects; that no extant studies contradict its existence; and that it has attracted so little attention.

11. The Relative Costs of UDIS and DOC

The reductions in delinquent behavior that were produced by UDIS and DOC came with a bill, in tax dollars and in other, nonmonetary costs. This chapter examines the comparative magnitudes of those costs which could be counted.

COSTS IN TAX DOLLARS

Delinquency is expensive. Apart from the social costs that delinquent behavior may inflict on victims and the community, it uses up a substantial number of tax dollars. Each time an offense committed by a juvenile is reported to the police the expenses begin, regardless of whether the offender is even caught. For any nontrivial report, the minimum cost is the time of a two-person car out of service during the call. If the offense is a major one, followup investigation may be conducted, with all of the detective's costs associated with that investigation. Then, whenever a delinquent is apprehended, a two-person team and a vehicle are taken out of service to transport the youth to the station and transfer him to detention or back home. The Youth Officer, a detective, pursues the matter at the station, trying to call in the parents or guardian if it is an offense that will be referred to court. The paperwork involved in booking and writing up the police report takes the time of both sworn officers and clerical staff, at the precinct and then again at the Youth Division's central office at Police Headquarters.

When the matter is referred to court, attorneys' time is taken up at both the States Attorney's and the Public Defender's offices. If the youth is detained, the cost of keeping him at Audy Home must be added. Probation services are called upon to conduct direct casework with the youth and perhaps sessions with the family, along with completing the collateral paperwork. Finally, there may be all the costs associated with a court hearing.

All of these dollars are spent before the youth is sent to UDIS or DOC. Once there, a whole new set of expenses arise. The support and administrative staff, case workers, service providers, institutional costs, parole personnel--all must be fed into the growing total.

In all, there are three pieces to the total dollar costs of UDIS and DOC: the *direct costs* of the initial program cycle, the *deferred costs* of subsequent institutionalization, and the dollar *costs of processing offenses committed during the program*, in police, court, and detention services. We limit the discussion to the cost component. The postprogram recidivism data in the preceding chapters speak for themselves, and projections of what they might mean in comparative postprogram dollar benefits would be speculative. In this case, we can count current costs much more accurately than we can extrapolate future benefits.

Direct Costs

For both UDIS and DOC, direct costs are calculated as total operations and administrative expenses divided by the number of client person-days in the program.

The Numerator. For UDIS, the numerator of the division consists of the dollar value of the grants expended during fiscal 1976 plus the appropriations from the general fund:

Grants expended in FY 1976	$2,214,722
General fund appropriations, FY 1976	151,471
Total	$2,366,193*

For DOC, the numerator consists of *all* expenditures from appropriated funds--general revenue fund operations, awards and grants, and permanent improvement expenditures

* We wish to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Maurice Moore of UDIS and of Mr. Marvin Jenkins of DOC in assembling the UDIS cost figures for FY 1976.

of all Illinois juvenile institutions, plus the administrative costs of the central office of the Juvenile Division.* The costs were:

Institutions, General Revenue Fund, Operations, FY76	$16,171,320
Institutions, General Revenue Fund, Permanent Improvements, FY76	87,432
Institutions, General Revenue Fund, Awards and Grants, FY76	10,531
Juvenile Field Services, Administration, General Revenue Fund, Operations, FY76	174,015
Total	$16,443,298

The Denominator. The denominator of the calculation was the number of days spent "in UDIS" and "in DOC, not on parole" during fiscal 1976. For UDIS, we obtained from the Northwestern UDIS Tracking System a listing of the indates and outdates of all referrals to UDIS.† The days spent in UDIS during fiscal 1976 were determined separately for each referral, then summed. The total for fiscal 1976 was 66,257 person-days (2,178 31 person-months, 181.40 person-years).

For DOC, the weekly population summaries were used to compute client days. The book counts for the weeks in

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*This is a considerably more inclusive approach than is generally used. For example, the DOC Fiscal Report for FY 1976 (Petrilli, Fiscal Dept.) associates $16,182,800 with overall costs of institutions, compared to our figure of $16,443,298. The reason for risking an unduly inflated estimate is that our findings tend to contradict the popular belief that community-based corrections are less expensive than institutionalization. Because there are many ways of calculating institutional costs, we have tried to forestall the reply that our findings would have been different if we used another definition. Ours is a high-cost alternative to begin with. Source for the figures is the *Illinois Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1976: July 1, 1975 - June 30, 1976*, prepared by the Comptroller (Michael J. Bakalis), pp. 128-155. The figure for Juvenile Field Services administrative costs reflects operating costs of the St. Charles and Springfield Administrative Offices.

†Updated as of 10/4/77.

fiscal 1976 were summed and multiplied by seven.* The result was 424,522 days (13,956.89 person-months, 1,163.07 person-years).

*Hereby hangs an issue with which the reader should be familiar.

There are two ways of calculating number of days spent in a juvenile institution: "book count" and "head count." Book count includes all boys carried on the books as being consigned to that institution. Thus, it includes boys on temporary furlough (two weeks or less), boys who have been on unauthorized absence for less than 30 days, or boys who are temporarily off the grounds of the institution for a variety of other reasons. Book count does *not* include boys on parole.

The alternative is to use "head count," or "daily population" representing the number of person-days that were actually spent under the roof of a juvenile institution. As discussed subsequently, there is a considerable difference between the "head count" and the "book count." Head count for fiscal 1976 indicates only 273,525 person-days, 35.6 percent fewer than the book count.

From a conceptual standpoint, it makes sense to use book count for several reasons. It conveys a more commonly understood meaning. When it is said that a boy was "in DOC for six months," the sense of the meaning is that he was consigned to an institution for that elapsed period of calendar time, not that he spent 182.5 days on the grounds of an institution, spread over some longer period of calendar time. Also, the size of an institution's staff and its facility costs are relatively insensitive to short-term reductions in population. Finally, using book count is consistent with the approach to calculating UDIS costs, which likewise considered a boy as "in UDIS" on the days he received no services.

So we use book count days instead of head count days as the denominator in calculating monthly direct costs--the "unit cost." But because the cost of institutionalization is so often used as a political football, let this be made explicit: *The method of calculating unit cost has no effect on the estimated costs of a program cycle.* Over a large sample of boys, using book count or head count produces the same answer.

The reason is that the value of the parameters for "days in program" and "cost per day" are both functions of the same definition of what constitutes a DOC day. If book count produces the cost-per-day, then in figuring the costs of a program cycle it is necessary to count days away from the institution as costing money. If head count is used, those days are not counted at all. For example, consider the calculation of expected direct costs for a boy who is paroled after six months in DOC. Using book count, the calculation is the FY 76 budget divided by total days that youngsters were officially consigned to DOC institutions, multiplied by the number of days in six months:

For presentation purposes, we use person-month as the unit. The costs per program-cycle month per youth for the two programs in fiscal 1976 were:

Direct costs per month of the program cycle:	**UDIS** = $1,086	**DOC** = $1,178

Deferred Costs

Deferred costs accrue because more than a quarter of UDIS referrals were eventually committed to DOC and more than a quarter of DOC parolees were returned again to the institution. If the question is, "How much will it eventually cost if a boy is sent to UDIS instead of DOC?", the costs of the initial term in each program must be augmented by the costs of the program failures.

Deferred costs for UDIS are based on that fraction of a month that a UDIS referral can eventually be expected to spend in DOC for every month he was in UDIS. For DOC,

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(footnote continued)
$16,443,298 ÷ 424,522 × 182.5 = $7,068.90. Using head count, the calculation is the FY 76 budget divided by total days actually spent under the roofs of DOC institutions, multiplied by the expected number of days in six months that a boy actually spent in an institution: $16,443,298 ÷ 273,525 × 117.6 = $7,069.67. The 77 cent difference is a result of rounding error. *The mathematical effect of switching from book count to head count is to increase the unit cost by exactly the same proportion that the day count decreases.*

The very large "annual costs" that are sometimes cited for DOC--the DOC annual report for 1976 gives a figure of $21,988 for FY 1976--are produced by using as a denominator the average daily population in the institutions. The figure has nothing to do with the cost of a year's stay in DOC for the average boy. Rather, it specifies the cost of spending 365 days on the grounds of an institution, which in turn implies consignment to an institution for about 18.6 months--more than a year and a half. Because this is seldom made explicit, most consumers of these annual cost statistics assume that a figure of $21,988 does indeed signify the cost of committing a boy for a year. They are victims of a kind of mental sleight of hand--the calendar definition of "annual" that they naturally use for interpreting the number is subtly different from the one that was used in calculating it. The main point to remember is that it would indeed have cost more than $20,000 in direct costs to have kept a boy in an institution every day of fiscal 1976--but *the program that produced the recidivism results which we have been discussing in this report had annual direct costs of about $14,000, no matter which definition of unit cost is used.*

deferred costs are based on the months spent back in DOC after a failed first parole, compared to the months spent in DOC during the initial stay.

The denominator for the UDIS sample was the mean number of days spent in UDIS. The denominator for the DOC sample was the mean number of days spent in DOC before the first parole. In both cases, the means were based on all subjects who had exited the program prior to 31 December 1976. The numerator for UDIS was mean number of days spent in DOC through 31 December 1976, based on the records of boys who had exited UDIS at least one year prior to the end of data collection. For DOC, a parallel figure was computed using mean number of days spent back in DOC after revocation of the first parole. These proportions are both understated. Neither sample had accumulated its final total of DOC days.* The proportions can be expected to reflect *relative* deferred costs for UDIS and DOC. The figures used in the calculation of deferred costs are shown in Table 11.1.

Table 11.1 Basis for the Calculation of Deferred Costs

	UDIS	DOC
Mean number of days, first time in program	243.9	274.7
n	130	95
Mean number of subsequent days in DOC, for boys first released at least a year before the end of observation	72.8	62.1
n	46	45
Proportion of subsequent days to initial days	.298	.226
Monthly direct cost of DOC	$1,178.15	$1,178.15

* A more natural procedure would have been to use the mean number of subsequent days in DOC based on the sample of boys who had returned to DOC (or who had been sent there from UDIS) and had been released again. But we found that this was eliminating the long-term returnees who had not been released by the end of the observation period even though they had already accumulated more days "back in" than the average of the released-twice sample. Empirically, the procedure we substituted turned out to work to the advantage of UDIS.

The algorithm is proportion of subsequent days to initial days multiplied by the monthly program cost of DOC.

On the basis of the above parameters, the estimated monthly deferred costs for UDIS and DOC was as follow:

Monthly deferred costs:	**UDIS** = $351	**DOC** = $266

External Dollar Costs

External costs are generated by offenses committed while the youth is in the program. We will return to the nonmonetary considerations associated with these offenses in another context. In dollar terms, we attempted to estimate costs of police, court, and detention services required to process the offenses that occurred.

The details of the cost calculations are given in the notes to Table 11.2. As a close reading of that table will make apparent, a great deal of estimation had to go into the exercise. Officials of both the Chicago Police Department and the Cook County Juvenile Court were able, however, to provide estimates based on their experiences, and we present the data with confidence that the costs do usefully cut down the range of guesses.

The costs increase, of course, when the offense resulted in referral to court and are most expensive when referral to court is accompanied by detention at Audy Home.

The sample of UDIS referrals had accumulated 121 person-years in the program by the cutoff of data collection on 31 December 1976. During that time they had committed a total of 361 offenses. The DOC sample had spent 147 person-years "in" institutions--remembering that roughly a third of the time was probably spent on authorized or unauthorized absence--and had committed 57 offenses during

Table 11.2 The Basis of the Cost Estimates for Apprehended Offenses[1]

	Hourly wage[2]	Proportion, for cases reaching that phase	Typical time in hours From	To	Low Estimate	High Estimate	Aggregates		Best Estimate
I. COSTS AT THE POLICE STATION[3]									
Arresting Officers (2)	9.88	100%	.75	2.00	7.41	19.76			
Youth Officer	10.72	100%	.75	2.50	8.04	26.80			
Clerical Support	4.47	100%	.25	.50	1.12	2.24			
Police Investigator	10.72	20%	1.50	5.00	3.22	10.72			
TOTAL DIRECT					19.79	59.52			
General Administrative[4] (8.3% of Total Direct)					1.64	4.94			
Non-personnel costs[5] (6.8% of Total Direct and Administrative)					1.46	4.38			
TOTAL DIRECT and INDIRECT							22.89	68.84	
II. COSTS AT COURT[6]									
Judge	22.83	75%	.33	3.00	5.65	51.37			
Probation Officer	11.02	100%	4.00	10.00	44.08	110.20			
State's Attorney	10.68	75%	.50	5.00	4.01	40.05			
Public Defender	12.05	75%	.50	5.00	4.52	45.19			
Sheriff, Court Clerk	6.18	75%	.25	2.00	1.16	9.27			
Arresting Officer (testimony)	9.88	20%	2.00	4.00	3.95	7.90			
Clerical	5.13	100%	3.00	8.00	15.39	41.04			
TOTAL DIRECT					78.76	305.02			
General Administrative[7] (22.1% of Total Direct)					17.41	67.41			
Non-personnel costs[8] (5.6% of Total Direct and Administrative)					5.39	20.86			
TOTAL DIRECT and INDIRECT							101.56	393.29	
III. COSTS OF DETENTION[9]									
Daily cost (44.85)[10] X Mean no. of days (9.0)		100%	NA	NA	403.65	403.65			
Escort to and from courtroom (sheriff)	6.18	67%	1.00	3.00	4.14	12.42			
TOTAL							407.79	416.07	
TOTAL COSTS: COMMUNITY ADJUSTMENT							22.89	68.84	45.87
TOTAL COSTS: REFERRAL TO COURT WITHOUT DETENTION							124.45	462.13	293.29
TOTAL COSTS: REFERRAL TO COURT WITH DETENTION							532.24	878.20	705.22

Notes

1. Budget Sources: George W. Dunne, President, Cook County Board of Commissioners. The Annual Appropriation Bill for the Fiscal Year 1977. 1976 City of Chicago Budget Recommendations. Planned Allocation of Appropriations by Program Element. Appropriations for F.Y. 1976 were used in both cases.

2. All wages are based on median for that job level, assuming a 146 hour month.

3. Description of police procedure was provided by staff of the Youth Division, Chicago Department of Police.

4. The General Administrative loading represents the summed personnel budgets of support functions divided by total police budget. The total police budget was 303,698,697. The following budgets were summed for support functions:

Administration Departmental	423,451	Police Document Services	526,513
Research and Development	1,163,085	Administrative Operational Services	505,956
Administration Administrative	70,700	Administrative Patrol Division	1,568,132
Finance	568,285	Administrative Communication	59,723
Personnel	1,273,879	Administrative Community Services	88,724
Training	1,355,265	Reproduction and Graphic Arts	307,648
Data Systems	1,841,334	Administrative Inspectional Services	184,655
Property Management	1,978,798	Internal Affairs	2,370,370
Records	169,526	Inspections	623,852
Records Inquiry	1,925,848	Administrative Investigative Services	83,994
Administrative General Support	29,380	Administrative Criminal Investigation	1,845,724
Equipment and Supply	165,533	Inspection of Entertainment Exhibitions	148,814
Electronics and Motor Maintenance	5,592,126	TOTAL	25,261,317

5. This loading represents non-personnel costs divided by the total police budget. Budgets of the following categories were summed:

Contractual services	7,335,200
Travel	25,000
Commodities	6,933,000
Equipment	5,852,500
Permanent Improvements and Land	328,000
Specific Items and Contingencies	110,000
TOTAL	20,583,700

6. Description of Juvenile Court Procedure was provided by staff of the Juvenile Court and in house study of use of time by probation officers, and Douglas Thomson, "Action Taken Regarding 100 Children Referred to Cook County Juvenile Court on Original Delinquency Petitions in January 1973," Cook County Juvenile Court, 1974.

7. This loading represents summed personnel budgets for support functions divided by the total juvenile court budget. Support functions as defined included the following:

General Administration	1,249,778	The total juvenile court budget was 7,328,429.
Clinical Services	324,120	
Juvenile Court Committee Staff	43,320	
TOTAL	1,617,218	

8. This loading represents nonpersonnel costs divided by the total juvenile court budget. Budgets of the following categories were summed:

Impersonal Services	337,051
Supplies, Materials, are, Parts	20,000
Operation and Maintenance	37,300
Capital Outlay	14,400
TOTAL	408,751

9. Source was the F.Y.75 calculation of daily costs and average stay at Audy, taken from the Audy Home's 1976 report on expenditures.

10. Data on daily costs were valid for fiscal 1975. In F.Y. 1974-75, the cost had increased by 47.4 percent, from $24.36/day to $35.88/day. We assume a 25 percent increase from F.Y.75 to F.Y.76.

190

that time. Table 11.3 shows a breakdown of the offenses by disposition. Rates are expressed in number of occurrences per hundred person-years in the program.

Table 11.3 Dispositions of Offenses Committed During the Program

	Number of events per 100 person-years in the program	
	UDIS (n = 189, person-years in UDIS = 121.05)	DOC (n = 156, person-years in DOC = 147.47)
Arrests, no referral to court	122.3	9.5
Arrests with referral to court	49.6	.7
Arrests with referral and detention	126.4	28.5
Total number of police contacts	298.3	38.7

Not surprisingly, UDIS with its community-based orientation was less effective than institutionalization in incapacitating the youth during the program. UDIS youth were picked up by the police at a rate 7.7 times higher than that of DOC.

Applying the cost figures in Table 11.2 to the disposition figures in Table 11.3, estimated monthly external costs for UDIS and DOC were:*

		UDIS	DOC
Monthly estimated costs:	Low estimate	$ 63.49	$ 12.87
	High estimate	118.52	21.63
	Best estimate	91.01	17.25

*Unrounded data were used for the calculations. The "best estimate" is simply the mean of the low and high estimates. See Table 11.2 for details.

Summing across the direct costs, deferred costs, and the best estimate of the external costs, the estimated monthly cost of UDIS and DOC was:

Total estimated monthly costs:	**UDIS** = $1,528	**DOC** = $1,462

If we adjust these figures for the average length of stay in the two programs, the *estimated costs for the complete intervention cycle* were as shown in Table 11.4.*

Table 11.4 Costs of a Typical Intervention Cycle

	UDIS	DOC	Dollar Costs UDIS	DOC
• mean initial stay (in months)	8.02	9.03	$ 8,711.73	$10,638.69
• expected subsequent institutionalization (in months)	1.77	1.38	2,085.33	1,625.85
• expected number of police contacts during an average initial term	1.89	.29	86.69	13.30
• expected number of court referrals during an average initial term	1.12	.21	277.12	51.96
• expected number of detentions during an average initial term	.80	.21	329.54	86.51
TOTAL COSTS FOR A TYPICAL INTERVENTION CYCLE			$11,490.41	$12,416.31

On a monthly basis, then, DOC was 4.8 percent less expensive than UDIS. Over a typical program cycle, UDIS was 7.0 percent less expensive than DOC, because it held its clients for a shorter time.

The conclusion we draw from the exercise is that *there is little basis for choice between UDIS and DOC if the criterion is dollar costs to the taxpayer.* The proposition that community-based corrections is substantially less expensive than institutionalization was not borne out by UDIS experience.†

*Table 11.4 is calculated from the unrounded figures for direct costs (p. 181), deferred costs (p. 183), and the mean of the low and high estimates of external costs for each type of cost (I, II, and III in Table 11.2, p. 184).

†This finding is consistent with other examinations of the costs of deinstitutionalization. The most authoritative example is Lerman's analysis of the California Community Treatment Project (Lerman, 1975).

THE NONMONETARY COSTS

Dollar costs are probably the least important ones. It happens, as in evaluations of social programs everywhere, that they are the ones we know how to measure most accurately. But there are some underlying "actual" costs of UDIS and DOC, omitted from the dollar cost comparison, that are in some respects much closer to the heart of decisions about the future of policy toward juvenile offenders. Three factors are of special importance.

First, *the calculation of dollar costs has ignored the victim.* One of the most inflammatory issues surrounding deinstitutionalization of chronic delinquents is offenses committed while in the program. Institutions have been widely accepted as "safe" places to keep delinquents; community-based services frequently have not. And the passions aroused by the perceived lack of safety have been fed primarily by concern over the human costs of being a victim, not by the costs of processing them through the arrest or the court appearance.

In truth, the institutionalized youth has not been as thoroughly removed from the streets as most people assume. In 1976, for example, a committed delinquent (*not* paroled) in Illinois was on the streets for more than a third of the time--35.6 percent--that he was officially consigned to an institution: 20.9 percent of the DOC person-weeks for that year was spent on authorized absence and 14.7 percent was spent as runaways. DOC as well as UDIS has been vulnerable to inprogram costs in the form of offenses. But DOC does start with an intrinsic advantage over a program like UDIS. The question is whether the advantage is a significant one.

In the calculation of external dollar costs, it was revealed that the inprogram apprehensions of UDIS youth occurred at a rate 7.7 times that of DOC. Table 11.5 on the following page presents some additional information about the nature of those offenses.

We do not intend to invoke images of widespread mayhem, but, as the table indicates, the incidence rates are of such magnitude that they cannot be disregarded. In addition to the annual rates of the general categories of crime as shown in Table 11.5, we may put the issue in terms of some specific crimes during the average stay in the program. For every eight boys who stayed in UDIS for the typical eight-month period, one was apprehended during that time for an

Table 11.5 Types of Offenses Committed During the Program

		Violence-Related	Theft	Damage	Other Non-status Offenses	Status Offenses	Total
UDIS	Per 100 person-years	43.8	109.9	22.3	106.6	15.7	298.3
	Proportion of total	14.7%	36.8%	7.5%	35.7%	5.3%	100.0%
	(n=189, person-years in UDIS = 121.05)						
DOC	Per 100 person-years	8.1	14.9	1.4	14.2	0	38.6
	Proportion of total	21.1%	38.6%	3.5%	36.8%	0.0%	100.0%
	(n = 156, person-years in DOC = 147.47)						

armed or strong-armed robbery. One of every eight was arrested for assault or battery. For every four, one was arrested for burglary. For every 48, one was arrested for homicide. These crimes are not status offenses or pranks; they involve serious damage to victims. The costs are not easily quantified, but they are very real.

The implications of these differences are augmented by the second omission in the dollar cost analysis: *the figures on inprogram offenses presumably represent only a fraction of the real level of offensive activity.* Police clear only a small proportion of offenses. Exactly how small a proportion for this population of offenders is unknown. One major study has suggested it to be as small as three percent (Williams and Gold, 1972), but that report dealt with the general population of youth, not the special class in this study.

We may reach an approximation by combining police clearance rates with rates of reporting. In the five largest U.S. cities (Chicago data are not broken out), the percentage of arrests for reported burglaries was 18.3 in 1972 (LEAA/NCJISS, 1975(a), Table 4.17, pp. 353-354). The percentage of arrests for robbery was 31.7, and 16.9 for auto theft. In Chicago, also in 1972, the *reporting* rates of actual victimizations were found to be 53 percent for burglary, 52 percent for robbery, and 78 percent for auto

theft (LEAA/NCJISS, 1975(b), Table 6, p. 61.* By extrapolation, it can be estimated that apprehensions of total offenses were in the region of 10 percent for burglaries, 16 percent for robbery, and 13 percent for auto theft. As a rough estimate, then, perhaps 10 to 20 percent of the offenses being committed by the delinquents in this study were being apprehended. The implication is that UDIS youth were committing on the order of 15 to 30 offenses per person-year while in the program compared to 2 to 4 for DOC. It is not a trivial difference.

Finally, *the calculation of costs has ignored the interests of the youth.* The enumeration of inprogram offenses omitted the unknown number of assaults and other offenses committed *inside* the institution. More generally, institutions have been assessed as being destructive places, even with the best of facilities and staff. The literature on the subject is large, though generally imprecise as to the real extent of damage, psychological or physical, to populations of committed delinquents. Our data do not address this issue except insofar as they serve to disconfirm the proposition that institutions increase the likelihood of delinquent behavior. In making policy decisions, the subjective weight attached to preventing inprogram offenses must be balanced against an equally subjective weight attached to keeping youngsters out of institutions.

SUMMARY

UDIS and DOC were nearly identical in dollar costs per month of a program cycle. Inprogram nonmonetary costs to the community were much greater for UDIS than for DOC. The raw magnitude of the difference in nonmonetary costs is uncertain, because of our ignorance about the ratio of actual offenses to apprehensions. The nonmonetary costs to the youth were presumably greater for DOC than for UDIS.

We have not attempted to construct a cost-benefit equation. *Given that DOC was equivalent to UDIS in dollar costs, conspicuously less expensive in terms of inprogram offenses, and at least as effective in reducing recidivism,*

* Insofar as the primary population of victims--poor, minority, in the inner-city--are also the least likely to report victimizations to the police, our estimates of apprehension rates based on reporting characteristics of the overall population are likely to be inflated.

the only factor that could swing the cost-benefit ratio in UDIS's favor is the imponderable personal cost of institutionalization to the youth. If the issue is immediate costs and benefits to the public, a comparison of cost-benefit ratios would have to favor DOC over UDIS.

These results do not necessarily extend to the question of expansion of services. New institutions require major capital expenditures. So also do certain types of UDIS services (intensive care and other residential services); but others, notably advocacy and counseling services, do not. Especially if UDIS were to concentrate its resources on Level I services, *it can be assumed that expansion of UDIS would require lower front-end expenditures than expansion of DOC.*

12. Conclusions and Recommendations

This study set out to compare the effectiveness of UDIS and institutionalization, and found that the differences between them were considerably less interesting than their common impact on the incidence of offenses. We therefore begin the discussion of conclusions with an examination of what we have called the suppression effect: its reality, its generalizability, and its explanation. We will then turn to a comparison of UDIS with the institutional alternative, DOC; to implications for the operation of UDIS; and finally to the issue of expanding correctional interventions.

THE SUPPRESSION EFFECT

Recapitulation of the Findings

The evaluation of UDIS produced a finding that was both unforeseen and provocative:

> *UDIS and DOC alike achieved large reductions in the indicators of recidivism used in this study;* so large, that this result ranks as the single most significant finding.

When the postintervention police records of the combined UDIS and DOC samples were compared to their police records during the year preceding intervention with respect to incidents per person-month,

> *Arrests* dropped by 67.8 percent,
> *Court appearances* dropped by 64.4 percent,
> *Violence-related offenses* dropped by 73.7 percent, and
> *Aggregate "seriousness" costs* of the offenses to the community dropped by 65.2 percent.

Statistically, all of these reductions were significant beyond the .001 level.

*Calculated from the data in Table 8.12, p. 147.

We emphasize that *these findings deal only with the persistent, chronic delinquent, not with the majority of young offenders who appear at the police station once or twice.* But with that caveat, the suppression effect apparently was not an artifact of the methodology for the study, nor could it be attributed to factors other than the impact of UDIS or DOC. The analysis in Chapter 10 revealed that the major competing hypotheses to explain the effect did not apply. Specifically:

> *The reductions were* not *the result of a delinquent career having run its course.*

Whether the youth had been arrested seldom or often before intervention, the proportionate drops in postintervention incidents were not significantly different.

> *The reductions were* not *the result of maturation.*

Boys who entered UDIS or DOC at age 16 or older had a proportionate reduction only 8 percentage points greater than boys who entered at age 14 or younger (the reductions were 66.3 and 58.7 percent, respectively).

> *The reductions could* not *be attributed to a natural drop (or, regression effect) from the high levels of activity that triggered the intervention.*

Even if the six months immediately preceding intervention--the most active period--are ignored altogether, the proportionate reductions are still in excess of 50 percent, and still significant beyond the .001 level.

> *The reductions were* not *an artifact of a sample biased toward socially or economically favored and therefore "easy" delinquents.*

On the contrary, UDIS and DOC dealt with the most disadvantaged segments of the inner city youth population: predominantly Black, poor, from broken homes, failures in school, untrained for the workplace.

Nor was the suppression effect just one more in a series of short-term slow-downs in offensive activity following intervention:

Comparable reductions were not achieved by earlier, milder interventions applied to the same sample of delinquents.

Changes of this magnitude were unique in the offense histories of these boys.

Historically, the first appearance in court of the boys in these samples was followed by a sharp, sudden increase in offensive activity.* The next escalation of response, temporary detention in Cook County's juvenile detention center, was followed by continued arrests at roughly the pre-detention level. In contrast, the suppression effect was precipitous and, more importantly, continuing:

A two-year followup period showed no evidence of a tendency to slip back from the initial drop,

let alone to resume preintervention levels of activity. *The post-intervention trend line was flat.* This finding remained even after controlling for the possible contributing effects of parole supervision for the DOC sample.

Consistency of the Findings with Other Research

Popular impressions notwithstanding, the above findings are not inconsistent with comparable research. Rather, as discussed in Chapter 10, very little comparable research exists. Studies that do exist are consistent:

The two other major longitudinal studies of the effects of correctional interventions on juveniles that we have been able to identify showed reductions which were within a few percentage points of the ones reported for UDIS and DOC.†

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*Did offenses balloon because the boys realized that getting caught did not mean that anything very serious was going to happen to them? Or because they had been labeled delinquent, and responded as labeling theory suggests? The reader may choose the one that fits personal predilections; the data do not exclude either explanation.

†Empey and Lubeck, 1971, and Empey and Erickson, 1972. "Correctional intervention" is used here, as elsewhere in the report, to designate both UDIS and DOC, in contrast to warnings and ordinary probation.

The widespread assumption that correctional intervention for juveniles has been proved ineffective is an erroneous one, derived from post-program measures that ignore the pre-intervention level of activity and, to a surprising degree, from undocumented assertions. The body of hard research on the question of whether correctional interventions do in fact reduce criminal behavior is extremely small in relation to the volume of anecdotes and opinion on the subject.

Explaining the Suppression Effect

The statistical reality of a major suppression effect is, we believe, solidly established by the data in this study. *Why* it occurred is another question. UDIS and DOC were two black boxes that differed widely in philosophy and operations yet produced similar results. What were the mechanisms at work in the UDIS and DOC experience that apparently caused such large-scale changes in behavior?

The assumptions of four of the most popular explanations were in conflict with the data. We review these first, before turning to the explanation that we find most consistent with the data.

The Medical Model. The "medical model" in its general formulation asserts that a boy becomes delinquent because of some condition within himself. Something is wrong with him. He ceases his delinquent activity when that something is diagnosed and appropriately treated. Theories of the origins of delinquency in psychological disturbance or in low intelligence or, more recently, in learning disabilities, are examples of explanations of delinquency that broadly fall within the medical model. To reduce delinquency, the model implies, it is important to identify and treat the problem that caused the delinquency in the first place.

This approach to reducing delinquency may be effective, but the data for this study suggest it is not *necessary*, if the objective is simply to cut offense rates:

> *The medical model cannot explain a significant proportion of the suppression effect found in this study*, because it applied so seldom to the treatment pattern.

This was conspicuously true in the case of UDIS (we lack the data to comment on DOC's program content). First, there was little pre-treatment diagnosis. Second, there was only a small proportion of boys who received treatment services--counseling, psychological therapy, or a program such as Positive Peer Culture--in a form that was intensive or extended. And, third, there was no indication that any problem had been resolved by the end of the program. When the reasons for egress decisions and the exigencies that led to them were examined, these were not linked to changes in the internal states of the delinquents.

It should be emphasized that UDIS's progenitors were highly skeptical of the medical model, and did not intend to make UDIS an exemplification of it. The lack of systematic treatment was not a deviation from plan. Our point is simply that the program achieved large reductions in delinquent behavior without conceivably having done so through the mechanisms implied by the medical model.

Socioeconomic Explanations. The theory behind a variety of delinquency treatment approaches has focused on the problem of opportunities. In broad strokes, the theory argues that crime is a predictable response for a boy without money, without a decent job or the prospects for one, or without a satisfying legitimate social role. As an explanation of the *causes* of delinquency, the socioeconomic arguments are consistent with our data. The boys in both UDIS and DOC were disproportionately located at the bottom levels of society, if the criterion is money or education. But as an explanation of the *outcomes* of the program, it appears that the effects of socioeconomic improvements went untested:

> *The same UDIS boys who reduced their police contacts by two-thirds had not widely improved their job or school skills as a result of the UDIS experience.*

Only a third of the sample received educational services and only five percent received vocational services. More to the point, we obtained very little evidence to suggest that these services had much input. A major part of the problem was time--a few months of tutoring could not bring a functionally illiterate 16 year-old boy up to a tenth or eleventh grade level of reading. But, whatever the reason, the case histories revealed only a scattering of instances

in which a boy returned successfully to school or got a job because of skills learned in UDIS. It remains possible that these boys had become more employable in the broad sense of that term, insofar as holding a job had become more important to them. But that sort of gain in employability would be a consequence of whatever reduced the recidivism, not an explanation of it.

The "Labeling" Explanation. Labeling theory, with its many applications in education, has increasingly been touted as an explanation of delinquency--roughly, via the argument that (1) all youngsters engage in acts for which they could be arrested; (2) only a few actually are arrested, usually for fairly capricious reasons; and that (3) it is being *labeled* delinquent by the police and courts, not any real differences from other children, that tends to provoke subsequent and more serious deviant behavior.

This sketchy outline of the logic cannot do justice to the sophisticated and highly influential theory that the labeling explanation represents. It has many proponents among decision-makers, to the point that it has provided the intellectual underpinning for the growing policy consensus that less intervention is better intervention--also known as the minimalist approach. The principal Federal legislation on delinquency takes an explicitly minimalist stance.* The principal Federal agency for dealing with delinquency, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, reflects the influence of minimalist policy guidelines in its grant programs and in its research agenda. And state-level action throughout the country to divert status offenders, reduce commitments to institutions (the trend in Illinois is a typical example), and seal or destroy juvenile offense records, are grounded in minimalist tenets that labeling theory has done much to develop.

Nothing in this report challenges (or supports) the validity of labeling theory or the utility of minimal intervention for most delinquents. But

> *The findings of this study directly challenge the proposition that minimal intervention works for the chronic delinquent.*

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*The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-415).

Whatever the virtues of averting labeling in the early stages of delinquency, the existence of the suppression effect *only* after the most intense interventions suggests that the chronic delinquent comprises a special subgroup.

The Getting-Smarter Hypothesis. A common reaction to data that show a reduction in indicators of delinquency is that the youngsters are simply getting caught less frequently. According to this explanation, the experience of going to UDIS or DOC made the youngsters wiser or more careful, and thereby enabled them to avoid arrest.

It is, to our knowledge, an untested hypothesis.* We too were unable to test it directly, but we can make certain pertinent observations.

First, the core of the argument is that a delinquent learns from the correctional intervention how to be a better criminal. Perhaps he merely becomes more careful, because of his desire to avoid a repetition of the intervention. Or perhaps he becomes smarter as well as more careful, by being thrown together with other, more experienced delinquents. The boys exchange experiences, hints, tricks of the trade, and the result is a more canny offender who continues his criminal career more profitably and more safely than if the juvenile justice system had left him alone.

As an explanation for the findings in this study, the argument about getting smarter is difficult to defend. *For many of the UDIS referrals, the intervention did not involve close, extended contact with other delinquents.* The learning experience never had a chance to take place. And, most of the other assumptions that underlie this hypothesis also are suspect. For example...

Is it true that *large numbers* of these boys have better access to information on how to get away with crime in UDIS or DOC than in their own neighborhood or schoolyard?

Is it true that *large numbers* of these boys are even attentive to crime as a craft?

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*And to test it systematically would be a formidable task, requiring both long-term self-report data and accurate reporting of recent, serious felonies for which the respondent had not been apprehended.

Is it true that *large numbers* of these boys are not only attentive to the question of technique but ready to apply what amounts to a sophisticated learning-application sequence?

Is it true that *large numbers* of these boys want to become more cautious and inconspicuous, rather than to do bigger and more visible crimes?

More generally, we are asking if it is really true that a large sample of boys can continue to commit offenses at the rate prior to intervention, but reduce the rate of apprehensions by any figure approaching an average of two-thirds (the magnitude of the suppression effect). It would be an impressive achievement, especially in the face of a competing factor--their high personal visibility to the police because of their UDIS or DOC background--that should tend to increase apprehension rates rather than reduce them.

We find it plausible that some boys consciously wanted to become more careful or more adept in their offensive activity. It is plausible that some of them actually did change their behavior. It is even plausible that among these boys, some successfully reduced their apprehension rate. But these would seem to be credible explanations for only a small portion of the reductions we found.

"You Can't Do That Any More"

Given these shortcomings of the classic explanations of the dynamics, we are left with a large reduction and no readily discernible reasons. The UDIS experience did not make many of the boys into better students or skilled workmen, and it did not widely alter internal or environmental states that might have driven the boys to commit offenses. We did not examine in detail the content of the DOC experience, but it is doubtful on the face of it that institutionalization achieved these goals either, on a scale broad enough to explain more than a fraction of the observed suppression effect. In fact, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that a before-after comparison of the boys who went to UDIS or DOC would reveal no substantive change of any sort *except* in the recidivism measures. The question remains: Why did UDIS and DOC produce such a precipitous drop in recidivism with these boys for whom nothing else had worked?

Our data do not provide an explanation. We emphasize that at the outset. We will, however, propose a simple explanation that is consistent with the data

It starts with the premise that delinquent behavior among the great majority of these boys was not *compelled* by circumstances, even though circumstances may have strongly encouraged it. Except for a small minority, the boys in UDIS and DOC typically *chose* to commit offenses.

A second premise is that the choice to commit offenses was for reasons that were internally consistent and rational. Perhaps the behavior was fun, perhaps it provided money, perhaps it enhanced status among peers, perhaps it let off pressures that had been building at home. For whatever reasons, crime paid.

Seen in this perspective, UDIS and DOC did not necessarily have to "cure" anything, nor even to change a boy's capabilities in any way whatsoever. The necessary and sufficient condition for success was to change his mind about the wisdom of his behavior. We suggest that recidivism was reduced because *society did what was necessary to get their attention, and told them some good reasons why they should not do those things any more.* And the boys listened.

Some of the reasons were negative ones--"You can't do that any more, because some very unpleasant things will happen if you do." Some of the reasons were positive--"You shouldn't do that any more because you have better options." We examine each set in turn.

The deterrent effect of incarceration played a role. We will not try to recapitulate here the current, very controversial state of wisdom on the role of deterrence in corrections. But the data collected for the study indicated that the deterrence effect was real.

The numbers provide the most obvious evidence. In the course of this report, arrest data were analyzed with regard to six types of intervention that can be ranged in order of severity: first referral to court, first temporary detention, UDIS at-home first placement (Level I), UDIS group home/foster care first placement (Level II), UDIS out-of-town residential first placement (Level III), and institutionalization in DOC. Now compare the percentage

changes in arrests produced among the subsets of chronic delinquents who experienced these interventions:*

First referral to court	+182.4%
First temporary detention	+ 42.7%
UDIS—Level I first placement	– 55.8%
UDIS—Level II first placement	– 61.2%
UDIS—Level III first placement	– 68.4%
DOC	– 71.4%

The more drastic the intervention, the greater the reduction in police contacts without exception. The total analysis of recidivism was, of course, more complex than this. But, especially when read in light of the findings on the lack of influence of age and number of prior arrests, *the recidivism data reported in this study lend themselves to an interpretation that deterrence was the dominant force at work.*

Another source of evidence was the youngsters themselves. Among the interviewees, the consensus was nearly unanimous on two issues. First, *DOC was openly perceived as a bad place to go, and something to be avoided.*† Several explicitly stated that the way to turn a delinquent around was to give him a taste of DOC or jail--to let him know more about the punishing consequences of continued delinquent behavior. Second, *UDIS was believed to be the anteroom to DOC.* The boys said with few exceptions that they chose UDIS because DOC was the perceived alternative, and they further expected that DOC would be their next stop if they continued to be apprehended for serious offenses.

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*Figures compare the year prior to intervention with the post-intervention period converted to person years, as presented in Chapters 8, 9, and 10. See those chapters for additional information on the samples and procedures.

†It is often reported by correctional experts that institutionalization can have a certain cachet on the street--be a credential that confers status. Without denying the point, it seems likely that going to DOC is one of those experiences that is rewarding to have done, not to do. None of the boys in the interview sample gave any indication that they welcomed the prospect of DOC. If the question is whether DOC scared everybody, the answer is no. But it certainly occupied a place of its own, as the worst of the alternative interventions.

It is not a complicated causal hypothesis. The boys wanted to avoid DOC, so they reduced those activities that were likely to put them there.

Moreover, it is important to note that *the suppression effect occurred the first time that the threat of serious punishment became credible.* We argue emphatically that the boys in the sample should not be viewed as irrational, persisting in their delinquent behavior despite the sanctions of society. By the ordinary rules of predictability, *consignment to UDIS or DOC was the first time that an observant youngster in these samples had reason to believe that incarceration was imminent.* The typical member of the recidivism samples had been arrested 13 times and had gone to court six times without being committed to DOC. Some had been arrested as often as 20 or 30 times. Under these circumstances, it cannot be expected that commitment to DOC was a credible threat until it had actually occurred or something happened that concretely demonstrated a high probability of occurrence. From the youngster's perspective, the threat of DOC prior to that point was long-range, a statistical possibility rather than a probability, and much less tangible than the existing reinforcement from delinquent activity. *It was not irrational under such circumstances to persist in committing offenses,* assuming that the results of those acts were reinforcing.

The evidence from the UDIS referrals on the role of sanctions was echoed by Probation Officers and the vendor staffs. Members of these groups were generally opposed to institutionalization, but both also spoke of the utility of DOC as a credible option. Even UDIS staff, though extremely reluctant to take the actual step of recommending institutionalization, often took advantage of this threat to create an incentive for cooperating with the UDIS program. Whatever the theoretical arguments about the deterrent effect of punishment may be, the people who worked with the chronic delinquents of this study behaved as if they believed that the effect existed. So too did the delinquents themselves.

A positive guidance function also appears to have been at work. The desire to avoid punishment was not necessarily the sole or even the dominant factor in creating the suppression effect. If it was true that UDIS or DOC was the first time that the imminence of punishment became real to these boys, it was also the first time that other, more positive things had happened to many of them.

For many of the boys, the UDIS experience was the first time that someone outside the family, an adult with a measure of status and authority, had not only told them "you can't do that any more," but also had cared whether they listened. In a variety of ways, the message was elaborated, explained, repeated, with caring and persistence, over a period of time. Sometimes it was the Case Manager who performed this function, sometimes one of the service vendors, sometimes a combination. But it was clear from the interviews that UDIS was providing a kind of supportive personal attention that probation did not provide. The PO had too many other roles to play, and too large a caseload for whom to play them.

None of the sets of actors we interviewed articulated the link between supportiveness and reduced recidivism, nor is the link intuitively obvious. We offer these speculations.

In the course of constructing the case histories, one key theme appeared to be *exposure to the reality of options*. Sometimes, the reality of options was being demonstrated by example. Some of the Case Managers and service providers were conspicuously positive role models--they had grown up in the same neighborhoods as the boys, under the same circumstances, and were doing very well for themselves. In other cases, it was our impression that the Case Managers and service providers were filling a basic information function. Options for these boys were often limited at best. But it is also plausible to portray a situation in which many of the boys were perceiving *no* options where some did exist. Or perhaps the illegitimate options were being perceived as unrealistically attractive, while the legitimate ones were being unrealistically discounted. Seen in this context, the UDIS experience compensated for the ways in which the boys' environments were blocking, filtering, and otherwise constraining access to choices. It augmented the information flow about what was really out there and thereby changed the basis for calculating where self-interest really lay. The boy was being given more raw material for making decisions.

Besides information, the raw material could also consist of adequate *time and an environment conducive to reappraisal*, and these may have been the critical virtues of the out-of-town placement. For many of the boys in UDIS or DOC, it was the first time off the streets of Chicago, the first time separated from the peers with whom they had grown up and grown delinquent, and the first time away from the

pressures and problems of whatever situation they were forced to face at home. And these were, after all, adolescents. Other adolescents are expected to fret about directions and options and, after some false starts, slowly come around to satisfying ways of fitting in. It is not farfetched to suggest that the chronic delinquents in this study were trying to do exactly the same thing, and that the residential out-of-town placement gave many of them a needed opportunity. One of the boys said it for us, when giving his opinion of the right way to treat a boy who kept getting arrested:

> He should be put in a place where he can sit down and *think*....A kid who doesn't communicate with his family or UDIS or [program] workers should be put someplace where he can communicate with himself, because that's really what he can't do.

Similar, less explicit statements of this theme by other boys make the assessment of the Level III placements especially intriguing. The boys generally did view them as more tightly controlled than the community-based placements, with greater use of negative sanctions for "messing up." On several items indicating preferences, the Level III placements tended to fare worse than the other types. But they did not associate the out-of-town residential placement with the punitive aura of DOC, either in their ratings or their anecdotal comments. The apparent superiority of Level III placements in reducing recidivism should not be reflexively attributed to greater deterrent effect. The "sit down and think" effect is as persuasive an explanation as any fear they might have inspired.

Ultimately, it is probably impossible to disentangle the relative roles of deterrence and of personal growth that may have been encouraged by correctional interventions. DOC as well as UDIS provided a place to sit down and think, and much of DOC's recidivism results could be explained by its nonpunitive effects. By the same token, UDIS, while it was not perceived as highly punitive in itself, may have achieved its recidivism results because of its credibility as the last stop before DOC.

The two dynamics are probably inextricably intertwined in reality as well as in our data. If it is true that it is better *for the boy* as well as for society that he quit

committing crimes, and that a youngster can be made to understand that, then UDIS's and DOC's common role may most accurately be seen as implementing the twin steps of (1) getting the boy's attention, and then (2) giving him a chance to figure out why it really would be better for him to change his ways. The key assumption is that the youth who goes to UDIS or DOC has behaved in ways that made sense to him--were rational, in a word--based on his understanding of the way the world works, and that he continues to behave rationally after the UDIS or DOC experience, based on his revised understanding of the way the world works.

To support this explanation of the suppression effect, it is not necessary that the assumption of rational behavior hold true for all delinquents nor for all of the acts of any one delinquent; just for most of the boys most of the time. UDIS and DOC did not stop delinquent behavior; they reduced it.

Still, the explanation sounds too simple. The psychologists, sociologists, and economists have all made convincing cases that, whatever the causes of delinquency may be, they are certainly complex. But it is permitted that solutions be simpler than causes, and the causes and solutions of chronic delinquency may be a case in point. If so, the suspicion that simple explanations automatically provoke is in this instance ironic. For we in the adult, straight world assume from the outset that it is in the youngster's self-interest to back off from his delinquent activity. And then when he does, we cannot understand why.

UDIS VERSUS INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Recidivism

The comparative recidivism results presented in Chapter 8 did not provide ammunition for the proponents of either side of the deinstitutionalization debate. Both alternatives produced the suppression effect, but

> *The recidivism analysis did not make a case for the overall superiority of either UDIS or DOC.*

DOC had an edge in reducing the incidence of offenses; UDIS had an edge in reducing the seriousness of the offenses

that continued to be committed. DOC appeared to produce fewer repeat institutionalizations than did UDIS, but the comparison was an extremely complex one.

It seems hazardous to conclude that DOC and UDIS were truly equal in their effectiveness, however, because of the selection biases at work. They were potent ones. First, it must be remembered that

> *33 UDIS "failures," a number equal to 18.6 percent of the members of the UDIS sample who had exited the program, were sent directly from UDIS to DOC and therefore never were part of the recidivism analysis.*

We must ask: How much better would DOC have looked if we had also deleted 18.6 percent of its most troublesome commitments from the sample?

The second source of bias has been discussed at several points throughout the report. Most judges and Probation Officers said they tried to identify the hardcore, dangerous offender and put him in DOC, while sending the more manageable-but-committable offender to UDIS. How accurately did they discriminate on the basis of the many intangible factors that we did not measure?

> *To the extent that these judgments were accurate, DOC started with more intractable delinquents than did UDIS,*

and had to do better just to stay even with UDIS's results.

Taking both of these factors into account, *the possibility that selection biases masked superior effectiveness of institutionalization cannot be discounted.* The sample differences favoring UDIS, particularly the large, unavoidable skew produced by the skim-off effect, could easily have wiped out even quite large differences in favor of DOC.

Costs

The costs of institutionalization have been well-publicized, and a major reason for seeking alternatives.

The tenor of the argument is usually on the lines of "You could send a kid to Harvard for the money it takes to keep him in a training school."*

The cost analysis in Chapter 11 showed that this indeed was a weakness of DOC. But it was also a weakness of UDIS. On a monthly basis, DOC was estimated to be 4.8 percent less expensive than UDIS. Over a typical program cycle, UDIS was 7.0 percent less expensive than DOC, because it held its clients for a shorter time. The conclusion was that

> *There is little basis for choice between UDIS and DOC if the criterion is dollar costs to the taxpayer.*

This finding is not startling in light of other assessments of the costs of community-based versus institutional programs (which have generally reached similar conclusions), but it does contradict intuition: it *must* be more expensive to house, clothe, school, and feed a boy in an institutional facility than it is to provide him with some counseling or vocational training. And so it must, if that were the true nature of the comparison. But the noninstitutional program (UDIS) included expensive residential programs, multiple services, and a low referral/staff ratio. The institutional program (DOC) was similarly impure. A boy who was committed to an Illinois institution on January first and paroled on June thirtieth was "in" DOC for six months during the period of the evaluation, but was (in the typical case) literally *in* an institution--physically on its grounds--for only 64.4 percent of those days. If DOC were to revise policy to eliminate furloughs and increase security, and UDIS were to discard its intensive care and rural placements, then it could be expected that UDIS would be significantly less expensive than DOC. But *the UDIS and the DOC programs that produced the recidivism results described in this study had equivalent dollar costs.* Pure forms of community-based and institutional programs might not.

These results do not necessarily extend to the question of expansion of services. New institutions require major capital expenditures. So also do certain types of UDIS services (intensive care and other residential services); but others, notably advocacy and counseling services, do

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*"If Harvard will take him, fine," was the response of one corrections administrator.

not. Especially if UDIS were to concentrate its resources on Level I services, *it should be assumed that expansion of UDIS would require lower front-end expenditures than expansion of DOC.*

We conducted detailed cost comparisons because dollars have become a central issue in the institutionalization debate. We doubt that they should be, on merit. The true costs of delinquency go far beyond the dollars spent on corrections. Three other comparisons of the costs of the alternative approaches seem to us appreciably more important.

The first is *the cost to the victim.* One of the most inflammatory issues surrounding deinstitutionalization of the chronic delinquent is offenses committed while he is in the program. Institutions have been widely accepted as safe places to keep delinquents; community-based services frequently have not. And institutionalization did in fact prove to have an advantage in this regard, even after counting offenses committed by the DOC sample while on furlough or runaway status:

> *Inprogram arrests of UDIS youth occurred at a rate 7.7 times that of DOC youth.*

We may cite some specific examples. For every eight boys who stayed in UDIS for the typical eight-month period, one was apprehended during that time for an armed or strong-armed robbery. One of every eight was arrested for assault or battery. For every four, one was arrested for burglary. For every 48, one was arrested for homicide. The parallel inprogram rates for the DOC sample were a small fraction of those of UDIS--less than a third the rate of armed and unarmed robberies, a twentieth the rate of assault or battery, a fifth the rate of burglaries. And DOC had no homicides.

The implications of these differences are augmented by a second omission in dollar costs analysis: *the figures on inprogram offenses presumably represent only a fraction of the real level of offensive activity.* Police clear only a small proportion of offenses. If the proportion of apprehensions to offenses is in the range of 10 percent to 20 percent, the implication is that UDIS youth were committing on the order of 15 to 30 offenses per person-year while in the program compared to 2 to 4 for DOC. It is not a trivial difference.

Finally, *the calculation of dollar costs has ignored the interests of the youth.* The enumeration of inprogram offenses omitted the unknown number of assaults and other offenses which might be committed *inside* the institution. More generally, institutions have been assessed for years as being destructive places, even with the best of facilities and staff. In making policy decisions, the subjective weight attached to preventing inprogram offenses must be balanced against an equally subjective weight attached to keeping youngsters out of institutions.

THE UDIS OPERATION

Overview

Chapters 4 through 7 described the UDIS operation at length. The overall assessment we draw from that material is positive. When the basics are reviewed, UDIS has achieved results that are unusual among service-delivery agencies. First,

> *UDIS does deliver services, with little bureaucracy to cut into the resources.*

To an unusual degree, UDIS budget dollars are converted into interactions with and services for the youth it is supposed to serve; not into conferences, study groups, logistic support, public relations, red tape, or evaluations.

> *The assets of the community are also being tapped by UDIS in much the way that was promised.*

UDIS has established accessibility to a range and number of nongovernmental services that can be of significant utility to other child-serving agencies as well as to the rest of the juvenile justice community.

> *UDIS has managed overall to maintain a high degree of responsiveness and flexibility.*

There have been exceptions, of course, but the rule appears to have been a close interest in its clients and rapid response to individual situations. Again, a comparison with the experience of other service-delivery agencies would probably be to UDIS's advantage.

Finally, UDIS fills a need. It may not be the need that UDIS wanted to fill--the evaluation has by no means demonstrated that UDIS should replace all institutions. But Cook County will continue to have a large population of chronic offenders who do not require the control of an institution but who do require an energetic correctional intervention. *UDIS has proved it can produce marked changes for the better in the subsequent behavior of those youngsters.*

This is not to say that UDIS was a model operation; far from it. But the changes that were indicated in basic organization and management were of the kind for which an evaluation is not required. We will not cite them at length. UDIS ought, for example, to streamline its reporting system (there were too many redundant forms and not enough emphasis on filling out at least one of them fully and accurately). Assessment procedures ought to be changed (and have been, since we made these observations). Data collection procedures for the Northwestern Tracking System ought to incorporate better quality control (again, these have already been changed). Staffings of cases should occur either more often or more thoroughly, to avoid the occasional instances we found of referrals maintained in the program apparently out of inertia, or the even rarer instances of the referral who did not receive any services for a period of time (still again, revisions have already been made). On these and similar topics, our criticisms were of characteristic management problems, not ones of dramatic proportions, which were being addressed on an ongoing basis. We will concentrate instead on a few basic policy conclusions and recommendations, plus a few more speculative observations.

Protecting the Public

UDIS is most vulnerable to criticism on the issue of inprogram offenses. They did occur, many of them were serious, and it must be presumed there were many undetected ones as well. The residents of the affected neighborhoods are paying a price for letting UDIS referrals stay in the community, just as the opponents of deinstitutionalization claim.

If UDIS were producing better recidivism results than DOC, it could be argued that these inprogram offenses were a small front-end price for eventual, large savings in offenses. But that argument cannot be supported. It therefore is hard to argue with a victim of an inprogram offense who asks why

he or she should suffer pain and loss when DOC is available, costs no more than UDIS, and is just as effective in reducing postprogram recidivism. To answer that UDIS is more humane than DOC is awkward. Humane for whom?

Discussion of steps to minimize the price to the public must start from a recognition of UDIS's position:

> *Protection of the public has in practice been a much less visibly important concern of Case Managers than keeping the referral out of DOC*, and understandably so.

UDIS has nearly always assumed a resolutely pro-kid stance when referrals have been arrested. Strenuous efforts to keep a judge from committing a referral to DOC have been routine. UDIS has left it to the judge and the PO to assess whether a boy presents an unacceptable risk to the community. In part, this has been a natural and desirable outgrowth of UDIS's origins as an advocacy-oriented service. From the outset, UDIS saw itself as an agency that would try to do for its clients what middle-class parents do for their children in trouble. And very few children of middle class parents end up in DOC.

We do not recommend that UDIS divest itself of this orientation. But we do conclude that a much stricter policy toward inprogram offenses should be adopted. Bluntly put, UDIS should become less successful in keeping its problem cases out of DOC:

> *Guidelines should be adopted that sharply restrict the eligibility of a youth to remain in UDIS after an inprogram offense.*

Some flexibility is required, but we believe that the guidelines should start from the premise that *any* apprehension for a nontrivial offense jeopardizes the boy's status with UDIS and may easily result in commitment, and that two such offenses will definitely result in commitment to DOC unless the most unusual mitigating circumstances exist.

UDIS is not the preferred source of these guidelines. It would be useful for some other authority--the Juvenile Court is the obvious locus--to take on the onus, so that the Case Manager can legitimately tell a referral that an arrest will mean DOC, without having to be the bad guy, and so that the Case Manager can legitimately continue to play

an advocate's role for the referral. But if the Court does not move to adopt such guidelines, we believe that better UDIS than no one. We reach this conclusion for three reasons.

First, UDIS's past experience indicates that *there is not much to lose.* The analysis of both the recidivism data and the case histories strongly indicated that UDIS was rarely successful in turning around referrals who got a second or third chance after serious inprogram offenses. *A high proportion eventually went to DOC anyway, and almost all of them continued to show up in the police records during and after UDIS*, at much higher rates than the typical UDIS graduate. If it were true that the extra effort and the one-more-chance were resulting in an appreciable number of success stories, we would hesitate to push for what amounts to a policy of giving up sooner. But there were virtually no success stories at all in the cases we examined.

Second, *such a step would enhance one of the factors that apparently actuates the suppression effect: the role of UDIS as the last stop before DOC.* We have already summarized the evidence for the role of deterrence. Given these data, there is reason to hope that a stricter policy would prevent inprogram offenses as well as put a lid on the number that is tolerable.

Third, *we argue the importance of this step out of consideration for the residents of the communities in which the UDIS referrals live.* The residents are not obligated to further the cause of community-based corrections. A referral is in UDIS instead of DOC on sufferance of the community, not because he has an inalienable right to be kept out of an institution.

The need for UDIS to take the lead on this issue is especially acute. It happens that at this point in the dialog on juvenile corrections, the delinquent has many vocal, articulate, highly-placed advocates in policy positions and, contemporaneously, that the communities with the highest delinquency rates tend to be politically unorganized and unheard on the issue. The community needs an advocate.

In addition to adopting a much stricter policy on inprogram offenses--or, more precisely, encouraging the Court to force a stricter policy--UDIS can take steps to better protect the public through its placement strategies. Most of the changes, however, seem to be desirable not only from the public's point of view but from the boys' as well. We turn to them now.

Placement Strategies

The easiest way to protect the neighborhood while a delinquent is in UDIS is to take him out of the neighborhood. At present, UDIS usually waits for the Court to take the initiative in doing so. We recommend a more active role:

> At intake, UDIS should explicitly try to identify high-risk referrals, and *routinely send them to an out-of-town program for the first placement.*

Trying to identify the high-risk referral and successfully identifying him are very different matters. The record on attempts to quantify or otherwise mechanize the prediction process has been dismal. We do not intend to encourage any sort of packaged procedure. But UDIS does have case staff who are experienced in dealing with the high-risk delinquent and sensitive to cues in his record and in his face-to-face behavior. A thorough interview/assessment procedure at intake which explicitly asked the staff to assess risk would (1) probably do better than chance, (2) provide an accumulating record that UDIS could use to improve its ability to identify and deal with high-risk referrals, and (3) serve as a clear reminder to Case Managers that the prevention of inprogram offenses is an important part of their job. And it appears that there is no penalty attached to making mistakes, for the finding about placements that we can report most confidently is that

> *The Level III placement--out-of-town and residential--was more effective for dealing with this sample of delinquents than either the at-home or group home placements.*

This appeared to hold true whether the criterion of effectiveness was recidivism or qualitative improvements in behavior and attitude during the program. In terms of recidivism, *the out-of-town residential placement was associated with markedly superior recidivism results*, in measures of both numbers of offenses and their seriousness. Moreover, these results were achieved among a sample containing a disproportionate number of boys believed to pose a high risk of recidivism. In terms of qualitative effects among the sample of case histories, the out-of-town residential placement was assessed positively by Case Managers approximately twice as frequently as the other levels. It was cited as the most successful placement a boy had received in almost

three-fourths of the cases in which comparisons were drawn among placements in different levels. And in their narrative comments, *Case Managers repeatedly specified significant behavioral and attitudinal changes for the better that they attributed to the Level III placement*, whether it was a wilderness program, the Work Camp, or one of the intensive care programs.*

The convergence of the Case Managers' assessments and the recidivism data point to an obvious conclusion:

> The utility of the least drastic alternative principle was not confirmed by the data. On the contrary, *removing the youth from the community on a short-term basis appeared to have intrinsic value.*

"Short-term" should be emphasized. The wilderness programs usually lasted only a few weeks, and a stay at the Work Camp typically lasted only a few months. Also, "Level III" is not synonymous with secure or otherwise institution-like facilities. Most of them were open facilities or (for some wilderness programs) no facility at all.

The immediate action implication for UDIS is to develop its roster of residential placements and to expand their use. But we also propose more generally that

> *UDIS should systematically explore for innovations that would build on the strengths of the Level III placements.*

The potential for imaginative improvements has scarcely been recognized. A primary example is the integration of the residential program with the followup services that UDIS typically provides. The case histories showed that the boys tended to find their own advocates in out-of-town placements. What are the possibilities for procedures that would permit continuation of established relationships when the boy returns to the community? The case histories also suggested that dramatic changes in behavior and attitude could disappear upon a sudden return to the community. Is

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*For readers who have started with the *Conclusions*, it should be noted that the Work Camp was not nearly as forbidding as its name. See p.

there merit to the notion of planned alternations between the Level III placement and home, as a reintegration mechanism? UDIS could do much to identify and address such questions, without expensive research, simply by systematically reviewing and comparing the case experiences and insights of the staff. The underlying question is: *What was it about the Level III placements that gave them superior results, apparently with few of the destructively negative experiences that tend to be associated with institutionalization?*

The problem area in placements was the group home. The recidivism results were spotty for the Level II placements (which included a relatively small number of foster care placements). The assessments by Case Managers in the case histories were negative for more than 40 percent of the Level II placements, and unambiguously positive for only one out of four. Overall, only one group home out of the many with which UDIS has maintained contracts received predominantly favorable reviews. Perhaps these results were a function of the specific vendors involved. But *the possibility is worth investigating that the group home combines the* dis*advantages of residential placements and of community-based placements* without possessing the advantages of either. We pose the issue as one that needs exploration, not as a firm conclusion. Briefly, the logic behind the argument is as follows.

The general advantages of the residential Level III programs were said to have been some increase in security and, more importantly, a structured environment away from the pressures and temptations of the neighborhood. A group home provides neither of these types of insulation, except insofar as strict rules are enforced. But that exacerbates the *dis*advantage of residential placements--the youngster's resentment at being subject to discipline. As their responses made clear, very few of the boys we interviewed took naturally to the acceptance of authority or the enforcement of rules. The Level III programs typically expected to deal with these resentments *as part of the point of the program.* Many wilderness programs, for example, depend on the existence of initial resentment and lack of trust for much of their eventual impact. In the group home, enforcement of rules created resentment, but with the major complicating factor of its location in the neighborhood. The constraints on the boy became that much more vivid in contrast to pre-UDIS days, and escape from them that much more feasible.

We urge that UDIS reassess its experiences with Level II placements in light of these possibilities. The characteristics of the one highly rated group home--operated by American Youth Hostels--should be examined, of course. But it may be that the answer to the negative observations is not better group homes, but a greater reliance on placements at extremes: either at home in the neighborhood, or removed altogether from both home and neighborhood.

Length of Program

Six months in the program--UDIS's stated though frequently unmet goal--was admittedly short. Among vendors, Case Managers, and Probation Officers alike, the concern that UDIS was prematurely egressing its referrals was endemic. Two separate points need to be made.

If the issue is the substance of the program--the remedial reading course, the apprenticeship in television repair, the family counseling sessions--short-term programming may often have cut off progress and foreclosed meaningful achievement. If the resources had been available, continuation of these services would often have been desirable regardless of the recidivism results.

But if the issue is recidivism, then it is important to note that, within the time variability we examined (predominantly in the three months to one year range),

> *The length of time in the program apparently had no bearing on the degree of reduction in offenses.*

A short program produced results equal to those of a long program, even when the length of time in UDIS was unrelated to the boys assessed "progress" or lack of it. Whatever was causing the suppression effect among the UDIS boys seemed to take hold, if it was ever going to take hold, within the six-month period.

The program implications are not clearcut. *If UDIS wants to maximize impact on delinquency*, then the implication is that UDIS should experiment with arbitrary limits on the amount of time that a referral stays in the program. The shorter the intervention, the more referrals UDIS can take with a given resource base, and presumably the greater the aggregate impact on delinquency.

Specifically, *the impact-maximizing strategy indicated by the findings in this study would combine very short-term programming* (based perhaps on UDIS's earliest goal of a 120-day cycle) *with initial placement in a Level III setting.* The standard sequence during the period would be a month or six weeks in one of the out-of-town programs followed by reintegration into the community with the help of an advocate or counseling service. Exit after a prespecified period of time would be delayed only for exceptional, concrete reasons. We encourage UDIS to experiment with such a strategy.*

From other perspectives, however, *it is limiting to view UDIS exclusively as a delinquency-reduction machine.* Even if these youth were not delinquent, most of them would be in need of the services that UDIS can provide. If a referral is enthusiastically attending his tutoring services, it is manipulative in the extreme to cut him off from them just because the data indicate that the delinquency objectives have probably been met as much as they ever will be. A few extra months, time to try to reintegrate the boy into a normal classroom setting, would seem to be in order. In this context, UDIS would become a locus for providing services to some of Cook County's most disadvantaged youngsters, and length of time in the program would be decided for reasons other than delinquency treatment effects. *The key to filling the latter function without running up unacceptable costs for too few referrals may be reliance on self-selection.* A boy who by his behavior as well as his words clearly *wants* to continue a service should be supported until some kind of reasonable closure is reached. Otherwise, the provision of services would continue to be short-term, assessed predominantly on the basis of delinquency-related criteria.

Bureaucratic Location

During the period of the evaluation, UDIS reported to the Department of Corrections but operated with a great deal of independence. It was bureaucratically autonomous of the Juvenile Court. If UDIS is to retain its effectiveness, we strongly urge that this situation not be changed:

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*It is not our job to make recommendations about institutionalization, but an experimental program of arbitrary parole after 120 days in DOC would nicely complement the UDIS pilot effort. The possibility that DOC could retain its existing suppression effect with a third of its average current term is not at all remote, given the UDIS experience.

UDIS should remain operationally independent of both DOC and the Juvenile Court.

We raise the issue because of the varied proponents of closer links between UDIS and either the Court or DOC.

The principal argument in favor of greater integration with either unit is that UDIS is redundant. Given the same resources, it is argued, the Probation Department Could perform UDIS's functions, and do so more efficiently. From another perspective, it is argued that UDIS should be blended into the Field Services Division of DOC for the same reasons.

Organizationally, integration may have merit. Operationally, our assessment of the evidence is that to locate UDIS within the Court or within Field Services would jeopardize its effectiveness. The reasons are necessarily interpretive, but we believe them to be compelling.

There are two reasons for staying separate from the Court. First, UDIS is correctly seen by most of its referrals as the last stop before DOC. There is evidence from Case Managers, vendors, and the boys themselves that this is an important incentive to do well. *UDIS can much more easily retain the last-stop image in its present bureaucratic location than in Juvenile Court*, where its distinction from ordinary probation would be blurred.

Second, it is equally important that the UDIS Case Manager be able to maintain some daylight between his or her role and that of the Court. *UDIS can more credibly claim to be a fair last chance by remaining separate from the Court.* The UDIS staff does not carry an institutional memory of past interactions that may have soured the youth and the Probation Officer on each other. *A UDIS Case Manager can more easily use the threat of DOC without becoming the enemy.* What the Court does is not within the Case Manager's power to control. By maintaining some separation from the court, *UDIS can more easily resist pressures to accept inappropriate referrals.*

The reasons for staying separate from day-to-day identification with DOC parallel the ones for staying separate from the Court.

First, *it may well be in DOC's interests to remain synonymous with institutionalization.* If it is true that

DOC has the deterrent effect that the data in this study suggest, why dilute it unnecessarily? A related thought is that the situation for the referral also becomes confusing. Now, the difference between "staying in UDIS" and "going to DOC" is clear. We speculate that this has advantages over the distinction between "staying in this part of DOC" and "going to another part of DOC."

Second, we doubt the degree to which DOC could maintain the organizational integrity of UDIS if it were more closely tied to DOC operationally. The pressures to share resources with other DOC missions would be substantial, and the long-range prospect, we believe, would be a UDIS indistinguishable in resources and staff from Field Services as a whole.

This leads to perhaps the most important reason for not integrating UDIS with either the Court or DOC. *Keeping UDIS quasi-independent and bureaucratically simple will help maintain the sense of special mission that is important to an organization with its unusual role.* It is hardly an exaggeration to say that UDIS deals with a set of youngsters who qualify for the program because they have a history of failing everyone else who has ever tried to work with them. A UDIS Case Manager is guaranteed to have an unusually difficult and often discouraging job. *The job does not lend itself to routinization, nor to being categorized as a variation of the Probation Officer's or the Parole Officer's function.*

CORRECTIONAL INTERVENTION AND THE CHRONIC DELINQUENT

Given the results of the evaluation, the question is obvious: Why not resort to UDIS or DOC much earlier? Why wait until a youngster has been arrested 13 times, when we know that intervening sooner produced the same suppression effect? Why wait until the youngster is almost 16 years old when we know that boys who went to UDIS or DOC at 14 or 15 were nearly as responsive? They are salient questions. Without persuasive answers to them, it makes eminently good sense to expand significantly the use of UDIS and DOC.

There are three main lines of objection to so doing: costs, the problem of false-positives, and generalized opposition to intervention. We consider each in turn.

Costs

The first objection is dollar costs, that UDIS and DOC are both too expensive to apply widely. And it is probably true that in the short-term, considering only tax dollar costs, UDIS and DOC are more expensive than doing nothing or relying on probation. But it is also apparently true that *taxpayers buy an important benefit when they pay for correctional interventions: fewer crimes.* Whether the nonquantifiable benefits of fewer crimes are worth the money is an essentially political decision.

But *even if the issue is restricted to dollar costs, it is questionable whether in the long run correctional interventions are more expensive than doing nothing.* If correctional interventions turn even a small percentage of their clients from adult criminal careers--an impact that the data cannot demonstrate but which they certainly make plausible--then the dollar criterion would quickly flip in favor of paying for a few months of correctional intervention now rather than for years of it later.*

In view of the magnitudes of the reductions in incidence associated with UDIS and DOC, and in view of the provocative finding that UDIS and DOC were the *only* interventions that had such effects on this very active set of delinquents, we have reached the conclusion that the validity of economic objections to expanded use of correctional intervention is dubious. Whether the calculation is in eventual dollar costs or immediate human costs, the notion that correctional interventions are too expensive must answer the challenge: too expensive compared to what? *Doing nothing is not a low-cost alternative.*

The False-Positives Problem

Any correctional intervention, no matter when it takes place, expends some of its resources on delinquents who were about to quit committing offenses anyway. The more youngsters are tapped for correctional intervention, the more often the intervention will be "wasted" from a resource allocation point of view, or "unjustly inflicted" on the youth from the point of view of those who see correctional interventions as intrinsically harmful.

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*Collateral benefits--reduced welfare expenditures, for example--are also plausible outcomes, and have tangible dollar implications.

Clearly, *the importance of the false-positive mistakes in selection depends heavily on the degree to which the program has negative side-effects.* In this regard, UDIS has a major advantage over institutionalization. Despite the general level of ignorance on the subject (see below), there is every reason to avoid institutionalization when continued delinquency is not an issue. The literature on juvenile correctional facilities in this country is shot through with histories of abuses. And beyond the question of abuse, it remains intuitively apparent that a correctional institution is an unnatural environment in which to spend adolescence. For these reasons,

> *The greater the likelihood that a youth is a false-positive, the greater the desirability of using UDIS instead of DOC.*

UDIS in many ways provides a low-risk next step for boys who are already thoroughly labeled "delinquent" but who have remained on probation despite new offenses. If more delinquents are to be routed to correctional intervention, we strongly recommend that UDIS be given the first chance, rather than simultaneously increasing intake for both UDIS and DOC.

In this regard, it should also be noted that intervening earlier in the youngster's career would presumably mean that judges would less often be faced with a case that seems to demand immediate incarceration. A policy of nearly universal referral to UDIS before resorting to DOC would be increasingly realistic under such circumstances.

General Opposition to Intervention

A final set of objections lies in general antagonism toward dealing drastically with youngsters. Labeling theory, mentioned earlier, is part of this. But the major source of opposition lies in revulsion toward putting juveniles in institutions.

UDIS is not an institutional program, and therefore escapes much of this objection to expansion. But the issue is still highly relevant, for *it is extremely unlikely that UDIS can be expanded to deal with youth at an earlier point in their delinquency without maintaining or even increasing the current number of commitments to DOC.* Even with its relatively flexible policies, 33 out of the 191

in the UDIS sample were sent to DOC directly or within two weeks of exit, and another 19 had gone to DOC by the end of the observation period. We are recommending a much tighter policy of transfer to DOC than UDIS now employs; even without it, the need for a DOC at roughly its current level should be expected if UDIS were to receive an expanded set of referrals. In weighing the future of UDIS, the question of damage done by institutionalization cannot be dismissed.

The data collected for this study rarely intersected the issue. These limited remarks do seem appropriate.

The obvious observation is that *the data for this study directly contradict one of the most common rhetorical claims about institutionalization*, that it only makes the youngster more likely to commit crimes. Despite being repeated so often that it is taken to be a given, it has been essentially an empirically unsupported assertion. The reductions in incidence observed among the two samples of institutionalized youth (DOC and the Pre-UDIS Baseline) are conspicuously inconsistent with the expectations of the conventional wisdom.

That the conventional wisdom has had so little to justify it points to the other, fundamental observation we wish to make: *Hard data about the effects of institutionalization are remarkably scarce.* There have been many anecdotal studies and very few quantitative ones. Besides being predominantly anecdotal, the available evidence is very much focused on the here-and-now, not on followup data.

This does not mean that the opponents of institutionalization are wrong. Rather, if institutionalization does reduce incidence of post-release offenses by the magnitudes presented in this study and also better protects the public than a program like UDIS, then the estimation of the human costs becomes much more important than it has been in the past. The conventional wisdom has had it that institutionalization for juveniles is intrinsically undesirable *and* expensive *and* does not work. Precision about the degree of undesirability was hardly necessary. If institutionalization does work, and to such a degree that it is no longer seen as excessively expensive, then

> *Dispassionate, technically competent assessments of the harmful effects on youngsters of labeling and of institutionalization are badly needed,*
> to make sound judgments about the

extent to which and the directions in which correctional interventions should be expanded.

A complex, very difficult trade-off of values is associated with the means for dealing with delinquency, and it should no longer be sidestepped as it has so often been, by the recitation of horror stories about institutionalization. Counterbalancing horror stories can be told--no more usefully--about what happens in the street.

There are too many blanks in knowledge and too many choices of values to permit a concluding balance sheet on the pros and cons of expanding the use of UDIS and DOC. The benefits are reasonably clear. The costs are much less so.

We can urge two steps, regardless of expansion: first, *keep UDIS* as an alternative, and, second, keep it part of a sequence *so consistently applied* that a Cook County youngster can count on it: station adjustments for the first few offenses, then probation, then UDIS, then DOC.

How soon each successive step is taken depends on the priorities decided upon by the people who run the law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. But, at least, effective options are available. The reductions in offenses appear to have been real, generalizable, and causally attributable to the fact of correctional intervention through UDIS or DOC. The lesson is that something can after all be done about delinquency; reports of the futility of juvenile corrections have been greatly exaggerated.

The question is whether the price of the remedy is acceptable. Taxpayers must be willing to pay a price in dollars. The juvenile corrections community must be willing to rethink the axioms of minimal intervention.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A:
The Data Collection Instruments

The standardized data collection instruments used for the UDIS evaluation are attached.

Interview Forms

Case Manager Form

Probation Officer Form

Vendor Form I: Basic Program Information

Vendor Form II: Interactions with UDIS

Case History from Case Manager

Case History from Probation Officer

Case History from Vendor

UDIS Youth Interview Form

Archival Data Collection Forms

Coding Sheet for Police Contact Data

Coding Key for Police Contact Data

Personal History Form

CASE MANAGER FORM

Interviewer _____ Date _____

Respondent _____

1. Education

2. Other relevant experience

3. Age _____

4. Joined UDIS [month] [year] Case Manager from [month] [year] to [month] [year]

5. Current caseload _____ Cumulative caseload _____

6. General approach to job – respondent's position relative to tensions between

- **advocacy** ("represent the client") / **diagnosis** ("do what is best for the client")

- **radical non-intervention** ("get the client out of the system as soon as possible") / **treatment** ("change the client's behavior and values")

- **discipline** ("make the client live up to his agreement") / **support** ("the case manager is always on the client's side")

- **monitoring a case** ("be on top of what is happening to the client") / **participating in a case** ("try to take part in the vendor's decisions about how the program is run")

- **aiding the criminal justice system** ("UDIS is trying to work with the system") / **adversary of the criminal justice system** ("UDIS and the rest of the system are fundamentally different")

7. Overall, what are the main discrepancies (if any) between what the respondent is trying to do and the expectations of

- **the kids:**

- **the judges:**

- **the probation officers:**

- **the vendors:**

8. What are the measures you use to assess whether you are doing the job right?

ELEMENTS OF THE PROCESS

9. General characterization of the judges' assignments

10. The last time you **did not** get an appropriate referral

- Approximate number of times this has happened _____

11. The last time you refused an inappropriate referral

- Approximate number of times this has happened _____

12. Kinds of kids that you would generally not want to take

13. Can you predict outcomes when a kid is accepted in UDIS? What are the indicators?

14. Last time the judge made an inappropriate commitment decision about a kid in UDIS

- Approximate number of times this has happened _____

15. The three judges you most and least like to deal with and why

MOST: 1.

2.

3.

LEAST: 1.

2.

3.

DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM FOR THE CLIENT

16. Utility and quality of the assessments

17. Criteria for choosing an assessor

18. Adequacy of overall information about the client

19. Utility and quality of the contracts

CONTACT WITH THE VENDORS

20. Accountability and monitoring of the vendor. What is and what should be

21. Degree of contact with the vendor about the kid. What is and what should be

22. The last time you decided to terminate a kid from a program

23. Relative proportions of reasons for terminations. Poor vendor service delivery versus the need to try something else for that client

24. The best and the worst vendors

	BEST	WORST
• advocacy		
• group home		
• counseling		
• educational		
• residential		

25. Overall assessment of the quality and variety of vendor services

EGRESS DECISIONS

26. What criteria do you use to decide whether a kid should egress from UDIS?

27. Characterization of vendor/UDIS interaction on egress decisions

PROBATION OFFICER FORM

Interviewer _____ Date _____

Respondent _____

1. Education _____

2. Other relevant experience _____

3. Age _____

4. Joined Court _____ (month, year) Field probation officer from _____ (month, year) to _____ (month, year)

5. Current caseload _____ Cumulative caseload (approximate) since 10/74 _____

   Delinquency cases _____ Delinquency cases _____

6. For DELINQUENCY CASES only - since 10/74

RECOMMENDATION	ACTION: DOC	UDIS	OTHER	Total
DOC				
UDIS				
OTHER				
Total				

7. UDIS cases currently active _____

8. General approach to job: respondent's position relative to tensions between

- **advocacy ("represent the client")/diagnosis ("do what is best for the client"):**

- **reduced non-intervention ("get the client out of the system as soon as possible")/ treatment ("change the client's behavior and values"):**

- **accountability/discipline ("make the client live up to his/her agreement")/support ("the probation office is always on the client's side"):**

- **(Perception of UDIS) aiding the criminal justice system ("UDIS is one more part of the system")/ adversary of the criminal justice system ("UDIS and the rest of the system are fundamentally different"):**

9. The PO's contact with the CM. What should be and what is – during referral, placement, egress

10. What are the distinctions between your role and that of the CMs? Ideally and in practice?

ROLE OF UDIS

11. You have recommended [____] kids for UDIS. If UDIS did not exist, how many of these would you have recommended be institutionalized? [____]

12. Of the [____] who have been referred, how many would have been institutionalized at that time? [____]

13. What criteria do you use in deciding whether to recommend referral to UDIS or commitment to DOC?

14. To what extent do you use UDIS as a supplement to probation as compared to an alternative to incarceration?

15. How has UDIS differed from your early expectations of it?

16. Is there anything UDIS does that the court could not do if it had the resources (purchase of service money)?

17. Given the opportunity, how would you change UDIS?

VENDOR FORM I: BASIC PROGRAM INFORMATION

Interviewer: _____ **Date:** _____

Respondent: _____ **Position:** _____

1. AIR ID _____
2. Official name of vendor _____
3. Telephone _____
4. Name of director _____
5. Number of staff Full-time _____ Part time _____
6. Qualifications of staff (note characteristics of education, background, sex, age, focusing on full-time staff)

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

7. Other personnel resources (e.g., volunteers)

_____

_____

8. Organizational structure

9. Current client load Male _____ Female _____ Youngest _____ Oldest _____ Median age _____

Number who are UDIS referrals _____ Cumulative UDIS referrals _____

10. Capacity Males _____ Females _____
11. Constraints (if any) on age, sex, etc.

_____

_____

12. Geographic coverage

_____

_____

13. Program components (describe activities under each):

COUNSELING (individual, group, family) _____

_____

EDUCATIONAL _____

_____

VOCATIONAL (training and employment) _____

_____

RECREATIONAL _____

_____

MEDICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL (in-house or referral) _____

_____

ADVOCACY (e.g., representation of child at court or with police) _____

_____

14. Physical facilities _____

_____

_____

FOR NON-RESIDENTIAL SERVICES ONLY

15. Required contact: Number of times per day or week _____ Nature of contacts _____

_____

16. Number of dropouts _____ Actions usually taken toward dropouts _____

_____

_____

FOR RESIDENTIAL SERVICES ONLY

17. Home visit policy _____

_____

18. Unauthorized absences (current, rate, duration, typical response) _____

_____

19. During the last month, describe numbers, durations, and types of absences, authorized and unauthorized.

_____

_____

_____

_____

20. Current cost of services _____
21. Changes in cost since inception of UDIS _____

_____

22. Funding sources other than UDIS (amounts, proportions) _____

_____

4

VENDOR FORM II: INTERACTIONS WITH UDIS

Interviewer: _____ Date: _____

Respondent: _____ Organization: _____

Position: _____ Phone: _____

AIR ID: _____

NOTE: Obtain critical incidents for all relevant items.

1. Vendor's role during the referral process: _____

2. Ever refused a referral? Number of times ____ Critical incident(s): _____

3. Ever experienced "mistakes" in referrals? Number of times ____ Critical incident(s): _____

4. Nature of contact with UDIS (general description including assessment of adequacy, differences among CM's, comparisons with PO's, monitoring functions, etc.)

5. Critical incident(s) of instance when UDIS vendor interaction **positively** affected the progress of a child:

6. Critical incident(s) of instance when UDIS/vendor interaction, or lack of it, **negatively affected the** progress of a child:

7. Average frequency of contact: _____

   Actual UDIS contacts with respondent **last week** (number and nature): _____

   Actual UDIS contacts with respondent during **the last month** (number only): _____

8. Ever had children terminated from this program? Number: _____
   Critical incidents (if too many to cover all, obtain breakdown of reasons for termination):

9. Ever had children enrolled in this program after termination from another program? Critical incidents (if too many to cover all, obtain statement of conditions leading to choice of this program):

10. Are referrals typically enrolled in other programs simultaneously? (Describe):

11. Vendor's role in egress decisions

12. Ever premature egress decisions? Number of times _____ Critical incident(s) _____

13. Characteristics (whenever "especially suitable" or "generally unsuitable" are checked, provide details below)

	Number	Suitability for this service: Especially suitable	Can take, but no special services	Generally unsuitable
Mentally retarde				
Unusually intelligent				
History of violent behavior				
History of running away				
Very low adult presence in home				
Active gang member				
Unusually withdrawn or immature				
Diagnosable psychological disturbance				

Details

14. Other relevant information (continue on back of form if more space is required)

CASE HISTORY FROM CASE MANAGER

AIR ID: _____

NOTE: Emphasize that we already have had access to background information (police record, placement history, UDIS file material, etc.) We want to focus on what the CM has in his or her head, that is not reflected in the written record.

1. Date of UDIS entrance: ___ ___ ___ Is date correct? ◯ Yes ◯ No Correct date: ___ ___ ___

2. Date of UDIS exit ___ ___ ___ Still active?
   Is that correct? ◯ Yes ◯ No Correct date ___ ___ ___
   Egressed? ◯ Terminated? ◯ Terminated to DOC ◯
   Is that correct? ◯ Yes ◯ No Correction: _____

3. UDIS Placements

PROGRAM	DATE IN	DATE OUT	CORRECTIONS

Any additions? _____

Was youth attending any special educational program (like Alexander Smith) not listed above?
◯ No ◯ Yes (specify) _____

4. Why was the initial program chosen? _____

5. What specific incidents led to changes in program placements? _____

6. What role did the family play during the child's involvement with UDIS?

7. What role did the probation officer play during the child's involvement with UDIS?

8. During the time that he/she was in the program, what changes did you observe in him/her, positive or negative? (Please be as specific as possible)

- **Personality, general attitudes:**
- **Related to school or job:**
- **Contacts with the police and courts:**
- **Relationship with family:**

9. What do you know about the activities of the child, positive or negative, since he left the program?

10. Would you consider UDIS "successful" with this child?

Which of the placements was MOST successful?

Why?

Which of the placements was LEAST successful?

Why?

11. In retrospect, would you do anything differently?

12. Was this person in UDIS too long? ◯ Not long enough? ◯ About the right amount of time? ◯

13. What kind of role did you and UDIS play for this child while he was in the program? (Probe for advocate, disciplinarian, monitor or participant in case, radical non-intervention, treatment?)

14. Additional comments (Probe for whether youth was typical or atypical UDIS client, striking characteristics, background)

CASE HISTORY FROM PROBATION OFFICER

AIR ID ⌊_____⌋

1. Why did you recommend that this youth be referred to UDIS?

2. Do you think that the placement(s) selected by UDIS were appropriate? Why or why not?

3. Were there any events of importance in the subsequent months before egress or termination? Specifically, regarding

- **PO contact with the CM including role in decision-making?**
- **changes in placement?**
- **contacts with the police?**
- **provision of services by the vendor?**
- **observable changes in the child?**

4. What role did the family play during the child's involvement with UDIS?

5. What about subsequent activity of the child, positive or negative?

6. Would you consider UDIS "successful" with this child?

CASE HISTORY FROM VENDOR

4 ID ____

Vendor: _____ Interviewer: _____

Respondent: _____ Date: _____

1. When this youth arrived at your agency, what was the nature of his/her progress in UDIS? What more remained to be done?

2. Please summarize what happened to him/her while in your program with particular emphasis on positive and negative indications.

3. Concerning contact with UDIS in this particular case, were there any instances when you needed their intervention and you received it? Any times when you needed it and did not get it? Did UDIS ever intervene in this case when you wished they had not? (Examples of each)

4. What was your prognosis for this youth when he/she left your program?

5. Were the services received by this youth significantly different in any way from the general program as you described it earlier?

UDIS YOUTH INTERVIEW

AIR ID: /////

INTERVIEWER:_____ DATE:_____

INTRODUCTORY EXPLANATION:

Cover the following points:

- We are talking to about 100 kids who have been in UDIS.
- We are working for the State of Illinois, NOT UDIS, to look at how UDIS is doing and how it can be improved. We want both bad and good comments.
- Everything is confidential.
- Don't answer any questions you don't want to.

1. LET'S START WITH HOW YOU GOT INTO UDIS. THE UDIS RECORDS SAY YOU FIRST WENT THERE IN _____.
IS THAT RIGHT? Yes_____ No_____ (If no) WHEN DID YOU GET INTO UDIS?_____ _____

2. HAD YOU HEARD ABOUT UDIS BEFORE YOU GOT INVOLVED IN IT?

Yes_____ No_____

WHO TOLD YOU ABOUT IT?_____ WHAT DID THEY SAY?

_____

_____

_____

_____

3. WHAT DID THE PEOPLE AT THE COURT TELL YOU ABOUT UDIS?

WHO? _____

_____

_____

_____

4. DID THEY GIVE YOU A CHOICE? Yes_____ No_____

(If no, go to Question 7.)

5. WHAT DO YOU THINK WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IF YOU HAD SAID YOU DIDN'T WANT TO GET INTO UDIS? (Ask if he would have gone to DOC.)

_____

_____

_____

_____

6. WHEN YOU CHOSE UDIS, HOW IMPORTANT WAS IT TO:

	not at all	slightly	some-what	important	extremely important
a. Keep out of DOC	1	2	3	4	5
b. Be able to stay at home	1	2	3	4	5
c. Get away from home	1	2	3	4	5
d. Get services	1	2	3	4	5
e. Other (_____)	1	2	3	4	5

7. WHEN YOU WERE IN COURT, WHAT DID THE JUDGE SAY HE WAS TRYING TO DO WITH YOU?

_____

_____

_____

8. DID HE MENTION ANY OF THESE THINGS?

___a. Place you in a program to provide you with schooling and/or job training
___b. Place you in a program which would make it easier for you to get along in your neighborhood
___c. Keep you off the streets
___d. Punish you
___e. Other (what?) _____
___f. Didn't say anything
___g. Can't remember

9. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING BEST DESCRIBES WHAT THE JUDGE <u>REALLY DID</u> WITH YOU WHEN YOU ENTERED UDIS?

___a. Place you in a program to provide you with schooling and/or job training
___b. Place you in a program which would make it easier for you to get along in your neighborhood
___c. Keep you off the streets
___d. Punish you
___e. Other (what?) _____

10. DO YOU KNOW WHAT A UDIS PERFORMANCE CONTRACT IS? Yes____ No____
(If no, describe this way: The UDIS performance contract is a paper you may have signed when you started in UDIS, along with some other people.)

(If respondent still does not know what a performance contract is, skip to Question 17.)

11. WHY DO YOU THINK YOU HAD TO FILL OUT THE CONTRACT?

_____

_____

_____

_____

12. WHAT WAS IN IT? (Probe for youth's, family's, case manager's <u>specific</u> responsibilities.)

_____

_____

_____

_____

13. WERE YOU INVOLVED IN PLANNING THE CONTRACT? Yes_____ No_____
(if yes)
HOW? _____

_____

_____

_____

14. WAS YOUR FAMILY INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING OF THE CONTRACT?
Yes_____ No_____ (if yes) HOW? WHO IN YOUR FAMILY WAS INVOLVED?

_____

_____

_____

_____

15. DID YOUR CASE MANAGER EVER MENTION THE PERFORMANCE CONTRACT LATER?
Yes_____ No_____ (if yes, get incident)

_____

_____

_____

16. DID YOU LIVE UP TO YOUR SIDE OF THE CONTRACT? (refer back to the specifics in Question 12) Yes_____ No_____ DID UDIS?
Yes_____ No_____ (Get explanation for a "No" answer to either of the above.)

_____

_____

_____

_____

17. WAS THERE A TIME LIMIT FOR BEING IN UDIS? Yes_____ No_____
(if yes) WHAT WAS IT?

_____

_____

_____

18. DO YOU THINK YOU WERE IN UDIS ___TOO LONG, ___NOT LONG ENOUGH, OR ___JUST THE RIGHT AMOUNT OF TIME? WHY?

_____

_____

_____

19. DO YOU KNOW WHAT IT MEANS TO EGRESS FROM UDIS? (If not, note, then explain as "Getting through the program successfully, so you can be released by the court.") _____Yes _____No.

20. DO YOU KNOW WHAT IT MEANS TO BE TERMINATED?_____Yes _____No (If no, explain that terminate means either you or the UDIS staff feels that UDIS is not the right plan for you, so you go back to court.)

21. WERE YOU TOLD WHAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO DO IN ORDER TO EGRESS FROM UDIS? Yes_____ No_____ (If yes, probe for what was said, when, and by whom.)

_____

_____

_____

_____

NOW I WANT YOU TO THINK ABOUT SOME OF THE DIFFERENT PROGRAMS YOU HAVE BEEN IN. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, YOU HAVE BEEN IN: (list of places determined before interview)

1._____
2._____
3._____
4._____
5._____
6._____
7._____
8._____
9._____
10._____
11._____
12._____

(Continue list on other side if necessary.)

22. HAVE I LEFT OUT ANY PROGRAM? Yes_____ No_____ (If yes, obtainnames of missing programs, and note any errors on the list.)

_____

_____

_____

FIRST, I'D LIKE TO HAVE YOU THINK ABOUT 1._____,

2._____, and 3._____

AND TALK ABOUT THE WAY THINGS WERE DONE IN THOSE PLACES.

(Use Response Card A)

	Placement 1	Placement 2	Placement 3
	strongly disagree 1 · disagree 2 · so-so 3 · agree 4 · strongly agree 5 · ? 8	strongly disagree 1 · disagree 2 · so-so 3 · agree 4 · strongly agree 5 · ? 8	strongly disagree 1 · disagree 2 · so-so 3 · agree 4 · strongly agree 5 · ? 8
31. I never liked this program.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
32. I ran away or refused to go to the program. (If yes, get details. If no, skip to question 36.)	Yes No	Yes No	Yes No
33. When I stayed away, people listened to why I was dissatisfied.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
34. When I stayed away, I was punished for doing something wrong.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
35. When I stayed away, people tried to suggest other programs I might be interested in.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
36. The staff makes decisions about you without asking you.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
37. If a kid does well here, the staff tells him so personally.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
38. If a kid does well here, the kids tell him so personally.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
39. If a kid messes up, the staff punishes him.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
40. If a kid messes up, the other kids will punish him.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8

NO TWO PROGRAMS ARE EVER THE SAME. WE ARE INTERESTED IN COMPARING DIFFERENT UDIS PROGRAMS. I AM GOING TO READ YOU SOME STATEMENTS AND I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MUCH YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THEM. (Use Response Card A for this page.)

	Placement 1	Placement 2	Placement 3
	strongly disagree 1 · disagree 2 · so-so 3 · agree 4 · strongly agree 5 · ? 8	strongly disagree 1 · disagree 2 · so-so 3 · agree 4 · strongly agree 5 · ? 8	strongly disagree 1 · disagree 2 · so-so 3 · agree 4 · strongly agree 5 · ? 8
23. I was in the program too long.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
24. I was in the program too briefly. (Make sure to ask for specifics if the answer is "agree" or "strongly agree," and record reasons on bottom of the page.)	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
25. I learned things which will be useful to me for--			
a. getting a job	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
b. dealing with problems	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
c. finishing school	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
26. I had a choice about whether to go into this program.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
27. I was placed here to be punished.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
28. I was placed here to be kept off the streets.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
29. I was placed here to learn skills or get an education.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
30. I was placed here to learn about myself.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8

(If there are no same type placements, skip to Question 49.)

I NOTICE THAT YOU WERE IN _____, _____, AND _____. THEY WERE ALL _____.

45. HOW WERE THEY DIFFERENT? _____

46. WHICH ONE DID YOU LIKE BEST? _____

WHICH ONE DID YOU LIKE LEAST? _____

47. WHY DID YOU LIKE _____ BEST? (Probe for examples.)

48. WHY DID YOU LIKE _____ LEAST?

10

(Use Response Card A)

	Placement 1	Placement 2	Placement 3
	strongly disagree 1 / disagree 2 / so-so 3 / agree 4 / strongly agree 5 / ? 8	strongly disagree 1 / disagree 2 / so-so 3 / agree 4 / strongly agree 5 / ? 8	strongly disagree 1 / disagree 2 / so-so 3 / agree 4 / strongly agree 5 / ? 8
41. People in the program are pretty much split into two different groups, with staff in one and kids in the other.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
42. There are too many kids here who push other kids around.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
43. I feel that I fit in here.	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8

44a. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE AT THESE DIFFERENT PLACES WHICH YOU THINK WE SHOULD KNOW?

b. WHAT DID YOU LIKE BEST ABOUT.....

c. WHAT DID YOU LIKE LEAST ABOUT.....

49. NOW: OF ALL THE PLACEMENTS YOU HAD IN UDIS (list again), WHICH PROGRAM DID YOU LIKE BEST? _____

LEAST? _____

If a program is named which has not already been discussed, ask why he/she liked it best or least. (Probe)

_____

_____

_____

_____

50. WE'RE ALSO INTERESTED IN LEARNING ABOUT ALL THE PEOPLE YOU'VE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH AND WHAT THEY DO. THINK OF THE PERSON YOU THINK IS THE BEST PERSON YOU'VE WORKED WITH IN ANY PROGRAM. WHO IS IT? ALL WE NEED IS A FIRST NAME SO WE CAN KEEP THESE PEOPLE STRAIGHT WHILE WE TALK. _____

51. WHAT PROGRAM? _____
(Probe a little about this; write name at top of column.)

I'M GOING TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS PERSON, YOUR MOST RECENT PROBATION OFFICER AND YOUR CASE MANAGER.

52. WHO IS YOUR MOST RECENT PROBATION OFFICER? _____

53. WHO IS YOUR MOST RECENT CASE MANAGER? _____

(If respondent does not know, ask if it is: _____
Yes _____ No _____

54. DID YOU EVER HAVE ANOTHER CASE MANAGER? Yes _____ No _____

(If yes, ask) WHY DID YOU CHANGE CASE MANAGERS? _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

NOW, I WANT YOU TO THINK ABOUT YOUR PROBATION OFFICER, YOUR UDIS CASE MANAGER, YOUR BEST PROGRAM WORKER AND WHAT THEY DO FOR YOU. (Use Response Card B)

	Probation Officer	Case Manager	Best Program Worker
55. If you had a problem with the police, how much would you want to talk to your....	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
56. If you had a problem with the court, how much would you want to talk to your....	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
57. If you had problems with money, how much would you want to talk to your....	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
58. If you had family or personal problems, how much would you want to talk to your....	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
59. If you were having trouble in school, how much would you want to talk to your....	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
60. Now, how about the influence these people have....	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
61. How much do the police listen to your....	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
62. How much does the school listen to your....	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8	1 2 3 4 5 8
	not at all very little somewhat very much always ?	not at all very little somewhat very much always ?	not at all very little somewhat very much always ?

(Use Response Card C)

	Probation Officer							Case Manager							Best Program Worker						
	not at all	seldom	occasionally	often	always	?		not at all	seldom	occasionally	often	always	?		not at all	seldom	occasionally	often	always	?	
68. How often did _____ go to court when you had to appear in court?	1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8	
69. How often did _____ think ahead and help make plans for you?	1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8	
70. How often did _____ try to find programs/activities which fit what you needed?	1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8	
71. How often does _____ ask you when making decisions about you?	1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8	
72. How much did _____ help (or try to help) you get a job?	1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8	
73. How much was _____ around when you needed him/her?	1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8	
74a. How were these people different?																					
b. What was best about _____?																					
c. What was worst about _____?																					

(Use Response Card B)

	Probation Officer							Case Manager							Best Program Worker						
	not at all	very little	somewhat	very much	always	?		not at all	very little	somewhat	very much	always	?		not at all	very little	somewhat	very much	always	?	
63. How much does your family listen to your....	1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8	
64. How much has _____ helped you in court?	1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8	
65. How much was the judge influenced by _____ in court?	1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8	
66. How much is _____ concerned with keeping kids under control rather than with helping them with their problems?	1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8		1	2	3	4	5	8	
67. How often do you see _____? (Record times per month, week, year, etc.)																					

75. WERE YOU PICKED UP BY THE POLICE WHILE YOU WERE IN UDIS?
Yes_____ No_____ (If no, skip to Question 79)

if during UDIS, ask:

76. DID YOU SHOW THE POLICE YOUR UDIS CARD? Yes_____ No_____
(If yes, ask Question 77; if no, ask Question 78)

77. WHAT HAPPENED WHEN YOU SHOWED IT?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

78. WHY DIDN'T YOU SHOW YOUR CARD?_____

_____

_____

_____

79. WHAT HAPPENED WHEN YOU WERE PICKED UP BY THE POLICE?

_____

_____

_____

_____

80. WHO DID YOU GET IN TOUCH WITH? (Get an example, emphasizing detail about response of the Case Manager, and why the respondent thought this was an example of effective or ineffective response. If the respondent did not call the Case Manager, get details of why, and why the respondent turned to someone else.)

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

NOW WE'RE INTERESTED IN KNOWING IF BEING IN UDIS HAS AN EFFECT ON WHAT HAPPENS TO YOU WHEN YOU GO TO COURT. I'D LIKE YOU TO COMPARE THE WAY THINGS WENT FOR YOU IN COURT BEFORE YOU WERE IN UDIS, WHILE YOU WERE IN UDIS, AND AFTER YOU LEFT UDIS (if applicable).

FIRST, LET'S JUST GO THROUGH SOME QUICK COMPARISONS.

THINK ABOUT THE TIME YOU REMEMBER BEST THAT YOU WERE IN COURT BEFORE YOU WERE IN UDIS, THE TIME YOU REMEMBER BEST WHILE YOU WERE IN UDIS. O.K.?

	Time Before UDIS			While in UDIS		
	Yes	No	?	Yes	No	?
81. Was your probation officer in court?						
82. Was a public defender in court?						
83. Was one of your parents in court?						

(Use Response Card B)

	Time before you were in UDIS						Time while you were in UDIS					
	not at all	slightly	somewhat	very	extremely	?	not at all	slightly	somewhat	very	extremely	?
84. How well was it explained to you what was going on in court?	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
85. How well was your side of the story brought out in court?	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
86. How fair did you think the decision was?	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
	not at all	very little	somewhat	very much	always	?	not at all	very little	somewhat	very much	always	?
87. How much did the judge listen to what you wanted to happen?	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8

FOR DOC AND TERMINATED YOUTHS (If the respondent egressed, skip to Question 91.)

88. DID YOU DECIDE TO TERMINATE? IF NOT, WHY WAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN UDIS TERMINATED? WHO DECIDED TO TERMINATE YOU? (Probe: crime committed, no proper placement.)

89. DID UDIS TRY TO KEEP YOU FROM BEING TERMINATED? (If yes) WHY DID THEY FAIL? WHAT COULD UDIS HAVE DONE TO PREVENT YOUR TERMINATION FROM UDIS?

90. WHAT COULD YOU HAVE DONE TO PREVENT YOUR TERMINATION FROM UDIS?

(Skip to Question 96)

FOR EGRESSED YOUTHS

91. WHEN DID YOU EGRESS?

92. WHO DECIDED THAT IT WAS TIME FOR YOU TO EGRESS? (Probe for roles played by Case Manager, P.O., Agency Worker, youth, family.) WHY?

93. ARE YOU STILL IN ANY OF THE PROGRAMS YOU WERE IN WHEN YOU WERE IN UDIS?

94. DID UDIS HAVE ANYTHING PLANNED FOR YOU FOR THE TIME AFTER YOU EGRESSED? (If yes) WHAT WAS IT?

95. ARE YOU STILL DOING IT?

96a. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN A DOC INSTITUTION? Yes____ No____ (If yes)

WHERE?

b. WHEN?

(If yes) I'D LIKE YOU TO COMPARE YOUR EXPERIENCE IN DOC WITH YOUR EXPERIENCE IN UDIS. (Go to DOC vs. UDIS comparison and explain that he should think of the overall UDIS and DOC experiences.)

(If no, skip to Question 111.)

NEXT, WE WANT TO KNOW HOW THINGS ARE GOING SINCE YOU WENT INTO UDIS. (When appropriate, probe for "What if you had been in DOC instead?" (Get a specific example for each statement about things being better or worse than before.)

111a. LIKE... YOUR FAMILY. HOW ARE YOU GETTING ALONG WITH THEM? WHAT IF YOU HAD BEEN IN DOC INSTEAD?

b. DO YOU GET ALONG BETTER OR WORSE THAN BEFORE?

112a. SCHOOL. ARE YOU ATTENDING? HOW ARE YOU GETTING ALONG?

b. BETTER OR WORSE THAN BEFORE?

(Use Response Card A)

		While in DOC						While in UDIS					
		strongly disagree	disagree	so-so	agree	strongly agree	?	strongly disagree	disagree	so-so	agree	strongly agree	?
97.	I had a choice about what activities to go into.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
98.	I was placed here to be punished.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
99.	I was placed here to be kept off the streets.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
100.	I was placed here to learn skills or to get an education.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
101.	I was placed here to receive counseling and to learn more about myself.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
102.	I wanted to get out of this program.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
103.	If I was dissatisfied with the way things were going, people would listen to me.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
104.	The staff made decisions without consulting me.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
105.	Someone lets you know where you stand and backs it up... a. if you're doing O.K. b. if you're messing up	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
106.	If he wants to, a kid can con the staff pretty easily.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
107.	There are too many kids here who push you around.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
108.	There was at least one staff person who really knew me.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
109.	My family kept up with what was happening to me.	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8
110.	I attended school regularly (includes school at DOC institution)	1	2	3	4	5	8	1	2	3	4	5	8

113a. YOUR FRIENDS. ARE THEY THE SAME PEOPLE AS BEFORE UDIS? _____

b. HAS ANYTHING CHANGED IN THE WAY YOU GET ALONG WITH THEM? _____

114a. A JOB. DO YOU HAVE A JOB? HOW MUCH HAVE YOU LOOKED FOR ONE?

b. ANY DIFFERENCE SINCE GOING INTO UDIS? _____

115a. THE LAW. HAVE YOU STAYED OUT OF TROUBLE WITH THE POLICE SINCE YOU HAVE BEEN IN UDIS? _____

b. ANY DIFFERENCE SINCE GOING INTO UDIS? _____

116. LET'S IMAGINE YOU ARE DECIDING WHO SHOULD GO INTO UDIS. IMAGINE YOU WERE THE JUDGE AND YOU HAD TO SEND SOME KIDS TO UDIS AND SOME TO DOC. WHICH KIDS WOULD YOU SEND TO UDIS AND WHICH WOULD YOU SEND TO DOC? (If appropriate prompt: Are there any kids who should be sent to DOC instead of UDIS? What kinds?)

117. IF YOU WERE YOUR CASE MANAGER AND COULD CHOOSE ANY KIND OF PROGRAM, WHAT PROGRAM WOULD YOU CHOOSE FOR YOURSELF?

118. IF YOU WERE A CASE MANAGER, HOW WOULD YOU DEAL WITH A KID WHO MESSES UP?_____

119. IS THIS DIFFERENT FROM THE WAY YOUR CASE MANAGER ACTED WHEN YOU MESSED UP?_____

120. ONE OF THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT HOW TO RUN UDIS IS WHETHER IT'S BETTER TO DO ANYTHING TO A KID IN TROUBLE, OR BETTER TO LEAVE HIM ALONE. I'M ASKING YOU: IF A KID HAS GOTTEN IN TROUBLE WITH THE POLICE, DOES IT MESS HIM UP EVEN MORE TO GO INTO SOME SORT OF PROBATION OR UDIS? SHOULD YOU LEAVE HIM ALONE AND FIGURE HE WILL GROW OUT OF IT? OR SHOULD YOU TRY TO DO SOMETHING FOR HIM? (Probe about changes this would imply for UDIS, look for targets of opportunity, and close it out.)

121. WHAT ELSE CAN YOU TELL ME ABOUT UDIS? ANY COMMENTS ABOUT THE INTERVIEW?_____

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TALKING WITH ME.

INTERVIEWER REPORT FORM

Interviewer

1. Your name_____

2. Date report form completed __/__/__

3. Your sex.....Male....1
   Female..2

4. Your age.....18 or younger.....1
   19 - 21.....2
   22 - 25.....3
   26 - 29.....4
   30 or older.....5

About the Interview

5. Where was the interview conducted (briefly describe setting)_____

6. Were there other persons (adults or children) present during all or part of the interview with the respondent?
   Yes.....1
   No.....2

(If yes)
7. Who was present during what part of the interview?_____

8. Was the respondent nervous at any time during the interview?
   Yes.....1
   No.....2

(If yes)
9. Please explain when, what issues were being discussed?_____

10. How willing was the client to talk?

Very willing.....1

Somewhat willing.....2

Unwilling.....3

(if unwilling)

11. Why was he unwilling to talk?_____

_____

_____

12. How well did the client understand the questions?

Very well.....1

Somewhat well.....2

Not too well.....3

Not well at all.....4

(if #3 or 4)

13. Please explain and note the specific questions the respondent experienced difficulty with._____

_____

_____

14. What came across to you during the interview which we might miss from reading the responses to the separate questions?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

A

Coder _____ Date _____

CODING SHEET FOR POLICE CONTACT DATA

AIR ID	Police File No.	Victims	Rape	Intimidation	Premises	Cars	Value ($)	Participation	Offense	Disposition	Date Month Yr	Sequence

1/72

CODING POLICE CONTACT DATA

1–4 AIR ID. Pick up four digit number from the roster of names.

5–10 POLICE FILE NO. Pick up six digit number from file cover.

11–14 VICTIMS
- Number of victims who received only minor injuries.
- Number of victims treated by medical personnel and discharged.
- Number of victims hospitalized.
- Number of victims killed.

15–16 RAPE
- Number of victims forced to engage in a sexual act.
- Number of rape victims against whom the offender used a weapon for intimidation.

17–18 INTIMIDATION. **Do NOT score for rape, homicide, attempted homicide, battery, aggravated battery, assault and battery or aggravated assault and battery.**
- Offender used physical or verbal intimidation only.
- Offender used weapon to intimidate victims.

19 PREMISES. Total number of premises forcibly entered by offender during event.

20 CARS. Number of motor vehicles stolen (recovered and undamaged) by offender during event.

21 VALUE ($). Monetary value of total property stolen and/or damaged by offender during event. **Do NOT score cost of motor vehicle if it is recovered and undamaged.**
- 1 = under 10
- 2 = 10–250
- 3 = 251–2000
- 4 = 2001–9000
- 5 = 9001–30,000
- 6 = 30,001–80,000
- 7 = over 80,000

22 PARTICIPATION
- 1 = Only one offender was involved.
- 2 = The record explicitly indicates that the subject was a passive bystander to the offense listed on the arrest or CA records (e.g., was part of a group that assaulted someone, but did not physically participate in the assault).
- 3 = No statement about level of participation.
- 4 = The record explicitly indicates that the subject took part in the offense.

23–24 OFFENSE TYPE. See list opposite.

25 DISPOSITION
- 1 = Adjusted at station (community adjustment).
- 2 = Referred to court.
- 3 = Detained (Juvy Home).

26–28 DATE. Enter month (two columns) and the last digit of the year.

29–30 SEQUENCE. Number events from earliest offense to most recent offense.

NOTE: An attempt is coded the same as an actual offense (e.g., "attempted armed robbery" and "armed robbery" are both entered as 03). The single exception to this rule is for codes 15 and 16, relating to murder.

ROBBERY AND THEFT	01	Unarmed robbery
	02	Strong-arm robbery
	03	Armed robbery
	04	Other robbery
	05	Purse-snatching
	06	Shoplifting
	07	Auto theft
	08	Larceny
	09	Burglary
	10	Other theft
VIOLENCE-RELATED OFFENSES	11	Intimidation or extortion
	12	Assault
	13	Battery (or assault and battery)
	14	Involuntary manslaughter
	15	Attempted murder
	16	Murder (specify type in margin)
	17	Rape
	18	Deviate sexual assault
	19	Deviate sexual conduct
	20	Contributing to sexual delinquency of a minor
	21	Other sex related offenses
	22	Battery with robbery or theft
	23	Sexual assault
	24	Other violent acts against persons
"POSSESSION" OFFENSES	31	Possession of heroin
	32	Possession of marijuana
	33	Possession of other controlled substances
	34	Possession of stolen property or receiver of stolen property
	35	Unlawful possession of a weapon
	36	Other possession offense
CRIMINAL DAMAGE AND TRESPASS	41	Criminal damage to property or land
	42	Criminal trespass to property or land
	43	Criminal trespass to vehicle
	44	Vandalism
	45	Arson
	46	Other damage offense
	47	Other trespass offense
A MULTITUDE OF SINS	51	Disorderly conduct
	52	Loitering
	53	False fire alarm
	54	Gambling
	55	Riding in a stolen car without knowledge
	56	Contributing to delinquency of a minor
	57	Recruiting gang members
	58	Resisting or obstructing peace officers
	59	Unlawful use of a weapon
	60	Violation of parole or probation
	61	Writ or Juvenile Court warrant
	62	Vice
	63	Prostitution
	64	Escapee
STATUS OFFENSE	71	Underage possession or use of alcohol
	72	Incorrigible or ungovernable
	73	Runaway
	74	Truancy
	75	Curfew violation
	76	Driving underage
	77	Other status offense
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS	81	Driving without a license
	82	Moving traffic violation
	83	Other traffic violation
CATCH-ALL	91	Other offense not covered above (specify in margin of coding sheet)

RESTRICTED INFORMATION / FOR UDIS EVALUATION STAFF USE ONLY

F II

A

PERSONAL HISTORY, UDIS AND DOC COMMITMENTS

Person recording: _____ Source: _____ Date: _____ AIR ID: ⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋

N.B. For all categorical variables, 8 = not applicable and 9 = missing data. For all ordinal and interval measures, use NA and MD.

FACE SHEET DATA:

⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ 1. AIR ID

⌊_⌋ 2. Population: 1 = UDIS, 2 = DOC, 3 = probation, 4 = other

⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ 3. File identifier

⌊_⌋ 4. Race: 1 = white, 2 = black, 3 = Hispanic, 4 = Asian, 5 = other

⌊_⌋ 5. Sex: 1 = male, 2 = female

⌊_⌊_⌋⁻⌊_⌊_⌋⁻⌊_⌊_⌋ 6. Birthdate: mo/day/yr

⌊_⌊_⌋ 7. Occupation:

⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ 8. Last school attended:

⌊_⌊_⌋ 9. Last grade attended:

If living with relatives: ⌊_⌋ 10. Living with: 1 = natural mother, 2 = adoptive mother, 3 = step/other, 4 = none

⌊_⌋ 11. Living with: 1 = natural father, 2 = adoptive father, 3 = stepfather, 4 = none

If neither or only one of the above, answer item 12. ⌊_⌋ 12. Living also with: 1 = two or more grandparents, 2 = one grandparent, 3 = some other adult(s) (specify) _____

If not living with relatives, answer item 13: ⌊_⌋ 13. Living in: 1 = foster home, 2 = group home, 3 = shelter care, 4 = residential treatment center, 5 = other ward of state, 6 = other

⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ 14. Address: _____

⌊_⌋ 15. Current employment of youth: 1 = full time, 2 = part time, 3 = unemployed

⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ 16. Court number of appearance when committed:

⌊_⌊_⌋ 17. Disposing judge, appearance when committed: _____

18. List in order: date committed and date of parole, and all subsequent revocations of parole, paroles, and discharge (if applicable)

In		Out		In		Out	
month	year	month	year	month	year	month	year
⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋
⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌊_⌋

⌊_⌊_⌋ 19. Total number of offenses which would be felonies if committed by an adult:

⌊_⌊_⌋ 20. Total number of status offenses and misdemeanors:

21. Offense Record (DOC = this offense shown on DOC face sheet; SOC HIS = this offense shown on the social history or social investigation. Check (✓) if yes.

	DOC	SOC HIS	month/year	offense	disposition	
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(1)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(2)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(3)

21. Continued

	DOC	SOC HIS	month/year	offense	disposition	
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(4)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(5)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(6)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(7)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(8)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(9)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(10)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(11)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(12)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(13)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(14)
⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋ ⌊_⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	⌊_⌋	_____	_____	_____	(15)

attach additional sheets to this questionnaire if more entry space is required

⌊_⌋ 22. Based on the other files I have seen: 1 = this offense record is probably complete, 2 = not sure, 3 = needs further checking

PARENTS AND FAMILY

⌊_⌋ 23. Probation officer for social investigation:

⌊_⌋ 24. Person preparing first social history:

⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌊_⌋ 25. Family file number (give mother's name **IF** no file number is found):

⌊_⌋ 26. If child is living with a male/female adult couple, indicate their marital status: 1 = married to each other, 2 = unmarried to anybody, 3 = married to other people (one or both), 4 = other

⌊_⌋ 27. Natural parents were: 1 = married, 2 = common law, 3 = never lived together, 4 = not known

⌊_⌊_⌋ 28. At time of commitment, legal parents (natural or adoptive): 1 = still together, 2 = one dead, 3 = both dead, 4 = separated, 5 = divorced, 6 = mother alone, father gone before birth, 7 = father permanently abandoned family, 10 = mother permanently abandoned family, 11 = father remarried or living with someone else, 12 = mother remarried or living with someone else, 13 = both remarried or living with someone else, 14 = live together periodically, 15 = father's status unknown, 16 = mother's status unknown

⌊_⌋ 29. During lifetime, child has undergone: 0 = no changes in parent set, 1 = one change in parent set, 2 = two changes in parent set, 3 = more than two changes, 4 = exceptionally chaotic changes in parent set. "Parent" is defined as an adult who has been resident and played the role of a parent for a significant period of time.

⌊_⌋ 30. Relationship with resident adult male playing role of father at time of commitment, or legal father, if none resident: 1 = conspicuously close, warm, 2 = no unusual characteristics noted, 3 = pattern of conflict, 4 = extreme hostility, alienation, 5 = no significant interaction, 6 = other (specify)

⌊_⌋ 31. Relationship with resident adult female playing role of mother at time of commitment, or legal mother if none resident: (use same code as No. 30). Specify other:

⌊_⌋ 32. Above relationships include physical abuse or conflict with: 1 = neither parent, 2 = father, 3 = mother, 4 = both

33. Presence of adults acting as parents: 1 = apparently normal parental presence, 2 = have been known to leave children unattended, 3 = frequently leave children unattended, 4 = are absent from home effectively all of the time

34. Degree of parental control: 1 = no unusual characteristics, 2 = weak control noted, 3 = parents unable to control

35. Resident parents alcoholic or regularly use hard drugs? 1 = no, 2 = one, 3 = both, or the only resident parent

36. Resident parents believed to be engaged in criminal activities? 1 = no, 2 = one, 3 = both, or the only resident parent

37. Number of siblings who had been committed to DOC at time of this youth's commitment, out of total number of siblings

38. **Other problems noted which make continued residence in the family unsuitable: 1 = none noted, 2 = one or both resident parents emotionally unstable, 3 = one or both resident parents physically ill and/or incapacitated, 4 = siblings have had police and/or court contact, 5 = siblings considered to be drug abusers, 6 = mother–prostitute, 7 = other (specify)**

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

39. Resident father's employment: 1 = regularly employed, 2 = sometimes employed, 3 = chronically unemployed, 4 = not in job market, 5 = other

40. Resident father's trade: 1 = professional, 2 = technician, 3 = other non-industrial/non-labor, 4 = skilled industrial or craft, 5 = general industrial, 6 = general labor, 7 = househusband, 10 = no occupation

41. Resident mother's employment (use same code as Number 39)

42. Resident mother's trade (use same code as Number 40, substituting "housewife" for for "househusband" in code 7)

43. Characterization of neighborhood: 1 = affluent, 2 = middle class, 3 = lower middle class, 4 = lower class, or deteriorating lower middle class, 5 = deteriorating lower class (slum) 6 = other (specify)

$ 44. Estimated family income in dollars per month

45. Characterization of condition of home: 1 = above average, 2 = average, 3 = poorly maintained, 4 = nearly uninhabitable

46. Number of persons resident in household / number of rooms

PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOR

47. School attendance: 1 = regular, 2 = some truancy, 3 = chronic truancy, 4 = does not attend, 5 = other (specify)

48. Summary of school performance: 1 = above average, 2 = average, 3 = below average, 4 = failing

49. Behavior at school: 1 = no problems, 2 = sporadic discipline problems, 3 = chronic disciplinary problems, 4 = school has expelled permanently or otherwise taken action to remove student from that school, 5 = other (specify)

50. Learning handicap: 1 = hearing loss, 2 = visual handicap, 3 = gross motor handicap, 4 = speech impediment, 5 = dyslexia, 6 = aphasia, 7 = hyperkinesis, 10 = general diagnosis of LD, 11 = mentally retarded (including EMR), 12 = testing not specified, but no indications of specific handicap, 13 = other (specify)

51. Psychological information: 1 = no unusual psychological characteristics noted, 2 = some minor abnormalities noted, 3 = abnormalities noted which appear to require special treatment, 4 = disabling abnormalities noted which are said to be severe, apparently calling for daily or residential treatment, 5 = testing not specified, but no indications of abnormality, 6 = other (specify) List summary diagnosis, if given, or otherwise clarify

52. EEG data: 1 = EEG given, normal, 2 = EEG given, some abnormality noted, 3 = EEG given, brain dysfunction diagnosed, 4 = EEG not given

53. IQ (verbal, performance, full scale) Exclude Beta

54. 1 = WISC, 2 = WAIS, 3 = Stanford–Binet, 4 = other (specify)

55. Revised Beta

56. Scores

Stanford Achievement	Reading	Arithmetic computation	Battery average	Expected placement

57. Physical characteristics: 1 = normal, 2 = problem abnormalities (specify)

58. Gang membership: 1 = active, 2 = nominal, 3 = suspected, 4 = none

59. Other peer influences: 1 = not noted, 2 = negative influences noted, 3 = negative peer influences noted as primary factor

60. Drug use by youth: 1 = no known use, or minor experimentation, 2 = probably uses alcohol or soft drugs, not judged serious problem, 3 = sporadic or suspected use of hard drugs, 4 = regular use of drugs or heavy use of alcohol, 5 = clinically addicted (specify)

61. Sexual problems: 1 = none noted, 2 = clinical abnormality, non agressive, 3 = aggressive abnormality (specify nature if any problem noted)

62. Background information indicates that: 1 = institutionalization is a last resort, 3 = institutionalization follows failure of more than one other structured approach, 5 = institutionalization is the first structured approach that has been tried

63. Use the space below to record unusual features of the record which might influence the judge's placement decision, not reflected in the instrument items

64. **Youth's experience with U.D.I.S. (FOR D.O.C. CASES ONLY) 1 = none noted, 2 = recommended to U.D.I.S., rejected, 3 = recommended to U.D.I.S., action taken unknown, 4 = U.D.I.S. failure, 5 = recommended to U.D.I.S. while in D.O.C., 6 = other (specify)**

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Appendix C:

Sample Outputs of the Northwestern Tracking System

The Northwestern Tracking System produced a variety of outputs, both on a regular basis in response to special requests. Attached three products that indicate the capabilities of the system: 1) sample pages from a monthly program summary prepared for administrators, members of the Advisory and Planning Board, and program monitors; 2) a sample page from a monthly caseload summary provided for each Case Manager; and, as an example of the graphic uses of the system, 3) maps showing the approximate distance between place of UDIS service.

UNIFIED DELINQUENCY INTERVENTION SERVICES
MONTHLY SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
FEBRUARY, 1977

I. New UDIS Participants (February, 1977)

SEE PAGE

UDIS accepted 20 youths during the month of February, 1977 and placed 16 of them. In addition, one youth accepted into UDIS in a previous month is included in this report.

JURISDICTION

1a. Of these 21, 19 (90%) were admitted to UDIS as simple referrals from the Juvenile Court, and 2 (10%) were referrals from the Department of Corrections.

1b. All 21 (100%) of these youths were from Chicago proper.

1c. The distribution of youths by UDIS area is as follows:

AREA	NORTH	SOUTH	EAST	WEST	DOC
# of youths	6	2	5	6	2
% of youths	29	10	24	29	10

CHARGES B1-B2

2a. 11 (52%) of these 21 youths had been charged with major felonies, 3 (14%) with minor felonies, 3 (14%) with major misdemeanors, 1 (5%) with a minor misdemeanor and 3 (14%) with theft, amount unknown.
8 (38%) were crimes against persons 12 (58%) were crimes against property, with 1 (5%) unknown.

2b. The distribution of number of previous adjudicated delinquency petitions for these youths is as follows:

# of previous petitions	0	1	2-3	4-5	more than 5
# of youths	1	8	10	2	0
% of youths	5	38	48	10	0

RACE

3. 15 (71%) of these youths are Black, 3 (14%) are White and 3 (14%) are Latino.

AGE

4. The age distribution is as follows:

Age	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
# of youths	0	0	1	8	12	0	0
% of youths	0	0	5	38	57	0	0

SEX

5. 19 (90%) of these youths are male and 2 (10%) are female.

PROGRAMS C2

6a. These youths' initial programs are as follows:

American Youth Hostels	2	SCAC	1
CAP	2	The Woodlawn Orgn.	2
Casa Central	2	VOA	1
COGS	2	WACA	1
Darrow Hall	1	YES Foster Care	1
Intensive Care Unit	2		

6b. Current programs include:

Alexander Smith	2	MEDS	1
American Youth Hostels	2	Near North Fam. Cen.	1
CAP	1	SCAC	1
Casa Buena	1	The Woodlawn Orgn.	2
Casa Central	1	VOA	1
COGS	4	WACA	1
Darrow Hall	1	Yes Foster Care	1
Intensive Care Unit	2		

If youths are in more than one program, the programs are all counted, i.e., there are 22 programs among the 17 youths which have been placed so far.

C3

6c. These youths' initial program, by type of program, is as follows:

type	# of youths	% of youths
Advocacy	8	48
Group Home	3	17
Residential Treatment Center	2	12
Rural	1	6
Specialized Foster Care	3	18

UDIS REFERRALS

PAGE 1 of 1

FOR THE PERIOD 2/1/77 to 2/28/77

AGE IN YEARS	RACE	SEX	POLICE DISTRICT	IS THIS CASE DOC. DCFS?	ALREADY ON PROBATION?	NUMBER OF PREVIOUS PETITIONS	MOST SERIOUS CURRENT OFFENSE	UDIS STATUS "ACCEPTED"
17	B	F	22	DOC	PAROLE	1	AGASL	2/5/77
16	B	M	5	DOC	PAROLE	1	CDTP	2/25/77
16	B	M	5	COURT	YES	4	RAPE	2/22/77
15	B	F	3	DOC	P	1	PTHFT	2/4/77
15	B	M	7	C	Y	2	ARAPE	2/14/77
16	B	M	12	C	Y	1	ARRB	2/28/77
16	B	M	7	C	Y	2	BURG	2/18/77
15	B	M	2	C	Y	2	ASLT	2/16/77
16	B	M	3	C	Y	2	BURG	2/18/77
15	B	M	13	C	Y	5	UTHFT	2/3/77
15	F	L	14	C	Y	0	INMSL	2/24/77
16	L	M	13	C	Y	2	ARRB	2/8/77
14	W	M	17	C	Y	2	BURG	2/14/77
16	L	M	13	C	N	1	INMSL	2/10/77
16	B	M	10	C	Y	2	UTHFT	2/10/77
16	W	M	15	C	Y	2	UTHFT	2/16/77
15	B	M	11	C	Y	2	ARRB	2/17/77
16	B	M	4	C	Y	1	BURG	2/2/77
16	B	M	3	C	Y	1	BURG	2/10/77
15	B	M	7	C	Y	1	BURG	2/15/77
16	B	M	10	C	Y	1	POSU	2/9/77
PREVIOUS MONTH:								
15	W	M	14	C	Y	2	CTV	1/25/77

II. Over-all UDIS Participation (Oct. 1974 thru Feb. 1977)

SEE PAGE

UDIS has accepted 663 youths between October 1, 1974 and February 28, 1977.

JURISDICTION

1a. Of these 663 youths, 74 (11%) were admitted to UDIS under DOC jurisdiction, 27 were under DCFS jurisdiction, and the remainder, 562 (85%) were simple referrals from the Juvenile Court.

1b. 550 (83%) of these youths were from Chicago proper, and 113 (17%) were from the Chicago suburbs; 41 from the North, 23 from the West, 40 from the South Suburbs, 5 from other suburbs, 1 out of state, and 2 unknown.

CHARGES A-1 to A-3

2a. 357 (54%) of these youths had been charged with major felonies, 122 (18%) with minor felonies, 106 (16%) with major misdemeanors, and 18 (3%) with minor misdemeanors. 50 (8%) were charged with status offenses and the remaining 10 (1.5%) were miscellaneous charges. 252 (39%) of the charges were crimes against persons, 411 (61%) were crimes against property, 10 (1.5%) were status offenses, and 2 (3%) were others.

2b. The distribution of number of previous adjudicated delinquency petitions for these youths is as follows:

# of previous petitions	0	1	2-3	4-5	more than 5
# of youths	47	222	306	53	35
% of youths	7	34	46	8	5

RACE

3. 439 (66%) of these youths are Black, 154 (23%) are White, 66 (10%) are Latino, 3 (.5%) are American Indian, and 1 (.2%) is other.

AGE

4. The age distribution of these youths is as follows:

AGE	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
# of Youths	6	44	104	211	243	52	3
% of Youths	1	7	16	32	37	8	.5

SEX

5. 613 (92.5%) of these youths are male, and 50 (7.5%) are female.

PLACEMENTS A-4

6A. These Youths' initial programs are as follows:

Afro-American Serv.	2	Midwest Fam. Res. Assn.	2
Alexander Smith Acad.	7	MEDS	2
Allendale	1	Multimedia	3
Alternatives	1	Midwest Success Training	2
Arden Group Home	3	Near North Fam.Center	1
Audy Home	4	Omni House	3
Aunt Martha's	1	Pride	1
Aunts House	1	Pritzker Hospital	1
American Youth Host.	21	Pleasant Valley	29
Beacon House	6	Real Learning	1
Bloom Township	8	Ridgeway Hospital	6
Booth Hospital	1	Riveredge	22
Bridge	1	S.W. Comm. Action	15
Buena House	10	St. James Group Home	3
CAM	1	St. Leonard's Grp. Home	16
Camelot	1	St. Luke's Hospital	2
CAP	45	STEP	1
Casa Central	3	St. Mary's High School.	1
Central Y High School	1	Suburb. Yth. Cntr. G.H.	1
Ch. of Good Shephard	44	Thornton Township	1
Children's Mem. Hosp.	1	The Other Side	5
CAP Trans. Living	2	The Woodlawn Orgn.	43
Chicago Yth. Centers	63	TWO Group Home	7
CYC Foster Care	8	Uncle	1
Depot	7	Underway	9
Darrow Hall	31	Virginia Group Home	8
Drake Group Home	18	VOA	17
Elk Grove Fam. Cns.	1	WACA	41
Englewood Group Home	1	West Town Yth. Services	11
Gateway	1	Work Camp	61
Gordon Group Home	1	YES Family Cns.	4
Home	1	Yth. Enrichment Serv.	2
HOW	2	Yth. Guidance	11
Ill. Soldiers Sailors	1	Yth. Guid. Fam. Cns.	2
Intensive Care Unit	7	Youth-in-Crisis	1
Latino Youth	2		
Lutheran Gen. Hosp.	1		
Maine Township	2	No Placement	7
Marcela Group Home	1	Egress	2
Maryville	1	Terminate	1
McNeal Hospital	2		

6B. Current programs * include:

American Institute	1	Intensive Care Unit	9
Arden Group Home	6	Juanita Hall Fam. Cns.	3
Alexander Smith Acad.	47	Latino Youth	3
Audy Home	9	Lyden Outpost	1
Aunt Martha's	1	Maine Township	2
Automotive Tech	1	MEDS	13
American Youth Host.	11	Multimedia	6
Beacon House	1	Near North Fam. Cns. Cen.	9
Bloom Township	2	Omni	1
Bromdale Group Home	1	Proviso Lyons Council	1
Buena House	3	Pretty Girl	2
Comm. Action Prog.	18	Pride	2
Casa Central	7	Real Learning	1
Christ. Action Min.	1	S.W. Comm. Action	10
Church Good Shepherd	19	St. James Grp. Home	2
CYC	20	Suburban Yth. Cen.	1
CYC Spec. Foster Care	2	The Other Side	3
Darrow Hall	11	The Woodlawn Orgn.	20
Depot	13	Underway	2
Drake Group Home	1	Virginia Group Home	1
Family Counseling	1	VOA Group Home	6
Gateway	2	WACA	25
Home	3	West Town Yth. Service	1
Individual Counsel.	3	Work Camp	2
Industrial Skill Cen.	2	Youth Enrichment Srv.	5

* If youths are in more than one program, all programs are counted.

Youth Enrich.Fam.Cns.	1	Egress	308
Youth Guid. Advocacy	4	DOC	66
Youth Guid. Fam. Cns.	3	Terminated	64
No Placement	7	Died	7

A-7 6c. These youths' initial program, by type of program, is as follows:

TYPE	# of Youths	% of Youths
Advocacy	300	45
Counseling	33	5
Diagnostic	1	.2
Educational	16	2
Specialized Foster Care	12	2
Group Home	105	16
Residential Treatmt. Center	48	7
Rural	129	20
Not A Udis Program	9	1.4
No Initial Program	7	1
Out of UDIS	3	.5

7. Of the 663 youths participating in UDIS:

(a) 71 (11%) have been terminated from UDIS* (including 7 deceased);

(b) 66 (10%) have been committed to DOC;

(c) 308 (47%) have egressed satisfactorily.

(d) 218 (33%) were active in UDIS.

* A youth may be terminated in one of two ways:

(a) The youth may leave the UDIS program on his own due to lack of interest.

(b) UDIS staff may terminate the youth after exhausting all possible resources.




PERSON VS. PROPERTY OFFENSES OF UDIS PARTICIPANT
PSTATUS PPROP
96
72
48
24
0
% CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
% CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
% OTHER CRIMES
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
TIME
NUMBER OF MONTHS SINCE UDIS BEGAN


AVERAGE AGE OF UDIS PARTICIPANTS
XAGE
17.000
16.500
16.000
15.500
15.000
14.500
14.000
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
TIME
NUMBER OF MONTHS SINCE UDIS BEGAN


RACIAL COMPOSITION OF UDIS PARTICIPANTS
96
72
48
24
0
BLACK
WHITE
LATINO & OTHER
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
TIME
NUMBER OF MONTHS SINCE UDIS BEGAN


CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMES COMMITTED
96
72
48
24
0
% MAJOR FELONIES
% MINOR FELONIES
% MISDEMEANORS
% OTHER
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
TIME
NUMBER OF MONTHS SINCE UDIS BEGAN


HOME LOCATION OF UDIS PARTICIPANTS
LSUBURBS
96
72
48
24
0
* CHICAGO
* SUBURBAN
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
TIME
NUMBER OF MONTHS SINCE UDIS BEGAN


PCENT LESS THAN 2 PREVIOUS ADJUDICATED PETITIONS
96
72
48
24
0
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
TIME
NUMBER OF MONTHS SINCE UDIS BEGAN

ADJUDICATION AND DISPOSITION OF COOK COUNTY DELINQUENTS 10/1/73 TO 3/31/77

SOURCES - COOK COUNTY JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS DIVISION AND UDIS